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1 Introduction
1.1 Class voting: the democratic class strnggle
Al~ost without exception, surveys condu~ted in v:rrious Western industrializ~d \
nauons after the Second World Wax established the Importance of people's SOCIal ii
positions - in particular class, religion and ethnicity - in determining party choice. !I
Indeed, in all Western industrialized democracies, class has turned out to be one \~
of the prime determinants of voting behaviour (Rose 1974; Franklin et al. 1992).
In this study we focus on the relationship between class and voting behaviour in
Western industrialized countries over the last decades. A central feature of this
relationship is that people from the lower classes are more likely to vote for left-
wing parties than are people from other classes. These left-wing parties prefer
social change in the direction of greater equality between citizens, for example
with respect to their labour contracts and income, whereas. right-wing parties are
against such changes (Lipset 1960). Thus, through their electoral behaviour,
members of both the lower and the higher classes have the chance to further their
interests. Members of· the lower class will strive for the improvement of their
labour contract and income, sometimes at the expense of the higher classes.
Members of the higher classes will try to preserve the status quo, or even try to
impfl!>ve their own position. Thus, elections can - in terms of Anderson &
Davidson (1943), Lipset (1960) and Korpi (1983) - be regarded as the platform of
"the democratic class struggle". Or, as przeworski and Spraque (1986) suggested,
instead of fighting the class struggle on the barricades with real bricks, during
elections manual class labourers can throw voting ballots as "paper stones" at the
ruling classes.
Although in every Western democracy people in lower class positions vote
more often for left-wing parties than do people from higher class positions, the
strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour has been shown· to
vary across countries. The Scandinavian countries and Britain, for example, have
had relatively high levels of class voting during the past decades, whereas in the
United States and Canada the class/vote relationship has been fairly weak. In
Norway, for example, in 1949, 83 per cent of the manual workers voted for a
left-wing political party, compared with 34 per cent of nonmanual workers
(Sainsbury 1990). The corresponding difference for the United States in 1952 was
much smaller: 48 per cent of the manual workers against 31 per cent of the
nonmanual workers had a left-wing party preference (Abramson et al. 1990).
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In addition, there is evidence of a decline in the levels of class voting in most
countries in the postwar period. The same countries form a telling example. In
Norway, by 1990, the percentage of manual workers voting for a left-wing
political party had dropped to 54 per cent, while the figures for nonmanual
workers had risen to 43 per cent (Sainsbury 1990Y. A similar pattern was true of
the United States where, in 1990, 30 per cent of manual workers had a preference
for a left-wing political party against 31 per cent of nonrnanual workers (Abram-
son et al. 1990). Thus, in both countries the voting behaviour of manual and
nonmanual workers became more similar between the points in time considered.
This study focuses on the relationship between class and voting behaviour in
Western industrialized countries. In doing so, we follow a long line of studies that
have examined this relationship, but we endeavour to improve on these by
addressing more precise questions, applying detailed class measures, employing
advanced methods of data analyses, and analysing data from many countries and
over a long period. The aim of this study is threefold. The first aim is to describe
the levels of class voting in the various Western industrialized countries in the
postwar period. Many scholars have already examined differences in the levels Of
class voting across countries and the declines in the levels of class voting within
countries (Kemp 1978; Andeweg 1982; Korpi 1983; Lipset 1983; Franklin 1985b;
Dalton 1988; Inglehart 1990). However, the descriptive studies that have appeared
so far, do not use current methods of analyses and measurement procedures, nor
are they based on data from many countries and from long periods simultaneous-
ly.
The second aim of this study is to test specific explanations for between-
country and over-time variation in levels of class voting. Various explanations for
differing levels of class voting have been suggested. In this study we focus on
three of the most influential arguments. The first argument suggests that various
social and political characteristics of a· country~opulation, such as individual
income differences and extent of religious heterogeneity, affect the level of class
voting in a country. The second explanation suggests tlJat changes in the voting
--.
behaviour of the manual and/or nonrnanual class, and thus in class-based voting,
lll"e due to the changing composition of these classes, while the third concerns the
effects of intergenerational class mobility in a country on that country's level of
class voting. All three explanations have not so far been tested, using current
research techniques and measurement procedures on a large amount of high
quality data.
The third aim of this study is to test micro-level assumptions that are implicit
in the macro-level explanations discussed above. For example, the explanation
linking differences in class mobility patterns of countries to differences in levels
of class voting in these countries, assumes a relationship between class mobility
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and individual voting behavioUr. In this study we pay specific attention to this
individual-level assumption.
1.2 Review of the literature on stratification and politics
The importance of class-based voting as a topic of investigation, and the rel-
evance of the three aims of the present study, can best be illuminated by review-
ing the literature on the relationship between social stratification and politics.
Such a review will show the progress in this research area, but it will also
identify the areas in which progress still has to be made.
We present the literature on the relationship between social stratification and
politics, by dividing the history of this research area into three generations. These
generations are comparable to those in which the history of comparative intergen-
erational social stratification and mobility research is commonly divided (Feather-
man et al. 1974; Kurz & Muller 1987; Ganzeboom et al. 1991; Ultee 1993). The
three generations can be distinguished by the following criteria: (a) the articula-
tion of research problems (b) the content of major hypotheses (c) measurement
procedures (d) data collection and (e) methods of data analysis. We are aware that
the three generations are not truly separated in time. Nevertheless it remains
informative to review the history of this research area by contemplating these
generations in developmental perspective. Doing this, the progress in measure-
ment procedures and methods of data analysis might seem somewhat more
influential than progress on research problems and hypotheses. This view how-
ever, as will be made clear in the next sections, is mistaken. The developments of
new measurement procedures and methods of analysis have indeed offered
opportunities to answer old substantive questions more adequately and to address
new, more precise questions.
The main contribution to the first generation in this research area was made in
the decades just after the Second World War. This generation can be character-
ized by the attention given to a broad range of research problems concerning the
relationship between class and voting behaviour. The research problems were
addressed by exarniningcross-tabulations based upon a limited number of datasets
and using simple class measures. The second generation started in the 1960s and
had as its main contribution the advancement of individual-level studies. These
were characterized by the analysis of survey data and by the application of linear
regression techniques. The third generation emerged around a decade ago, and can
be seen as dealing with more precise research questions than those formulated in
earlier generations. In addition, its extensive use of detailed and standardized
class measures, large scale comparable datasets from many countries, and non-
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linear research techniques marks this generation out from its predecessors. This
third generation is very promising, but since it is still in its infancy it has yet to
live up to these expectations.
In this section the three generations identified above will be discussed in more
detail. During this discussion, it will become clear that on the topic of stratifica-
tion and politics questions'emerge with respect to at least three related areas.
First, there are the descriptive questions concerning levels of class voting in
Western industrialized countries over the postwar period. Second, questions arise
as to how we can explain between-country and over-time variations in class
voting. Third, there is the challenge of accounting for the effects of class and
intergenerational class mobility on individual voting behaviour. Each of these
areas will be examined in turn.
1.2.1 First generation
Studies on the relationship between social stratification and politics have been
carried out since long before the Second World War. However, most of these
classic studies were based on impressionistic data (Sombatt 1976 [1906]; Sorokin
1959 [1927]) or on aggregated ecological data (Tingsten 1937; Siegfried 1913).
The first research contributions on stratification and politics based on national
representative surveys of the electorate appeared in the United States only after
1950 (Campbell et al. 1960). These were followed by studies based on surveys of
countries in Western-Europe .and other Western industrialized countries (Den Uyl
1951; Valen & Katz 1967; Alford 1963; MacRae 1967; Butler & Stokes 1974).
Such studies were characterized by the fact that they dealt with a large variety of
research problems. In the first place, they tested empirically the claim of earlier
studies that in most countries a relationship existed between people's social
position and their voting behaviour. When it became clear that this claim was
supported, descriptive questions about the strength of this relationship and about
its variation over-time and across countries .were asked. In addition, hypotheses
were suggested concerning the' explanations of over-time and between-country
variation in class voting. In general, however, the formulations were - especially
relative to the hypotheses advanced by the third generation - imprecise. This was
partly due to the state of theorizing at that time, but also to the relatively crude
measurement procedures and the simple methods of data analysis that were used
in this period. The studies from the first generation of survey research on
stratification and politics were characterized by a dependence on cross-tabulations,
and by simple examination of percentages in these tables.
Introduction
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The first generation of research on stratification and politics began by asking
whether a relationship existed between an individual's social and economic
position and his voting behaviour. Consequently, many monographs and articles
published in the 1950s and 1960s on this topic include tables that cross-classify
income, education, or occupation against voting behaviour (Svalastoga 1979;
Lipset & Zetterberg 1956). For all countries examined these studies showed that
people in lower social positions are more likely to vote for left-wing political
parties than people in higher classes.
Since studies were conducted in various countries, it became possible to make
cross-country comparisons of the strengths of links between people's class
position and their voting behaviour. However, making such comparisons of
separate studies of different countries was often problematic. For example, in
some studies personal income was used as a measure of people's social and
economic position, whereas in others education or occupation was used. More-
over, even when researchers used the same type of measure, classifications often
varied from the very detailed to the very crude. Thus, Lipset (1960) in one of the
first studies to display class voting tables integrating data from different countries
(Britain, France and Italy) did not present a single standardized measure of levels
of class voting. Similarly, the international comparative studies by Rose & Urwin
(1969) and by Rose (1974) brought together tables on the;influence of people's
social position in many countries, but without a standardized measure of class
voting.
Alford (1963, 1967) made the first major attempt at a truly comparable cross-
national analysis. He presented data from four Anglo-American countries (Austra-
lia, Britain, Canada, and the United States), while using a measure of people's
social and economic position that was comparable cross-nationally and over-time.
In order to get such a measure he collapsed various occupations or classes into a
dichotomous manuallnonrnanual class distinction. The manual class comprised
semi- and unskilled workers both in industry and in agriculture, while the
nonmanual class included large proprietors, petty bourgeoisie and farmers, and
also professionals, administrators, managers, and routine nonrnanual employees.
Members of the manual and nonrnanual classes were found to differ with respect
to their labour contract, income, and prestige, with nonmanual classes generally in
a better position than the manual. This manual/nonmanual class distinction
became the standard measurement procedure in cross-national or trend studies of
the first generation. All studies showed that people from the manual class were
more likely to vote for left-wing parties than were people from the nonrnanual
class. There seem to have been two reasons why class, and not income or
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education became the prime tool for comparative and over-time research. The first
is that a person's class is a better discriminator of his political interests and his
voting behaviour then any of the other measures. The second reason is that
information about respondent's class is more often comparable than information
on respondent's income or education in the available survey data.
Alford also proposed an index to measure the strength of the relationship
between class and voting behaviour in a country for cross-national and over-time
analyses. Although various alternative measures for the level of class voting in a
country were suggested (see e.g., Campbell et al. 1960), the index proposed by
Alford (1962) became the standard in studies on this topic. The so-called "Alford
index" is obtained by taking for a two by two table cross-classifying class
(manual/nonmanual) by party voted for (left-winglright-wing), the difference
between the percentage of manual workers that voted for left-wing political
parties on the one hand and the percentage of nonmanual workers that voted for
these parties on the other.
Applying this index, Alford investigated the levels of class voting in Australia,
Britain, Canada and the United States (Alford 1963, 1967). After his study, it
took some years before more cross-national studies on the relationship between
class and voting behaviour appeared that use standardized measures of the
strength of that relationship. Indeed, only since the 1970s have researchers
presented comparable data, class schemes, and measures on class voting on a
dozen of countries (Books & Reynolds 1975). Lenski (1970: 362) and Lijphart
(1971: 162) presented data for a considerable number of Western industrialized
countries surveyed around the 1960s. A decade later, Korpi (1983: 35) presented
data showing differences across eighteen countries in the 1970s. Recently, Lane &
t Ersson (1991: 94) corroborated this finding for sixteen countries during the K
I·'.. 1980s. All these first generation studies, showed that substantial differences flbetween countries in their levels of class voting existed in the postwar period, f\Jl~) 'i with the S~andinavian countries and Britain having the highest levels of class
voting, and the United States and Canada the lowest.
In addition to cross-national analyses, first generation studies also examined
trends iI! the levels of class voting within countries. Alford's (1963: 103) pioneer-
ing study examined trends in class voting in four Anglo-American democracies in
the period between 1936 and 1962. Later this study was updated and extended to
other countries and other periods (Abramson et al. 1990; Franklin 1985a, 1985b;
Baker et a!. 1981; Stephens 1981; Sainsbury 1987). Lipset (1983: 505) presented
trend data for four countries in the period 1948-1980 and Inglehart (1990: 260)
updated these data for five countries over the period 1947-1988. In addition, Lane
and Ersson (1991: 94) compared the levels of class voting in the 1950160s with
that in the 1970/80s for eleven countries. In general, these studies provided
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evidence of a downward trend in class voting in all Western democratic countries.
This was true even for the United States, a country with a traditionally low level
of class voting (Abramson et al. 1990).
Explanations of variations in class voting
When the results of the descriptive studies of the ftrst generation indicated that
cross-country differences in levels of class voting existed and that trends
occurred, various explanations of these differences were suggested. We will
discuss two of these explanations.
First of all, variations in the levels of class voting were explained with refer- .
ence to variations in the social and political characteristics of countries. A review
of this literature yields a long list of concrete hypotheses accounting for a
country's level of class voting at a certain point in time. Explanatory factors
include income differences among the inhabitants of a society (Alford 1963), the
religious and ethnic heterogeneity of a society's population (Upset & Rokkan
1967; Lijphart 1979), the mean standard of living of a nation's citizens (Kerr et
al. 1960), the percentage of workers that are members of labour unions (Korpi
1983), and the politization of class issues in a nation (Alford 1963). Explanations
based on social and political characteristics were, however, weakly - that is by
using bivariate analyses - empirically tested in studies of the first generation.
Limits on comparable data available in this ftrst generation, both on class voting
and on the various explanatory variables, did not allow for strong tests. For this
reason, most studies came up with only tentative conclusions.
A second explanation prominent in the ftrst generation for variations in class
voting among countries, invokes effects of varying intergenerational class
mobility patterns. This explanation was already touched upon by Sombart (1976
[1906]) when he maintained that the class struggle in the United States would be
stronger were that country to have the same intergenerational mobility pattern as
Britain or Germany. Upset & Zetterberg (1956), Campbell and his colleagues
(1960), Alford (1963), and Lenski (1966) also examined theeffect of class
mobility. They suggested as a general hypothesis that the more mobility there is
in a society, the lower the level of class voting is. When this hypothesis was
tested, however, the received wisdom in mobility research was that the overall
pattern of class mobility appears to be much the same in the industrial societies
of various Western nations (Upset & Bendix 1959; see also Upset & Zetterberg
1956). On this basis, explanations implying that class-based voting differed in
strength between countries because the mobility patterns differed between these
countries had to be rejected.
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Effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour
The attention given to the effect of a country's mobility pattern on that country's
level of class voting by scholars of the first generation was fed by the results
from analyses at the individual-level. Particular attention was given to the effects
of an individual's class mobility on that individual's voting behaviour (Lipset &
Zetterberg 1956; Valen & Katz 1967; Campbell et al. 1960; Lipset 1960; Lop-
reato 1967; Hazelrigg & Lopreato 1972; Stacey 1966).
In doing so, some first generation scholars compared the voting behaviour of
intergenerationally mobile class members with that of immobile class members
(Andeweg 1982; Herz 1986). This strategy, however, did not offer possibilities to
answer questions on the relative effects of people's origin and destination class on
their voting behaviour (see: De Graaf & Ultee 1990). Other scholars did examine
percentage figures from cross-tabulations of respondents' origin and destination
classes by their voting behaviour. Lipset & Zetterberg (1956: 427-443) analysed
these figures for West Germany, Finland and the United States, while Lipset &
Bendix (1959: 66-72) examined the patterns in Norway and Sweden. In all of
these countries except the United States, upwardly mobile persons tended to be
more leftist than was the case for those who belonged to the middle class since
childhood. Conversely, in the United States, people who had moved upwards
from the blue collar to the middle class turned out to be more conservative than
those belonging to the middle class since birth. These findings for the United
States, and similar findings in other (nonrepresentative) surveys (Lopreato 1967),
provoked a long debate in the literature as to whether the so-called "overconform-
ity" (Thompson 1971a) or "overidentification" hypothesis (Lopreato 1967) was
correct (Thompson 1971a, 1971b; Aberg 1979; Barber 1970). The conclusion of
this debate was that such findings were simply due to peculiarities in the datasets.
In the aftermath of this debate the generally accepted position was that for both
the upwardly and downwardly mobile, political loyalties and i1ttiwdes tend to
change in the directions appropriate to their new status, resulting in political
behaviour that is in between that of their old status and that of their new status
(Barber 1970: 36). The expression "between" is vague. However - as we will
see - scholars of the second and third generations have formulated more precise
hypotheses on the effects of individual class mobility on voting behaviour.
The first generation also produced hypotheses on the so-called "contextual"
effects of intergenerational class mobility. When scholars stated macro-level
hypotheses like "the higher the level of class mobility in a country, the lower the
level of class voting", it was often unclear how that macro-hypothesis was
deduced from micro-level assumptions. The most direct way was to assume a
composition effect. Such an effect presupposes that countries differ in the relative
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number of mobile and immobile class members, and moreover that the mobile
and immobile differ in voting behaviour. In addition, contextual effects of class
mobility were assumed. According to these contextual effects, immobile persons
were held to change their political behaviour because of the mobility they see in
others. Thus, if a stable manual worker in a certain country sees more of his class
members becoming upwardly mobile, and if a stable nonmanual worker sees class
members becoming downwardly mobile, then stable workers will be less likely to
show their typical voting behaviour. Consequently, the level of class voting in
that country will be lower (Lipset 1960; Campbell et al. 1960; Janowitz 1970; see
also: Turner 1992). Although an interesting proposition, this contextual hypothesis
was not tested by empirical research in the first generation.
1.2.2 Second generation
Studies from the second generation of research on social stratification and politics
are characterized by the use of linear regression techniques. These were intro-
duced into the social sciences around 1960 and their main effect was that the
questions asked became more precise. Despite the possibilities of such techniques,
the second generation made only a small contribution to research on the relation-
ship between class and voting behaviour. Instead, political science research during
this period was characterized by a focus on "social-psychological" explanations of
individual voting behaviour, while "sociological" explanations received less
attention. The aim was to increase the amount of variance in voting behaviour
explained by adding variables to the equation, rather than to explain the strength
of the relationship between class and voting behaviour. Furthermore, in social
stratification research generally, questions about the political consequences of
stratification and mobility were given low priority. Nevertheless, where they were
studied, the analyses were more sophisticated than those of the first generation,
and linear regression or path models replaced simple analyses of cross-tabulations.
Descriptions of class voting
The new regression techniques offered a better possibility of analysing the effects
of class, while controlling for the effects of other factors, than tabular analyses.
Most of the relevant second generation studies showed that class - even when
controlling for other factors like religion and education - had a substantial effect
on voting behaviour, in the sense that lower classes were more apt to vote for a
left-wing political party than were higher classes (McAllister & Kelley 1982;
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Franklin 1985a, 1985b). Scholars of this generation also used path models to get
a better insight into the influence of people's origin class and their current class
on their voting behaviour (Knoke 1973; Kelley & McAllister 1985; Van Deth &
Geurts 1989).
However, only a small number of studies in the second generation dealt with
describing differences between countries or trends within countries in levels of
class voting (Kemp 1978). One exception, published in 1992, was the study by
Franklin and his colleagues on electoral change in twenty countries. In this study
linear regression models on voting behaviour (left/right) were estimated for all
countries, including as explanatory variables social characteristics such as class
(manuallnonrnanual), religion and value orientations. However, because the
operationalization of variables was not always comparable between countries, and
since for the different countries different variables were included in the analyses,
no conclusions about cross-country differences in the effects of class on voting
behaviour could be drawn (see: Nieuwbeerta & Ultee 1993). Furthermore, because
for each of the countries only three datasets were analysed (one for the 1960s,
one for the 1970s, and one for the 1980s), conclusions on trends could only be
drawn tentatively.
Explanations of variation in class voting
Curiously, although the second generation paid hardly any attention to the
description of levels of class voting in Western industrialized countries in the
postwar period, they did advance many explanations for trends in these levels.
These explanations differed from those given in the fIrst generation, when
variations in class voting were predominantly deduced from a class perspective
and from interest theories. Researchers working in the second generation followed
the idea that "classes are dying" and suggested that other factors were becoming
important determinants of individual voting behaviour. They claimed that, when
the composition of societies differed with respect to these other factors, this might
explain variation in class voting. An example of such thinking is Inglehart's
theory on value change (Inglehart 1977, 1990; Inglehart & Rabier 1986). Ingle-
hart assumed that due to increasing wealth after the Second World War, more and
more people could be characterized as post-materialist. For post-materialists new
issues, like protection of the environment, rather than the old class issues, would
become important for their voting beha.viour. In addition, the theory assumed that
new cohorts would have more people with a post-materialistic value orientation
than would older cohorts. In this way, a process of generational replacement
could explain a decline in class voting in post-industrial societies. The concept of
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generational replacement is also prominent in other studies (Dalton et al. 1984;
Franklin et al. 1992). These explanations of variations in the levels of class voting
have only been tested indirectly. Few attempts have also been made to directly
test the macro-explanations for differences between countries.
Effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour
The main contribution of the second generation was at the micro-level. In the fIrst
generation it was unclear whether hypotheses on the effects of mobility referred
to the effect of a person's origin class plus the effect of a person's destination
class, or to an effect of mobility per se, net of the effects of origin and destina~
tion class. In the second generation questions were rephrased into specifIc
questions on effects of mobility per se on voting behaviour, and questions on the
relative effects of people's origin and destination class on their voting behaviour.
Furthermore, when examining the effects of class mobility on individual voting
behaviour, studies in the fIrst generation examined percentage fIgures in cross-
tabulations. Doing so, it is diffIcult to detect whether the voting behaviour of the
mobile is closer to that of their destination class than to that of their origin class.
Furthermore, it is diffIcult to examine whether mobility effects per se have an
impact on people's voting behaviour; To be able to investigate this adequately, it
is necessary to distinguish whether, in addition to the additive effects of people's
origin and destination class, there also is a separate interaction effect of upward
or downward mobility. Scholars from the second generation started to utilize
formal models including such interaction effects (Knoke 1973; Jackman 1972a;
Turner 1992). First, formalized models were used that were originally developed
by Duncan to determine the effects of mobility on fertility (Duncan 1966: 91;
Blau and Duncan 1967: 128-40, 361-99). In these models voting behaviour was
the variable to be explained, while origin, destination and a term for interaction
between origin and destination were explanatory variables. The main conclusion
of studies in the second generation was that the voting behaviour of the mobile
and immobile can best be explained by the combined effects of their origin and
destination class. That is, no mobility effect per se is necessary to explain the
voting behaviour of mobile class members.
1.2.3 Third generation
The study of voting behaviour in Britain by Heath and his colleagues in 1985 can
be regarded as the first major contribution to the third generation of research on
12 Introduction
stratification and politics. In general, research of this ongoing third generation
focuses on social stratification and mobility. Researchers recognized the applic-
ability of measurement procedures and analysis techniques common in mobility
research, to questions on the relationship between class and voting behaviour.
Thus, they began to ,employ these tools in research into this area. The use of a
detailed cross-nationally comparable class scheme, the application of (log-)odds-
ratios, and the application of nonlinear techniques characterize studies of the third
generation of research on class and voting behaviour, and distinguish them from
studies in the two earlier generations. As a result, these later studies dealt with
new or more specific questions. Furthermore, they continue to generate better
answers to old research questions. Consequently, the research of the third
generation again covers a wide range, addressing descriptive questions on levels
of class voting, suggesting new explanations, and investigating the effects of class
mobility on individual voting behaviour.
Descriptions of class voting
Studies from the first generation identified substantial differences in class voting
between countries and showed that a significant decline in class voting had
occurred in many countries. When examining this between-country and over-time
variation, the Alford index was applied. However, scholars of the third generation
argued that measures of the strength of a relationship between two categorical
variables - like class and voting behaviour - should be independent of variation in
the distributions of these variables. Since variation in Alford indices might be due
to their sensitivity to variation in the general popularity of political parties, third
generation researchers proposed a measUre of class voting unaffected by these
changes (Heath et al. 1985). Specifically, they argued that the focus should not be
on absolute levels of class voting, but on the so-called "relative" class voting,
measured by odds-ratios or by log-odds-ratios (Heath et al. 1985; Thomsen 1987).
These measures have in this context an advantage over other measures - like the
Alford index - in that they measure the strength of the relationship between class
and vote, independent of the general popularity of political parties.
Scholars of the third generation have also claimed that, with respect to mea-
surement procedures, a more detailed internationally comparable class scheme
was preferable to the manual/nonmanual class dichotomy. They have argued that
the manuallnonmanual distinction hides variations in the compositions of the
manual and nonmanual classes, and therefore obscures results when describing the
relationship between class and voting behaviour. To overcome this problem, they
introduced a class scheme - originally used in mobility research - that is compar-
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able cross-nationally and over-time. This scheme was developed by Erikson,
Goldthorpe & Portocarrero (1979), and by Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992). Since
then this so-called "EGP" class scheme has frequently been used, fIrst in mobility
studies, and subsequently in studies on the relationship between class and voting
behaviour (Evans et al. 1991). The advantage of this categorical class scheme
over prestige or status measures of people's social position in a society when
predicting peoples voting behaviour, is that using the latter measures the voting
behaviour of farmers and other self-employed can not well be predicted.
Studies of the third generation of research on stratifIcation and politics, not
only borrowed measurement conventions from mobility research, but also
techniques of data analysis. In mobility research, specifIc log-linear models were
developed to describe patterns of association in a cross-classifying table, and to
test whether differences exist between tables in the .. strength of the associations
(Hauser 1978; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992). These models and the odds-ratios on
which they are based were introduced into research on the class/vote relationship
by Heath et al. (1985). The application of stich techniques is a central characteris-
tic of studies of the third generation.
As suggested, the use of detailed standardized class schemes and techniques
built on log-odds-ratios to describe levels of class voting of countries, is a quite
recent innovation. The frrst studies were done by Heath et al. (1985, 1991),
Weakliem (1989), and Evans et al. (1991), describing trends in class voting in
Britain. The analyses in these studies investigated linear trends in the log-odds-
ratios. In subsequent analyses proportional trends were examined, by using the so-
called "uniform difference" models (Xie 1992; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992). Hout
et al. (1994) used these models to do analyses for the United States, Goldthorpe
(1994) and Heath et al. (1995) for Britain, while Weakliem & Heath (1994b)
applied this technique to an investigation of two extra countries. However, so far
no trend analyses have been done for other countries, and no other cross-national
comparisons have been made on relative levels of class voting.
Explanations of class voting
The main explanation of variations in class voting that has typically been
forwarded in studies of the third generation, is one closely connected to the
availability of a detailed class scheme in these studies. Recent research has
suggested that variations in class voting can be explained by variations in the
composition of the classes. The class structures of the countries show significant
differences. In addition, the class structures have changed substantially over the
last decades. It is therefore argued that the explanations for varying class voting
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given by the second generation might be premature. For example, Heath et al.
(1995) and Hout et al. (1994) have claimed that when taking into account detailed
class schemes, and measures of relative class voting, no trends in class voting can
be found for example in Britain or in the United States. Their claim is that
variations in class voting, when measured by manuallnonmanual class distinction
is due to changes in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes. Thus,
variations in class voting detected, when a manmd/nonmap.ual cl"ss distinction has
been applied could (to some extent) be an artefact of that dichotomous class
scheme (Heath et al. 1985; Evans et al. 1991; Hout et al. 1994). That is, the
decline in class voting can be caused by changes in the composition of the
manual and nonmanual class and not by changes in the voting behaviour of the
sub-classes of the manual and nonmanual class. This composition explanation,
however, has not been tested by comparing trends in class voting with the
manuallnonmanual class scheme and trends with a more detailed class scheme so
far. It is therefore worthwhile to test such an el'planation in this study.
Another explanation that figures in studies in the third generation invokes
intergenerational class mobility. When scholars of the first generation tested the
mobility explanation, i.e. the hypothesis that varying mobility patterns across
countries were to some extent responsible for variations in class voting among
these countries, they had to reject this hypothesis because they relied on findings
showing the same patterns of class mobility in industrialized countries. However,
later analyses on the same data (Miller 1960; Jones 1969; Hazelrigg 1974) did
show differences in the mobility patterns of countries. Furthermore, third gener-
ation studies on intergenerational mobility patterns (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992)
showed that substantial differences between countries in their absolute mobility
. patterns existed. It therefore is again worthwhile to address the question: to what
extent are differences in the pattern of mobility responsible for variations in
relative class voting? To date, this question has only tentatively been addressed in
studies of the third generation (De Graaf & Ultee 1987, 1990; De Graaf &
Nieuwbeerta 1995), but third generation methods and measurement procedures
make it possible to investigate it further.
Effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour
The third generation has so far made major contributions to investigations of the
effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour, an area which was
inadequately studied during the second generation. Hope (1971) and Sobel (1981)
revealed that the parametrization of the linear models typically used in the second
generation did not follow the central sociological idea that it is the stable or
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immobile members who define the norms, values and behaviour patterns of a
class (De Graaf & Ultee 1987, 1990; Clifford & Heath 1993: 3). The importance
of taking the various types of immobile persons as the reference had already been
suggested by Sorokin (1959 [1927]: 509-10), who argued that "If we want to
.. know the characteristic attitudes of a farmer, we do not go to a man who has
been a farmer for a few months, but go to a farmer who is a farmer for life".
Even better, we would argue, go to a farmer who has been born and bred a
farmer. Hope (1971) and Sobel (1981) showed that simple additive models
<i0nfuse the effects of people's destinatio.n class with those of mobility per se.
Both carne up with substantively more appropriate parametrizations. Hope's so-
called "diamond model", that was applied by Thornburn (1979) among others in
analyses of the effects of class mobility on voting behaviour, was shown not to be
the appropriate parametrization (Sobel 1981), but Sobel's (1981, 1985) so-called
"diagonal mobility" model (a specific type of non-linear regression model) was.
This diagonal mobility model provided a means of assessing the relative import-
ance of two identically categorized variables (e.g., origin and destination class).
for a dependent variable, as well as an estimate of the effect of any combination
of categories. Using such a technique it became possible to assess whether
mobility per se has consequences above and beyond the additive effects of origins
and destinations, as claimed in a number of early theoretical arguments (e.g.,
Janowitz 1970; Lipset 1960). These models also enabled a distinction to be made
between the effects of upward and downward mobility. For these reasons, it is
now generally recognized that diagonal mobility models are the most appropriate
for analysing the effects of class mobility on voting behaviour (Heath et al. 1991:
99).
De Graaf & Ultee (1987, 1990), analysing data for the Netherlands, were the
first to apply these models to data on mobility and voting behaviour. Since then
other scholars have also used these models. Weakliem (1992), for example,
analysed data from five countries, Clifford & Heath (1993) data from Britain, and
Breen & Whelan (1994) data from Ireland. Studies investigating the effects of
intergenerational class mobility on individual voting behaviour- using the diagonal
. models applied to data from other countries and longer periods, are an obvious
next step in the third generation.
1.3 Research questions in this study
Our review of the literature on stratification and politics has shown that signifi-
cant progress has been made with respect to the precision of research problems,
hypotheses, measurement procedures, data collections and methods of data analy-
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Table 1.1. Characteristics of studies describing variations in class voting
Questions
Class
Measurement
Techniques
Data
Examples of
descriptive
studies
First generation
(...-1 970s)
Are there differences between
countries in absolute class voting?
and:
Are there trends in absolute class
voting within countries?
Manuallnonmanual classes
Crosstabulations
Alford index: percentage
differenc.es
Eyeballing
Limited number of countries, short
period
Alford (1963), Lenski (1970),
Lipset (1983), Korpi (1983)
Second generation
(l960s- ...)
Are there differences between
countries in absolute class voting?
and:
Are there trends in absolute class
voting within countries?
Manualfnonmanual classes,
more detailed class schemes
Crosstabulations,
linear regression
Long term trends in single
countries;
Differences between countries in
single period
Kemp (1978),
Franklin et al. (1992)
sis. However, the review has also shown that some relevant questions remain
understudied, .or have to date only been addressed using inadequate measures,
data, or methods. In this study we aim to improve on the existing literature by
addressing relevant questions and by using up-to-date and appropriate research
designs. The specific research questions that are addressed in the present study
are introduced below.
1.3.1 Descriptions of class voting
Descriptive studies on the relationship between class and voting behaviour have
developed significantly over-time. The main developments in studies of Western
industrialized countries are summarized in Table 1.1. In studies of the first
generation, the descriptive questions addressed focused on levels of absolute class
voting, using simple cross-tabulations predominantly based on manual/nonmanual-
class schemes. Testing whether differences between countries in class voting
existed or whether trends had occurred in the levels of class voting, was limited
to "eyeballing" the obtained measures of class voting for the different countries or
Table 1.1. (Continued)
Third generation
(1980s-...)
Introduction
This study
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Are there differences between coun-
tries in relative class voting? and:
Are there trends in relative class
voting within countries?
Standardized, detailed class
schemes (EGP classes)
(log-)odds-ratios
loglinear models
So far: trends in single countries
Heath et aI. (1985, 1991, 1995),
Goldthorpe (1994), Hout et aI.
(1994), Weakliem & Heath (1994b)
To what extent did the level of relative class voting
differ across countries? and:
To what extent was there a decline in the levels of
relative class voting in these countries?
I. ManuallnonmanuaI classes
2. EGP classes
I. Linear regression, log-odds-ratio
(Thomsen index)
2. Loglinear models, log-odds-ratio
(kappa index, parameters loglinear models)
I. 324 cross-tabulations, from 20 countries,
1945-1990
2. 113 datasets from 16 countries, 1956-1990 .
I. Chapter 3
2. Chapter 6
periods. In the second generation only a few studies dealt with descriptive
questions. Subsequently, developments in methods of data analysis, and new
measurement procedures enabled scholars of the third generation to rephrase the
central research questions. Instead of focusing on the absolute levels of class
voting, they formulated questions on the levels of relative class voting. To
describe relative levels of class voting detailed standardized cross-nationally
comparable class measures were used. In addition, techniques especially designed
to deal with measures of relative class voting (i.e. log-linear methods) were used
to test whether significant between-country differences and over-time variation
existed. Third generation scholars argue that, although differences and trends in
absolute class voting might exist, it is not clear whether differences and trends in
relative class voting exist. Furthermore, they argue that descriptive studies using a
detailed class scheme might yield different results from studies applying a simple
manuallnonmanual class scheme. In their research the hypothesis of no change in
levels of class voting has survived. However, the third generation has resulted in
only a limited number of studies dealing with trends. In fact, the only studies
done (Heath et al. 1995; Hout et al. 1994) focused on trends in Britain, France
and the United States. Thus, so far no studies describing and comparing the
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relative levels of class voting in other countries have been done. The present
study aims to fill this gap by addressing two descriptive research questions about
levels of relative class voting:
To what extent did levels of relative class voting differ across democratic
industrialized countries in the postwar period?, and:
To what extent was there a decline in levels of relative class voting in these
countries over that period?
These questions are addressed in two separate chapters. We first use the tradi"
tional manual/nonmanual class scheme. This enables us to analyse an unprece"
dentedly large set of data from twenty countries over the period 1945-1990.
Subsequently, we address the descriptive questions using a detailed class scheme,
analysing data for sixteen countries over the period 1956-1990. In these analyses
we use log-linear techniques and a detailed class scheme, comparable cross-
nationally and over-time (i.e. the EGP scheme). In this way, the present study
aims to improve on studies of the first and the third generation. In addition, a
comparison of the results of these two chapters gives an indication of the extent
to which class composition effects explain differences in manual/nonmanual class
voting.
1.3.2 Explanations of variations in class voting
Over the three generations many explanations have been suggested for between-
country and over-time. variations in the strength of the relationship between class
and voting behaviour. The main characteristics of these studies are presented in
Table 1.2. In studies of the first generation, the most prominent explanations were
based on variations in the social and political characteristics of countries. How-
ever, to test such explanations first generation scholars could not rely on a large
amount of data that could be compared cross-nationally and over-time (Alford
1963). For second generation studies this problem was less urgent, but even then
tests of suth hypotheses involved only a limited number of countries (Kerr 1990),
or a few points in time (Korpi 1983; Lane & Ersson 1991; Franklin et al. 1992).
Therefore, in studies of the second generation it was only possible to calculate
bivariate correlations. Thus, this presented a challenge for studies of the third
generation. Here many data and appropriate multivariate techniques became
available. Despite this, so far only tentative attempts have been made to test the
various explanations in third generation studies (Evans et a1. 1991; Heath et al.
1991).
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This provides an opportunity to address more comprehensively the following
question in this study:
To what extent can differences across democratic industrialized countries and
changes within these countries in levels of relative class voting be explained by
differences between these countries and changes within these countries in their
social and political characteristics?
When addressing this question, we build on theories and results of studies of the
three generations, but make progress in various ways. First, we directly correlate
country characteristics with levels of class voting, where most earlier studies
predominantly linked these variables on impressionistic data (Alford 1963; Lipset
1960; Franklin et al. 1992). Second, in answering the explanatory questions in
this study we present analyses of data for a considerable number of countries and
over numerous points in time. In this way it goes beyond earlier studies involving
a limited number of countries and few points in time. This allows for multivariate
analyses, and lessens the chance of not accepting hypotheses when in reality these
hypotheses hold. Third, we use measures of relative level of class voting (odds-
ratios) instead of the measures of absolute level of class voting that are character-
istic of the fIrst generation. Fourth, country-level hypotheses are deduced from
theories based on individual voting behaviour. There are two reasons to choose
individual-level theories. First, country-level hypotheses found in the literature
seem to be unconnected, and it seems useful to attempt to incorporate these in a
more general theory. A second reason is that the link between country characteris-
tics and the level of class voting in a country is often seen by researchers as
simple and straightforward. However, a closer look at their arguments reveals that
this is not the case. To derive hypotheses that link country characteristics with a
country's level of class voting, several assumptions have to be made at the
individual level about the relationship between a person's class and his voting
behaviour. Furthermore, various assumptions have to be made that link the micro-
with the macro-leveL
The second explanation dealt with in the present study has been suggested by,
among others, Heath et al. (1991), Hout et aL (1993) and Goldthorpe (1994).
These scholars posit that in industrialized countries declines in the levels of class
voting, when measured by a manuallnonmanual class distinction, can - at least to
some extent - be explained by changes in the composition of these two classes.
During the last decades the class structure has undergone substantial
changes.Among these have been changes in the composition of the manual and
the nonmanual classes. Within the nonrnanual class sizeable changes have occur-
red in the size of its various sub-classes: farmers, large proprietors, petty bour-
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Table 1.2. Characteristics of studies explaining variations in class voting
Questions
Explanationsl
Hypotheses
Questions: on
effects of
mobility on
class voting
Class
Measurement
Techniques
Data
Examples of
explanatory
studies
First generation
(...-1970s)
Does country A, that has a higher
level of class voting than country
B, have a higher or lower score
on country characteristic X than
country B?
1. Social and political
characteristics of countries
3. Mobility explanation
To what extent would the level of
class voting in the USA be differ-
ent from that in Germany, if these
countries had the same mobility
pattern.
Manual/nonmanual classes
Comparing cross-tabulations
Small number of countries and
years
1. Upset & Bendix (1959), Alford
(1963), Upset & Rokkan (1967)
3. Sombart (1976 [1906]), Upset
& Zetterberg (1956),
Alford (1963), Lenski (1966)
Second generation
(l960s-...)
Is there a bivariate correlation
between country chatacteristics
and countries levels of class
voting?
Value orientations
Is there a relationship between the
percentage of intergenerationally
mobile persons in a country and
the level of class voting in a
country?
Manual/nonmanual classes,
more detailed class schemes
Crosstabulations/linear regression
More countries and years
Inglehart (1977, 1990),
Franklin et al. (1992)
geOlsle, service class workers (professionals, administrators and managers), and
routine nonmanual workers. In recent years many countries have seen the service
class grow substantially relative to the other nonmanual sub-classes. In addition,
within the manual class a significant change has occurred in the relative size of
the skilled, and unskilled manual groups and the agricultural labourers. While the
Table 1.2. (Continued)
Third generation
(1980s-.. .)
Introduction
This study
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Is there a correlation between
characteristics of conntries and their
levels of class voting, when
controlling for other country
characteristics?
Macro-micro-macro explanations:
2. composition explanation
3. mobility explanation
To what extent can differences in
class voting between countries be
explained by differences in mobility
patterns between the countries?
Standardized, detailed class
schemes (EGP classes)
Log-linear models /
counterfactual analyses
So far: single countries
2. Heath et aI. (1991),
Evans et aI. (1991)
3. De Graaf & Ultee (1990)
To what extent can differences across countries and
changes within countries in class voting be
explained by variation in these countries'
1. social and political characteristics,
2. class composition, and
3. mobility patterns?
1. Social and political characteristics
2. Class composition explanation
3. Mobility explanation
To what extent can differences in class voting
between countries be explained by differences in
mobility patterns between the countries?
1. Manuallnonmanual classes
2. EGP classes
3. EGP classes
1. Multi-level models
2. Counterfactual analyses / linear regression
3. Counterfactual analyses / non-linear regression
1. Aggregated country dataset:
324 cross-tabulations from 20 countries,
1945-1990
2. Individual dataset:
113 surveys from 16 countries, 1956-1990
3. Individual dataset:
113 surveys from 16 countries, 1956-1990
1. Chapter 4
2. Chapter 5
3. Chapter 9
relative percentage of skilled workers has grown, the percentage of unskilled
workers has diminished. These changes in the composition of the manual and
nonmanual classes may account for declining levels of class voting, as measured
by the manuallnonmanual distinction. For example, members of the service class
tend to be more left-wing than some other nonmanual sub-classes, like the petty
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bourgeoisie and farmers. Consequently, a relative growth of the service class
would cause the nonooual class to become more left-wing, and the level of class
voting in a country to decline. This could happen without any of the sub-classes
changing their political behaviour.
The class composition explanation has been supported by some empirical
evidence. For example, Heath et al. (1991), using the manualfnonmanual class
distinction, have identified a decline in class voting in Britain over the period
1964-1987. Applying a more detailed class scheme, they found only trendless
fluctuation in the level of class voting. Similarly, using a detailed class
categorization, Hout et al. (1994) found no systematic trend in the level of class
voting for the United States in the period 1948-1992.
In this study we first test whether changes in the composition of the classes
offer an explanation for the decline in manualfnonrnanual class voting within a
sizeable number of industrialized countries. We then test whether the class
composition explanation can be extended, by hypothesizing that differences in the
(manuallnonrnanual) class voting across countries can be explained by differences
in the composition of the manual class and the nonrnanual class across these
countries. In this way, the following research question is addressed:
To what extent can differences across democratic industrialized countries and
changes within these countries in levels of relative class voting, when measured
by the manuallnonmanual class distinction, be explained by differences between
these countries and changes within these countries in the composition of the
manual class and nonmanual class?
A third explanation we focus on in this study concerns the macro-level effects
of intergenerational class mobility on class voting. Intergenerational class mobility
occurs when people become members of a class that is different from the class
their parents belonged to. Countries differ substantially in their patterns of
intergenerational class mobility (Erikson & Go1dthorpe 1992). Several scholars
have suggested that differences between countries and developments within
countries in the amount of intergenerational class mobility might help to explain
cross-national and over-time variation in levels of class voting (Campbell & Kahn
1952; Dahrendorf 1959; Alford 1963; Abramson 1972; Lipset 1960; De Graaf &
Ultee 1987). In the first generation such hypotheses were tested by comparing the
percentage of mobile people in countries with the absolute level of class voting in
these countries. In the second generation this macro-level explanation was no
longer part of the research agenda. The techniques and measurement procedures,
and the large amount of high quality data that are available in the third gener-
ation, however, offer a good possibility to test this explanation thoroughly. To
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this end, in our study we answer the following questions:
23
To what extent can differences across democratic industrialized countries in
levels of relative class voting be explained by cross-country differences if!
patterns of intergenerational class mobility?, and:
To what extent can changes over-time in levels of relative class voting within
democratic industrialized countries be explained by changes within these
countries in patterns of intergenerational class mobility?
1.3.3 Effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour
To address the question on the macro-effects of class mobility in a country on
class voting in that country, we pay attention to the effects of interge!1l,:rational
class mobility on individual voting behaviour. The link between class mobility
and class voting is often regarded as a direct one, i.e. the level of intergenera-
tional class mobility is assumed. to influence the level of class voting directly at
the country-level. For example, Alford (1963: 118) hypothesized that the higher
the number of intergenerationally mobile persons in a country, the lower that
country's level of class voting. However, as De Graaf & Ultee (1990) have·
shown, it is by no means straightforward to deduce predictions about the extent to
which a country's level of intergenerational class mobility has an effect on the
level of class voting in that country. Auxiliary assumptions at the individual-level
are required. These individual-level assumptions concern the effects of class
mobility on the voting behaviour of both intergenerationally mobile and immobile
class members.
Research on the effects of mobility on individual voting behaviour has a long
history. As can be seen in Table 1.3, where the main characteristics of three
generations of studies on this topic are summarized, it started by looking at
simple cross-tabulations, cross-classifying the voting behaviour of persons by their
origin and their destination classes. The central question addressed in these
studies was: do intergenerationally stable members vote differently from mobile
class members? The analyses were, typically for the fIrst generation, done on
relatively small datasets. This has the drawback that only a small number of
intergenerationally mobile persons were analysed. A central hypothesis of this
first generation was that - both upwardly and downwardly - mobile class mem-
bers have voting behaviour that fall in between those of their origin and destina-
tion classes. In the second generation of research Oil class and voting behaviour
the questions could be formulated more specifically. The question then was
whether mobile people's voting behaviour is closer to theit origin than to their
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Table 1.3. Characteristics of studies
individual voting behaviour
First generation
(... -1970s)
examining the effects of class mobility on
Second generation
(1960s-...)
Questions
Hypotheses
Class
Measurement
Techniques
Data
Examples of
stndies on
this topic
Do intergenerationally stable
and mobile class members
differ in voting behaviour?
Are there contextnal effects of
class mobility?
Overconformity hypothesis (for
upwardly mobile), "in between"
hypothesis
Manuallnonmanual classes
Examining figures in
cross-tabulations
Limited number of surveys
with limited number of cases
Lipset & Bendix (1959),
Barber (1970), Lopreato
(1967), Lipset (1960),
Janowitz (1970)
What are the (relative) effects of
respondent's class and father's class on
voting behaviour?
Weak economic hypothesis,
Status hypothesis
Manual/nontnanual classes,
more detailed class schemes
Anova I linear regression
Surveys from single countries
Abramson & Books (1971), Knoke
(1973), Thorburn (1979), Turner (1992)
destination class. This question was answered by applying linear regression
techniques. However, as became obvious in the third generation, these techniques
are inappropriate to answer this question. In the third generation adequate models
to deal with such a question began to be developed and applied. These models
enabled the provision of answers to the research question from the second gener-
ation, and also offered the possibility of answering the question of to what extent
the upwardly mobile are relatively closer to their origin class than are the
downwardly mobile, and to what extent older persons are closer to their destina-
tion class than are young mobile. In this study we use the methods of the third
generation to address the following question:
What are the effects of individual intergenerational class mobility on the voting
behaviour of intergenerationally mobile people? .
Table 1.3. (Continued)
Third generation
(1980s-...)
Introduction
This study
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Is the voting behaviour of
mobile persons closer to that of
their destination class than to
that of their origin class?
Status maximization hypothesis,
Weak, and strong economic
hypothesis, Acculturation
hypothesis
Standardized, detailed class
schemes (EGP classes)
Diagonal mobility models
Survey from limited number of
countries
De Graaf & Ultee (1987, 1990)
Clifford & Heath (1993), Weak-
liem (1992), De Graaf et al.
(1995), Breen & Whelan (1994)
I. Is the voting behaviour of mobile persons closer to
that of their destination class than to that of their
origin class?
2. Do stable class members in countries with low rates
of mobility differ in voting behaviour from stable
members in countries with high rates of mobility?
I. Status maximization hypothesis; Weak, and strong
economic hypothesis; Acculturation hypothesis
2. Effects of rates of inflow and outflow mobility
I. EGP classes
2. EGP classes
I. Diagonal mobility models
2. Multi-level modelS
I. 113 surveys from 16 countries, 1956-1990
2. 113 surveys from 16 countries, 1956-1990
I. Chapter 7
2. Chapter 8
However, as already argued in studies of the first generation, it is not only mobile
people who are affected' by class mobility. Those who are immobile, i.e. those
with no change in their class position with respect to that of their parents, can be
expected to be influenced by the extent of class mobility in their environment
(Blau & Duncan 1967: 440; Abramson & Books 1971; Thorburn 1979; De Graaf
& Ultee 1987). It might be that the rates of mobility in a person's social context
have an effect on that person's voting behaviour. For example, it has been
suggested that the more upwardly mobile there are in a society, the less likely the
stable manual class workers are to vote for left-wing political parties. This
hypothesis has been raised several times, especially in the first generation.
However, to test this contextual hypothesis it is necessary to have data from many
"contexts". In early studies, such data were lacking. In this study we investigate
the contextual effects of class mobility on voting behaviour, focusing on the
effects on the voting behaviour of the immobile class members, leaving the
effects on the mobile class members aside. Thus, we address the following re-
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Figure 1.1. Macro-micro-macro link dealt with in this study, and organization of
this study (Numbers of Chapters are given between brackets)
SOCIETAL LEVEL
(4)
Social and political characteristics
(Class structures and mobility patterns)
-------~> Levels of class voting
(3,6)
(5,9)
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
(8) (5,9)
Class position and mobility experience
search question:
(7)
----------7) Voting behaviour
What are the contextual effects of intergenerational class mobility in a country
on the voting behaviour of intergenerationally immobile persons?
It should be noted that this study's prime focus is on the explanation of variation
in levels of class voting. To explain this phenomenon at the country-level, we
have to pay attention to the explanation of individual voting behaviour. We like
to stress that our prime interest is not with the explanations of why people vote as
they do, or with explanations of the variation in individual voting behaviour.
1.4 Organization of this study
Having formulated our research questions, the organization of this~tudy -
summarized in Table 1.4 - is as follows.
After we discuss the data and the operationalizations used in this study to
answer the research questions in Chapter 2, we address the descriptive research
questions in Chapter 3. This chapter describes the extent to which levels of class
voting have differed across democratic industrialized countries during the postwar
period. In addition, it describes the extent to which a decline in the levels of class
voting in these countries has occurred during this period. When describing the
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levels of class voting, classes are distinguished according to the manuallnon-
manual class scheme.
In Chapter 4 we test a first explanation of variation in class voting between
countries and over-time. The chapter addresses the macro-level question of to
what extent differences between democratic industrialized countries and changes
within these countries in levels of manuallnonmanual class voting can be explai-
ned by variation in the social and political characteristics of these countries.
In Chapter 5 we test a second explanation for between-country and over-time
variation in class voting, using the manuallnonmanual class scheme. According to
this explanation variation in the composition of the manual and the nonmanual
class to some extent can be held responsible for variation in manuallnonmanual
class voting.
Subsequently, in Chapter 6 the levels of class voting in democratic industrial-
ized countries in the postwar period are again described, but now applying the
EGP class scheme. The answers to the descriptive questions of this chapter allow
us to revise conclusions on the extent of country differences and changes over the
course of time, drawn when using the manuallnonrnanual class distinction.
The third explanation for between-country and over-time variation in class
voting can be found in variation in the patterns of intergenerational class mobility
in countries. This explanation is tested in Chapter 9. This macro-level explana-
tion, however, presupposes effects of class mobility on the voting behaviour of
individual class members.
Therefore, before the macro-level explanation for variation in class voting with
variation in class mobility is tested, in Chapter 7 we examine the effects of
individual class mobility on the voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile
persons. In addition, in Chapter 8 we investigate the contextual effects of class
mobility on the voting behaviour of immobile class members.
In the last chapter, Chapter 10, we summarize and discuss the findings of this
study, as well as making suggestions for future research.

2 Data and operationalizations
2.1 Scope of analysis
To address the research questions of this study, data from several countries, and
spanning several decades will be analysed. The first basis fOJ the selection of par-
ticular countries and periods stems directly from our research questions. These
questions concern changes within countries in the strength of the relationship
between social class and voting behaviour. Therefore, it is necessary that the
countries in this study can be considered as having been, over a substantial period
of time, basically democratic with regard to the criteria of both political rights -
such as the right to participate in free and competitive electi~ns - and civil
liberties - such as freedom of speech and association (Lijphart 1984: 37). Based
on these criteria, Lijphart (1994: 2) has argued that, of all the countries that were
registered at the United Nations in 1980, twenty seven can be defined as such
durable democratic countries. l
Another, more practical basis for choosing countries to include in this study
concerns the availability of relevant and appropriate data. Initially, we intended
including all twenty seven countries meeting the criteria for democratic govern-
ment postulated by Lijphart. However, for pragmatic reasons we dropped seven of
them - Costa Rica, Iceland, India, Israel, Japan, Malta and New Zealand - because
no sufficient data pertaining to these countries were found. Our final set of twenty
countries included all countries in Western Europe (except Iceland), two countries
from the continent of North-America (Canada and the United States), and
Australia. In Table 2.1 all the countries in the final sample are listed.
Table 2.1 also contains information about the histories of the political situ-
ations in the selected countries. The first column of Table 2.1 gives the first year
in which ministers were accountable to an elected parliament. The second and
third column give respectively the years when the universal adult male and
female franchise were introduced. The figures show that in almost all countries,
parliamentary accountability of ministers began at the end of the nineteenth
century. In some countries this was before the institutionalization of the universal
male franchise. Only in two countries -Denmark and Finland - was the universal
franchise for women institutionalized at the same time as male franchise. In the
other countries it was granted some or many years later.
The period under investigation in this study begins in 1945. This marked not
only the end of the Second World War, but also the begiuning of a long period of
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Table 2.1. Parliamentary responsibility and universal male and female franchise,
and national elections in twenty countries
Parliamentary Male Female Number of Years
Responsibility Franchise Franchise national national
elections elections
1945-90 1945-90
Australia 1892 1901 1902 19 1946-90
Austria 1918 1907 1918 14 1945-90
Belgium 1831 1893 1948 15 1946-87
Britain 1832 1918 1928 13 1945-87
Canada 1867 1917 1918 15 1945-88
Denmark 1901 1901 1915 19 1945-88
Finland ·1917 1906 1906 13 1945-87
France 1875 1848 1944 14 1945-88
Germany 1918 1869 1919 11 1949-87
Greece 1844 1877 1952 7 1974-90
Ireland 1923 1918 1918 14 1948-89
Italy 1919 1912 1946 11 1946-87
Luxembourg 1868 1919 1919 10 1945-89
Netherlands 1848 1917 1919 14 1946-89
Norway 1884 1897 1913 12 1945-89
Portugal 1822 1911 1974 7 1975-87
Spain 1976 1869 1976 5 1977-89
Sweden 1917 1909 1921 14 1948-88
Switzerland 1848 1919 1971 11 1947-87
United States 1789 1870 1920 23 1946-90
Sources: Ultee et al. 1992: 273; Mackie & Rose 1991; Lane et al. 1991: 111; Lijphart 1994:
5-6.
relative undisturbed democracy for most of the countries examined ·here. Further-
more, it is only since 1945 that survey data have become available for most
countries about the relationship between social class, class mobility and voting
behaviour. The decision to take the year 1990 as the end of the period under
analysis, was mainly based on practical considerations. Data after 1990 were only
scarcely available at the time the analyses for this study were being carried out.
However, the entire period from 1945 until 1990 could not be considered for
all twenty countries. Portugal, Greece and Spain. could only be included after
these countries became democratic. Furthermore, not every country could be
included over the total period 1945-1990 in each analysis presented in the next
chapters. The inevitable data restrictions faced when investigating so many coun-
tries and such a long time period, meant that for some countries, some data for all
or a part of the time span were unavailable. Thus, each chapter of this study
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clearly indicates which countries and periods were included in the analyses, and
which were left out.
2.2 Data
In the analyses two kinds of data were employed for the twenty countries under
investigation in the postwar period. To answer the descriptive research questions
on levels of class voting, and to address the explanatory question at the country-
level, aggregated country data about the levels of class voting and several social
and political characteristics of the countries were analysed. To answer the
explanatory questions concerning the effects of varying class compositions and of
varying class mobility patterns on the levels of class voting, individual-level data
were used from national representative surveys of these countries.
Country Data
The aggregated country data includes information about the levels of class voting
as well as on the explanatory factors for each of the twenty Western industrial-
ized countries in each year since the end of the Second World War. These data
were obtained from two sources: tables published in various articles and books,
and tables calculated using data from several national representative surveys
available on tapes (i.e. our individual dataset).
To obtain measures for the level of class voting, we consulted the literature
and data archives for pertinent information about the twenty countries during the
years 1945-1990. If relevant studies had been conducted every year in each
country and the results of these surveys were still available, this would yield
twenty by forty six observations. However, as expected, for a majority of country-
year points we were unable to find information about the level of class voting. In
total for all twenty countries, 324 tables cross-classifying class (manuallnonman-
ual) by party voted for (left-wing/right-wing) were found? In Table 2.2 the
numbers of tables we have for the various countries are given. In Appendix A the
sources of these class voting tables are listed. On the basis of these data, the
levels of class voting are described and explained in Chapters 3 and 4 .of this
study.
To test the explanations of differences between countries and changes within
countries in the levels of class voting, data were collected from various sources
on social and political characteristics of the countries under investigation since
1945. Specifically, data were collected for each year on the following country
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Table 2.2. Number of class voting tables in aggregated country dataset per
country and per period
1945-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 Total Range
Australia 7 3 2 5 17 1946-90
Austria 1 1 3 5 1968-89
Belgium 1 9 10 20 1968-90
Britain 8 4 8 10 30 1945-90
Canada 10 2 1 13 1945-84
Denmark 6 3 10 10 29 1945-90
Finland 1 1 2 1 5 1958-87
France 4 3 8 10 25 1947-90
Germany 3 4 8 10 25 1953-90
Greece 1 9 10 1980-89
Ireland 1 . 7 10 18 1969-90
Italy 1 1 8 10 20 1953-90
Luxembourg 7 10 17 1973-90
Netherlands 1 4 10 10 25 1950-90
Norway 2 2 3 4 11 1949-90
Portugal 5 5 1985-89
Spain 1 5 6 1979-89
Sweden 3 3 3 3 12 1946-88
Switzerland 3 1 4 1972-87
Un. States 5 4 8 10 27 1948-90
Total 51 37 99 137 324 1945-90
characteristics that in earlier studies were assumed to affect class voting and will
be examined in Chapter 4: the standard of living per capita, the income share of
the richest twenty per cent of the population, the percentage of intergenerationally
mobile people, the union density, the level of ethnic-linguistic and religious
heterogeneity, the prominence of Glass as a political issue, and the percentage of
manual workers. Full sources for these predictors are given in Appendix A, as
well as information about the procedures used to deal with missing values.
Individual data
To answer the explanatory questions on the effects of class composition and class
mobility on levels of class voting, individual-level survey data were used. As
listed in Table 2.3, these come from 113 datafiles from sixteen out of the twenty
selected countries. These files are available on tapes. For Greece, Luxembourg,
Portugal, and Spain no useful tape data were found. Extracts were taken from the
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Table 2.3. Number of surveys in individual dataset per country and per period
1956-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 Total Range
Australia 2 2 6 10 1965-90
Austria 1 3 4 1974-89
Belgium 1 1 1975
Britain 3 2 8 13 1964-90
Canada 1 1 1984
Denmark 5 1 6 1971-81
Finland 2 2 1972-75
France 1 1 1978
Germany 2 11 6 19 1969-90
Ireland 2 2 1989-90
Italy 1 1 1 3 1968-85
Netherlands 1 7 7 15 197Q.-90
Norway 1 2 4 7 1965-90
Sweden 1 1 2 1972-90
Switzerland 2 2 1972-90
United States 6 9 10 25 1956-90
Total 16 47 50 113 1956-90
original II3 datafiles and were merged into a single datafIle, titled "International
StratifIcation, Mobility and Politics File". This fIle contains standardized informa-
tion about the relevant variables. More detailed information about this fIle and the
original datasets is given in a codebook of the file (Nieuwbeerta & Ganzeboom
1995) and in Appendix B of this study.
Three criteria governed inclusion of datafIles in this study. First, because the
research questions concern the levels of class voting in countries, data had to
come from surveys based on probability samples of a country's population.
Second, data had to include information about the. relevant variables needed for
addressing the research questions. Thus, social class and voting behaviour of
respondents were needed, in addition to information about class of parents. The
third criterion concerned the quality of the data. As a quality control, we checked
whether the distribution of the voting behaviour variable in our dataset was
comparable to official elections results. Furthermore, we examined whether there
were implausible shifts in the class distribution over-time within each country. Of
the II9 datafIles we started with, six did not meet our criteria and were left out
of the analyses.3 Consequently we were left with II3 datafIles, and - due to the
fact that some surveys were held in the same year in the same country - with 103
different country/year combinations.
To address the research questions on the effects of class mobility on individual
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Table 2.4. Left-wing political parties in twenty countries, 1945-199rf
Australia: Australian Labor Party (0101); Communist Party (0110); Democratic Labor
Party (0121); Queensland Labor Party (0122);
Austria: Socialists (0201); Communist Party (0205); Democratic Progressive Party
(0212);
Belgium: Belgian Socialist Party (0303); Communist Party (0310); Walloon Wor-
kers' Party (0317); Labour Party (0324); Flemish Socialist Party (0330);
Britain: Labour Party (2406); Communist Party (2410); Social Democratic and
Labour Party (2418); Social Democratic Party (2420);
Canada: Communist Party - Labour Progressive Party (0406); New Democratic
Party (0408);
Denmark: Social Democrats (0504); Communist Party (0509); Socialist People's
Party (0516); Left Socialist Party (0518);
Finland: Social Democrats (0601); Finnish People's Democratic Union (0613);
Social Democratic League of Workers and Smallholders (0615); Demo-
cratic Alternative (0622);
France: Socialist Party (0701); Communist Party (0709); Other Extreme left
(0718); Unified Socialist Party (0719); Other Left (0727);
Germany: Social Democrats (0802); Communist Party (0828); Action for Democratic
Progress (0850);.
Greece: Communist Party of Greece (0904); United Democratic Left (0925);
Christian Democracy (0933); Communist Party of Greece (0935); Pan -
Hellenic Socialist Movement (0937); Greek Left (0945);
Ireland: Irish Labour Party (1108); Communists (1109); National Progressive
Democrats (1118); Workers' Party (1119); Socialist Labour Party (1121);
Democratic Socialist Party (1123);
Italy: Socialist Party (1303); Communist Party (1311); Social Democrats (1323);
United Socialist Party (1331); ManifestolParty of Proletarian Unity for
Communism (1332); Proletarian Democracy (1337);
Luxembourg: Social Democratic Party (1502); Communist Party (1507); Social Demo-
cratic Party (1519); Independent Socialists (1521);
Netherlands: Communist Party (1710); Labour Party (1723); Pacifist Socialist Party
(1727); Democratic Socialists '70 (1730);
Norway: Labour Party (1904); Communist Party (1909); Socialist People's Party
(!.2H); ~ ~
Portugal: Communist Party (2002); Socialist Party (2004); Democratic Movement
(2005); Movement of the Socialist Left (2006); Popular Democratic Union
(2007); Revolutionary Socialist Party (2012); Union of the Socialist and
Democratic Left (2013); Socialist Unity Party (2015);
Spain: Socialist Party (2101); Communist Party (2102); Popular Socialist Party
(2132); Spanish Labour Party (2133);
Sweden: Social Democrats (2205); Communist Party (2210);
Switzerland: Social Democrats (2305); Communist Party (2309); Autonomous Socialist
Party (2317);
United States: Democratic Party (2501); Socialist Labor Party (2515); Socialist Party
(2517); Communist Party (2521).
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voting behaviour, it is necessary to have reliable infonnation about respondents'
social classes and parents' social classes. In this respect a difficulty arises as to
how cohabiting or married women are to be assigned to a social class. Most
survey data available to us do not contain information about these women's own
occupational and class positions, since they only comprise information about the
class of the head of household. The apparent assumption is that if women are not
the head of the household, their own occupational or class position is irrelevant
for their voting behaviour. Furthermore, only a limited number of surveys contain
information about the social class of mothers. These restrictions do not allow us
to include women's and mothers' class positions properly in the analyses. In
addition, it is theoretically unclear how the social positions of wives and mothers
should be defined. De Graaf & Heath (1992) have shown that working women
should not be assigned to social classes solely on the basis of their husbands'
occupations or solely on the basis of their own occupation. For women and
mothers, more complex operationalizations are required which take account of the
interactions between husbands' and wives' occupations. To develop such a
complex operationalization, however, would go beyond the aim of this study (see
for a discussion on this topic: Sprensen 1994). Therefore, in this study we restrict
ourselves to the analysis of men and only investigate the effects of fathers' class
position on the voting behaviour of male respondents.
2.3 Operationalizations
Voting behaviour
To measure levels of class-based voting, it would be preferable to have data on
the actual voting behaviour of respondents during specific elections in the
surveys. However, because voting is confidential in democratic countries, we have
to rely on indirect measures of voting behaviour. In the surveys employed in this
study various such indirect measures are used as indicators for respondent's
voting behaviour. In some surveys respondents were asked to name the political
party they would vote for if there were a national election tomorrow. In other
surveys respondents were asked to name the party they voted for at the most
recent national election. In yet others respondents were asked which political
party they preferred or identified with. The limitations introduced by such differ-
ent measures of voting behaviour must be fully appreciated. However, various
analyses using only surveys containing "voting behaviour" measures, and several -
analyses using only surveys containing "political preference" measures, did not
result in significant different outcomes. Thus, we are confident that using these
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different measures of voting behaviour in the analyses does not cause major
problems. Indeed, we know of no study showing that the relationship between
class and political preference is fundamentally different from that between class
and respondents' voting behaviour.
In order to produce a classification of parties voted for that would allow cross-
country comparison, we followed Bartolini & Mair (1990) and Franklin and his
colleagues (1992), and dichotomized the politicai parties into left-wing on one
side and right-wing on the other. This distinction can be seen as the most relevant
distinction between political parties, when investigating class-based voting. To
oversimplify, left-wing parties prefer a change in the direction of greater social
equality, i.e. their policies are in favour of the manual classes, whereas right-wing
parties are against such changes (Lipset 1960), i.e. their policies are in the
interests of nonmanual classes.
In deciding whether a specific party should be included in the left-wing block,
we followed the criteria given by Bartolini & Mair (1990: 42-43): "As far as our
criteria for inclusion are concerned, only two general principles have been
adopted: first, the systematic inclusion of all those socialist parties which are
members of the Socialist International and of all those communist parties which
were once members of the Communist Third International; second, the systematic
exclusion of those recent and wholly new parties which concern themselves
primarily with the "newpolitics" issues, environmentalism, civil rights, feminism, .
and so on, despite the fact that these parties often locate themselves on the
ideological left, and occasionally further on the left than the historic class
parties". Since according to these criteria hardly any left-wing voters would exist
in the United States, for that country·an exception to the criteria Was made, and
the Democratic Party was defined as left-wing party. Table 2.4 presents, for each
country, a list of the political parties which were classified as left-wing in this
study.
To give an impression of the electoral strength of the left-wing parties, Table
2.5 shows the mean percentages of people who voted for these parties at the
national elections according to the official election results. Figures are presented
for each of the twenty selected countries in the periods 1945-1960, 1961-1970,
1971-1980, and 1981-1990. The percentage of left-wing voters is relatively stable
over-time within these countries. Differences across countries are more substan-
tial. In some countries the number of left-wing voters exceeds fifty per cent
(especially in Australia, Norway, Sweden) while in others (Canada, Greece
(before 1967) and Ireland) it represents less than twenty five per cent of the
electorate.
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Table 2.5. Percentage left-wing voters at national elections in twenty countries,
1945-1990
1945-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990
Australia 51 53 47 46
Austria 47 48 52 45
Belgium 40 35 30 30
Britaiu 47 45 39 30
Canada 14 15 18 20
Deumark 46 47 45 46
Finland 48 46 43 39
France 43 40 47 49
Germany 33 40 44 36
Greece 9 14 23 53
Ireland 10 15 14 12
Italy 40 46 51 49
Luxembourg 41 45 41 35
Netherlands 36 32 37 34
Norway 52 51 47 44
Portugal 55 43
Spain 44 50
Sweden 51 52 50 50
Switzerland 30 28 28 24
United States 47 52 43 44
Sources: Mackie & Rose 1991; Mackie 1991, 1992.
Social class
A manual versus nonmanual distinction is traditionally used in research on the
relationship between social class and voting behaviour. The manual class com-
prises semi- and unskilled workers both in industry and in agriculture who can be
seen as placing themselves to some degree under the authority and control of
employers who hire their labour. The nonmanual class includes large proprietors,
administrators, managers, and routine nonmanual employees. Members of the two
classes differ with respect to their labour contract and income where nonmanual
classes are in a better position than the manual.
In most analyses the manuallnonmanual distinction is used to measure the level
of class voting. However, to test the class composition and the class mobility
explanations, a more elaborate class scheme is necessary. This class scheme needs
to fulfil three requirements. First, it has to distinguish between the most important
social class positions. Therefore, a distinction between self-employed workers and
38 Data and operationalizations
Table 2.6. Social class scheme: EGP categories
Title
Nonmanual classes:
Service class
Routine nonmanual class
Petty bourgeoisie
Farmers
Manual classes:
Skilled workers
Nonskilled workers
Agricultural labourers
Description
Large proprietors; professionals, administrators and man-
agers; higher-grade technicians; supervisors of nonman-
ual workers.'
Routine nonrnanual employees in administration and
commerce; sales personnel; other rank-and-file service
workers.
Small proprietors and artisans, with and without
employees.
Farmers, smallholders and other self-employed workers
in primary production.
Lower-grade technicians; supervisors of manual workers;
skilled manual workers.
Semi- and unskilled, nonagricultural manual workers.
Agricultural and other workers in primary production.
employees, as well as'a distinction between workers with different levels of skill
and supervisory positions, should be taken into account. Second, the class scheme
should be appropriate when testing the class composition explanation. Thus, the
dichotomy between the manual and nonmanual classes has to be preserved so that
relevant changes in the compositions of these classes in industrialized societies
can be detected. Third, a more sophisticated class scheme should have been
shown to be effective in analyses of the relationship between social class, class
mobility and voting behaviour, as well as in comparative analyses of intergenera-
tional class mobility.
The seven class version of a class scheme originally introduced by Goldthorpe
for the Oxford Mobility Inquiry (Goldthorpe et al. 1978), and later elaborated by
Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarrero (1979), and Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992:
38-39), fulfils the requirements outlined. In this scheme, for brevity's sake called
EGP class scheme, individuals are categorized into a class based on their sector,
self-employment status, and supervisory status. The derivation of this scheme is
given in Chapter 3 of this study. The EGP class scheme has been useful in
comparative studies of intergenerational class mobility (Ganzeboom et al. 1989;
Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992), and in studies examining the relationship between
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social class and voting behaviour in Britain (Heath et al. 1985; Evans et al. 1991).
Nieuwbeerta & De Gram (1992) have also applied this scheme in their analyses
of the effects of class mobility on voting behaviour for the Netherlands.
The seven class version of the EGP class scheme distinguishes between. the
class categories given in Table 2.6. Respondents were coded into the EGP classes
on the basis of. data on their occupation, self-employment and supervisory status.
Two steps were involved. First, the original occupation codes were recoded into
the International Standard Classification of Occupation (ISCO) codes (!LO 1969).
Second, these ISCO codes were translated into EGP-scores through the Ganze-
boom et al. (1989) recoding scheme.
Manual/nonmanual class voting
The level of class voting in a country at a certain point in time can be operationa-
lized in various ways. Traditionally, the so-called "Alford index" has been used
(Alford 1962, 1963). In almost all cross-national and trend studies of the first
generation of research on stratification and politics this Alford index was applied.
The index is obtained by taking, for a two by two table cross-classifying class
(manuallnonmanual) and voting behaviour (Ieft-winglright-wing), the difference
between the percentage of manual workers that voted for left-wing political
parties on the one hand and the percentage of nonrnanuai workers that voted for
these parties on the other hand. Thus, if 80 per cent of the manual class vote for
left-wing parties against 20 per cent of the nonrnanual class, the Alford index
takes the value 60.
However, the Alford index has several drawbacks. The most important one is
that it is sensitive to changes in the overall percentage of a population voting for
parties of a certain type (Korpi 1972; Robertson 1984; Heath et al. 1985).
Therefore, differences between two Alford indices might. not· only be due to
differences in the strength of the relationship between social class and voting
behaviour, but also to differences in the overall popularity of political parties.
. . .
Recently, scholars of the third generation of research on stratification and
politics have proposed alternative measures of the class/vote relationship (Heath
et al. 1985; Thomsen 1987). They suggested using the odds-ratio or the log-odds-
ratio as a measure of the level of class voting. These measures are insensitive to
changes in the overall popularity of political parties. The odds-ratio for a two by
two table of class against vote, is the odds for manualworkers of voting left-wing
rather than right-wing divided by the odds for nonrnanual workers of doing the
same. The log-odds-ratio is the natural logarithm of that odds-ratio. This log-
odds-ratio can also be regarded as the log-odds for manual workers of voting for
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Table 2.7. Hypothetical tables on the relationship between class and voting
behaviour
Table A:
Left-wing Right-wing
Manual class
Nonmanual class
40 10
80.0% 20.0%
10 40
20.0% 80.0%
50
100%
50
100%
All 50
50%
50
50%
100
100%
Alford index = 80.0 - 20.0 = 60.0
Thomsen index =log «80.0/20.0)/(20.0/80.0)) =log(16) =2.77
Table B:
60 5
92.3% 7.7%
15 20
42.9% 57.1%
.
Manual class
Nonmanual class
All
Left-wing
75
75%
Right-wing
25
25%
65
100%
35
100%
100
100%
Alford index =92.3 - 42.9 =49.4
Thomsen index =log ((92.317.7)/(42.9/57.1)) =log(l6) =2.77
a left-wing political party rather than a right-wing party minus the log-odds for
nonmanual workers of voting in this way.6 If voting behaviour is not dependent
on class, the odds-ratio has the value of unity and the log-odds-ratio that of zero.
The higher the odds-ratio and the log-odds-ratio is, the higher the level of class
voting. Both measures have no upper bound.
In this study, we use the natural logarithm of the odds-ratio, instead of the odds-
ratio, to measure levels of class voting in a country. One reason is that, if there is
hardly a relationship between class and vote, a small change in the strength of
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that relationship results in a small alteration in the odds-ratio. However, if this
relationship is strong, a small change will result in a large alteration in this
measure. Or in other words, a decrease in an odds-ratio from say 10 to 9 does not
equal a decrease from 3 to 2. By using the naturalclogarithm of the odds-ratio we
adjust for these "floor effects". A related reason for choosing the log-odds-ratio
instead of the odds-ratio, is that in our explanatory analyses it is assumed that
explanatory variables have a multiplicative effect on the odds-ratios, which be-
comes an additive effect in the log-odds-ratios. This enables us to use standard
logistic regression techniques to investigate the impact of the explanatory
variables. As a tribute to the scholar who was one of the first to apply th~ log-
odds-ratio in research on stratification and politics, we call this log-odds-ratio the
Thomsen index (Thomsen 1987).
Since. the advantages of the Thomsen index over the Alford index are central in
debates between scholars from the first and the third generation, we illustrate
these further by giving an example. For that end we presented Table 2.7 where
two hypothetical class voting tables are shown.7 In these tables it is assumed that
the total population is comprised of the manual and the nonmanual classes, and
that only two types of political parties - left"wing and right-wing - exist. In both
tables it is assumed that the strength of the relationship between class and voting
behaviour is the same. The only difference between the two tables is that the
general popularity of the political parties differs. In Table B left-wing parties are
(three times) more popular than in Table A, i.e. among both manual and non-
manual class members. Because the strength of the relationship between class and
voting behaviour is the same, the measure of the level of class voting should take
the same value in both cases. This is true for the Thomsen index. However, the
Alford indices differ between the two tables. In Table A the index takes the value
60.0 and in Table B it is 49.4. Thus, this hypothetical example illustrates the
sensitivity of the Alford index to changes in the general popularity of the political
parties, and demonstrates one of the advantages of the Thomsen index.
However, it should be noted that in practice, for two by two class voting tables
the advantages of the Thomsen index over the ,Alford index should not be
overstated. The arguments given by Goodman (1975: 86), for example, suggest
that it is only when the distribution of the general popularity of political parties or
the distribution of social classes is more skewed than 25:75 or 75:25, that the
Alford and Thomsen indices might yield substantially different conclusions. How-
ever, such distributions are unlikely in our dataset. As we have discussed above,
it is only in Canada and II"eland that left-wing parties have less than 25 per cent
of the votes. Furthermore, it is also the case that, in the postwar period, the
percentage of manual workers has always been between 25 and 75 per cent in
Western industrialized countries.
42 DaTa and operationalizations
EGP class voting
Log-odds-ratios (which we labelled Thomsen indices) are not only useful when
measuring the level of class voting in a country with a manuallnonmanual class
scheme. They are also used to measure levels of class voting, when using a more
detailed class scheme. When doing so, the advantage of the log-odds-ratio over
the Alford index is more relevant. For example, when measuring the difference in
voting behaviour between unskilled manual workers and farmers, in most
countries both the voting and the class distribution are more skewed than 75:25.
When using the EGP class scheme that distinguishes between seven class
categories, we need six log-odds-ratios to measure the differences in voting
behaviour (left/right) between all the classes in a country in a specific year. One
of the aims of the present study is to investigate differences between countries
and changes within these countries with respect to class voting. Using six log-
odds-ratios for every year in each country, would create problems of interpreta-
tion. We therefore also use a summary measure of the overall level of class
voting, called the kappa index, that Hout and his colleagues (1994) have pro-
posed. This kappa index is the standard deviation of the log-odds-ratios measuring
the difference in voting behaviour between the detailed classes. This index reports
a single standardized score which reflects the level of class voting for a particular
country in a particular year or period, and provides a uniform metric for making
cross-national and over-time inferences. However, a drawback of this measure is
that it does not take into account that in some classes there are more respondents
than in others, and thus some log-odds-ratios are more robust than others.
Therefore, we also use another way of measuring the level of class voting, when
using the EGP class scheme. Using this method we examine parameters that
result from specially designed loglinear models. These so-called "uniform
difference" models, developed by Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992) and Xie (1992),
provide a single parameter as measure of the level of EGP class voting for a
country in a specific year. The models are fully equipped to examine the relation-
ship between class and voting behaviour net of changes in the sizes of the classes
and the popularity of the parties. Furthermore, these models are not influenced by
there being different numbers of respondents in the classes of any dataset. We
will pay more attention to this way of measuring levels of EGP class voting in
Chapter 6.
3 Description of ManuallNonmanual
Class Voting
3.1 Introductionl
From the start of research on stratification and politics, studies have been concerned
with the relationship between social class and voting behaviour. As discussed in
Chapter 1, the first generation of studies on this topic were characterized by the use
of a dichotomous manual/nonmanual class scheme. In addition, the focus was on the
absolute levels of class voting, using the Alford index as a measure of the strength
of the relationship between class and voting behaviour in a country. These first
generation studies showed that in all Western democratic countries, members of the
manual classes were more likely to vote for left-wing political parties than were
members of nonmanual classes. They also revealed that the strength of the link
between class and voting behaviour was different from country to country (Korpi
1983: 35; Lane & Ersson 1991: 94), and that declines in class voting occurred in
most countries in the postwar period (Lipset 1983; Clark et al. 1993: 312).
Despite the weight of evidence on between-country and over-time variation in
class voting, studies of the third generation have recently cast doubts on such
assertions (Heath et al. 1985; Rout et al. 1993). Third generation scholars argue that
the class scheme used in the studies of the first generation was - and remains - too
crude to take relevant developments in the class structure in these countries into
account. Furthermore, and for this chapter more importantly, they claim that the
traditionally used measure of class voting, i.e. the Alford index, is sensitive to
variation in the general popularity of political parties. Therefore, they argue, one
should focus on levels of relative class voting instead of absolute class voting, and
measure this by means of odds-ratios, or log-odds-ratios instead of Alford indices.
When examining relative class voting using log-odds-ratios (Thomsen indices)
different results might be obtained from those obtained in investigations of absolute
class voting.
It is against this background that we raise the following descriptive research
questions: To what extent did the levels of relative manuallnonmanual class voting
differ across democratic industrialized countries in the postwar period?, and: To
what extent was there a decline in the levels of relative manuallnonmanual class
voting in these countries over that period?
We answer these questions using two different datasets. First, we analyse the
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aggregated country data on levels of class voting in twenty countries in the period
1945-1990. Subsequeptly, we describe the levels of manualfnonmanual class voting
by analysing the data from our individual dataset. This dataset contains data from
113 surveys from sixteen countries over the period 1956 until 1990. The analysis on
the individual dataset offers the possibility to compare the results of this chapter with
results from later chapters that also use this individual dataset. Furthermore, the
individual dataset has the advantage that we were fully responsible for the
dichotomization of voting behaviour into left-wing and right-wing and of classes into
the manual and nonmanual.
In the next sections we address the descriptive research questions. In Section 2 we
examine the extent to which the levels of class voting differ between countries, and
in Section 3 the extent to which there was a decline in class voting in these
countries. After having answered the descriptive questions in this chapter, we pay
some attention in Section 4 to the question of what the results of our analysis would
have been if we had focused on the levels of absolute class voting, i.e. when using
the Alford index, and how these differ from the results when using the Thomsen
index.
3.2 Differences between countries
Among the studies of the fIrst generation 'are cross-national comparative analyses of
levels of class voting. These studies focused on the level of absolute class voting in
a country. Since Alford suggested an index to measure that level, this "Alford index"
has become the standard measure in cross-national comparative studies. Using this
index, Alford (1963) - in his comparison of four Anglo-American democracies
during 1945-1962 - provided the fIrst evidence of differences in class voting among
Western industrialized nations. About a decade later, Lenski (1970: 362) and Lijphart
(1971: 162) came up with a similar conclusion for a larger number of Western
industrialized countries surveyed around 1960. Korpi (1983: 35) showed differences
in Alford indices across eighteen countries in the 1970s, and Lane & Ersson (1991:
94) displayed a similar finding for sixteen countries during the 1980s.
In this chapter, as noted, our primary focus is not on the levels of absolute class
voting. We instead focus on the differences between countries in the levels of
relative class voting, i.e. measured by the Thomsen index. To describe the levels of
relative class voting we start using data from our aggregated country dataset, that
contains 324 tables cross-classifying class (manuallnonmanual) by party choice (left-
wing/right-wing) for twenty countries in the period 1945-1990. On the basis of these
cross-tabulations we calculated Thomsen indices as measures for the level of relative
class voting in the countries in the various years. These Thomsen indices are present-
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Table 3.1. Levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen index) in twenty countries,
1945-1990 (aggregated country dataset)
1945-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990
Australia 1.38 1.22 1.16 0.80
Austria 1.12 1.28 0.76
Belgium 1.21 0.87 0.80
Britain 1.64 1.67 1.07 0.90
Canada 0.30 0.31 0.27
Denmark 1.82 2.33 1.18 0.97
Finland 2.17 2.24 1.60 1.52
France 1.01 0.76 0.72 0.48
Germany 1.55 1.06 0.61 0.55
Greece 0.53 0.47
Ireland 0.88 0.77 0.70
Italy 1.13 0.66 0.73 0.53
Luxembourg 1.10 0.86
Netherlands 0.61 0.65 0.94 0.68
Norway 2.39 1.38 1.43 0.84
Portugal 0.62
Spain 0.75 0.63
Sweden 2.26 1.73 1.57 1.36
Switzerland 0.82 0.80
United States 0.67 0.36 0.46 0.34
Mean 1.41 1.17 0.98 ·0.74
Std. deviation 0.66 0.59 0.33 0.30
ed in the graphs of Figure 3.1. Second, in order to be able to compare the results in
this chapter with results from subsequent chapters, we carried out our descriptive
analyses on data from the individual dataset. On the basis of this dataset we
constructed class voting cross-tabulations, and also computed Thomsen indices of the
various years in the various countries.
.. ,As a next step, to summarize the data and in order not to be too dependent on
single cross-tabulations and thus open to the influence of peculiarities in the data, we
calculated the mean value of the Thomsen indices of each country in each of the
following four time periods: 1945-1960,1961-1970, 1971-1980 and 1981-1990. The
mean values on the basis of our aggregated dataset are presented in Table 3.1 and
those from our individual dataset in Table 3.2. Since we have no data, except for the
United States, for the period 1945-1960 in our individual-level dataset, that period
is not included in Table 3.2.
On the basis of these figures in Figure 3.1 and Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the descriptive
questions on the levels of relative manuallnonmanual class voting in the twenty
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Table 3.2. Levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen index) in sixteen countries,
1961-1990 (individual dataset)
1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Britain
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United States
Mean
Std. deviation
1.34
1.66
0.84
0.73
1.04
1.85
0.83
1.18
0.40
1.37 0.87
1.55 0.94
1.30
1.39 1.28
0.84
2.11 2.11
2.22
0.96
0.92 0.74
1.18
0.85 0.58
0.99 0.78
1.69 1.08
1.81 0.98
1.25
0.56 0.43
1.36 0.98
0.47 0.41
countries in the postwar period are addressed. Our aualyses confIrm the fIndings of
previous, more limited studies that use Alford indices. That is, also when examining
levels of relative class voting, countries differ in the level of class voting.
Furthermore, when countries are ordered on the basis of their levels of class voting,
the ordering remains fairly stable over the four periods considered. The lowest levels
of class voting are found in the United States aud Canada. In these countries we find
low positive Thomsen indices. This implies that mauual workers vote more left-wing
thau nonmauual workers. However, the strength of the relationship between class aud
voting behaviour in these two countries - aud especially in Cauada - is low. The
Thomsen indices of these countries rarely exceed 00-50. When rauking~ countries
on the basis of the Thomsen indices, a few countries have somewhathigher, but still
relatively low levels of class voting. These countries are Frauce, Greece, Irelaud,
Italy, Netherlauds, Portugal, Spain, Switzerlaud. In all these countries, the Thomsen
indices are rarely larger thau one. Then follows a group of countries with
intermediate levels of class voting. These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Germauy aud Luxembourg. In these countries the Thomsen indices have
predominautly a value between 1 aud 1.5. Finally, in some countries we fInd
relatively high levels of class voting, the Thomsen indices are higher thau 1.5. These
countries are the four Scaudinaviau countries aud Britain. In the Scaudinaviau
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r,
countries the Thomsen indices are occasionally even higher than two. i .
It should !'Wnoted that differences between countries in the levels of class voting l
have become smaller over the last decades. This can be shown by investigating the I
standard deviation over the Thomsen indices across countries. For example, in Table
3.1, in the period 1945-1960, the standard deviation of the levels of class voting
across countries had the value 0.66, while in the period 1961-70 it fell to 0.59.
Subsequently, in the period 1971-80, the variation dropped to 0.33, and to 0.30 in
the period 1981-90. A similar conclusion can be drawn from Table 3.2.
Summarizing the results of our between-country examinations, we can conclude
that there is a clear indication of substantial differences in levels of relative
manuallnonmanual class voting across democratic industrialized countries in the
postwar period. This conclusion can be drawn on the basis of our analyses of both
our aggregated country data and our individual dataset.
3.3 Trends within countries
Having described the differences between countries in levels ofclass voting, we next
examine the changes over-time in levels of class voting within these countries. A
pioneering study of trends in class voting, using the Alford index, was Kemp (1978).
It demonstrated a reduction of the level of class voting in Australia during the 1945-
1975 period. Others have also analysed trends in class voting for various individual
countries. For example, Andeweg (1982) has analysed trends in the strength of the
relationship between class and vote for the Netherlands, Abramson and his
colleagues (1990) for the United States, and Listhaug (1989) for Norway. Some have
shown a decline in the levels of class voting in several countries simultaneously.
Lipset (1983) has presented evidence of a downward trend in Alford indices of
Britain, Germany, and the United States between 1945 and 1980. A continuing
decline has been supported by further analyses of data from the early 1980s (Clark
et al. 1993: 313). In addition, Sainsbury (1987, 1990) has shown a decline in class
voting in the Scandinavian countries, while Lane & Ersson (1991: 94), comparing
the 1950/60s with the 1970/80s, have found less class voting in the later period for
nine Western industrialized nations and stronger class voting in only two countries
(France and Italy).
Our findings, on the basis of Thomsen indices instead of Alford indices, for twenty
countries in the period 1945-1990, confirm the [mdings of these earlier studies. A
substantial decline in the levels of class voting occurred in most countries. A first
indication is provided by Tables 3.1 and 3.2, which show higher Thomsen indices
for earlier periods than for more recent years. A second, more precise indication of
the decline in levels of class voting in most countries is provided by the figures in
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Table 3.3. linear trends in the levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen index)
in twenty countries (aggregated country dataset)
Intercept (class Trend N. of Range
voting in 1980) (change I 10 years) cases
parameter s.e. parameter s.e. Rank
Australia 0.93* 0.06 -0.18* 0.03 10 17 1946-90
Austria 0.96* 0.11 -0.27* 0.13 6 5 1968-89
Belgium 0.86* 0.07 -0.20* 0.11 8 20 1968-90
Britain 1.06* 0.05 -0.22* 0.D3 7 30 1945-90
Canada 0.28* 0.14 -0.01 0.06 18 13 1945-84
Denmark 1.15* 0.08 -0.30* 0.05 4 29 1945-90
Finland 1.57* 0.27 -0.30 0.21 3 5 1958-87
France 0.60* 0.05 -0.15* 0.00 12 25 1947-90
Germany 0.64* 0.05 -0.31 * 0.04 2 25 1953-90
Greece 0.40* 0.18 0.15 0.34 19 10 1980-89
Ireland 0.76* 0.08 -0.15 0.13 13 18 1969-90
Italy 0.64* 0.04 -0.19* 0.05 9 20 1953-90
Luxembourg 0.99* 0.10 -0.14 0.19 14 17 1973-90
Netherlands 0.77* 0.04 -0.01 0.05 17 25 1950-90
Norway 1.09* 0.09 -0.44* 0.06 1 11 1949-90
Portugal 0.43 0.51 0.27 0.72 20 5 1985-89
Spain 0.74* 0.19 -0.16 0.30 11 6 1979-89
Sweden 1.48* 0.07 -0.27* 0.04 5 12 1946-88
Switzerland 0.80* 0.15 -0.07 0.25 16 4 1972-87
United States 0.37* 0.06 -0.12* 0.05 15 27 1948-90
Notes: * p < 0.05
The variable Year is centred around 1980.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4, where summary measures are reported for the decline - or rise -
in the level of class voting for each country in the aggregated country dataset and
the individual dataset respectively. For every country, a linear regression analysis
was performed on the Thomsen indices with the exact year of observation as
independent variable.2 A decline in the level of class voting should be indicated'by
a negative trend-parameter. We should point out that we do not argue that a negative
linear trend-parameter for a country implies a strict linear declining trend in the level
of class voting in that country. The parameters are only regarded as a summary
measure of the overall increase or decrease in class voting in a country, and not as'
the best representation of the developments in class voting over-time.
In Table 3.3, negative trend"parameters are reported for eighteen out of the twenty
countries in our aggregated dataset. The only two countries with a positive (non-
significant) trend-parameter are Greece and PortugaL However, for these two coun-
Description of ManuallNonmanual Class Voting 51
Table 3.4. Linear trends in the levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen index) .
in sixteen countries (individual dataset)
Intercept (class Trend N. of Range
voting in 1980) (change / 10 years) years
parameter s.e. parameter s.e. Rank
Australia 1.07* 0.D7 -0.26* 0.08 4 9 1965-90
Austria 1.29* 0.19 -0.50 0.27 1 4 1974-89
Belgium 1 1975
Britain 1.39* 0.04 -0.21 * 0.05 5 12 1964-90
Canada 1 ·1984
Denmark 1.95* 0.22 -0.38 0.41 3 6 1971-81
Finland -0.06 -3.51 2 1972-75
France 1 1978
Germany 0.84* 0.04 -0.16* 0.07 6 13 1969-90
Ireland 2.86 -1.78 2 1989-90
Italy 0.68* 0.10 -0.10 0.12 8 3 1968-85
Netherlands 0.89* 0.03 -0.15* 0.06 7 14 1970-90
Norway 1.36* 0.10 -0.46* 0.11 2 7 1965-90
Sweden 1.44 -0.46 2 1972-90
Switzerland 1.16 -0.14 2 1972-76
United States 0.47* 0.07 -0.06 0.06 9 24 1956-90
Notes: * p < 0.05
The variable Year is centred around 1980.
tries data are only available over the periods 1980-1990 and 1985-1990 respectively.
Of the eighteen slope-parameters that are negative in Table 3.3, eleven are
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The pertinent countries are: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and
the United States. Furthermore, the fact that we find statistically insignificant slope-
parameters for Finland, Spain and Switzerland might be caused by the fact that for
these countries we have data for only a limited number of years. Thus, in general,
our data lend support to the statement that levels of class voting in Western
industrialized societies have declined over the postwar period. The only countries for
which we do not find significant declines in their levels of class voting, but where
we have data for a sufficient number of years to detect significant trends, are
Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Inspection of the graphs for these
countries in Figure 3.1, shows that indeed hardly any decline in class voting occurred
in these countries.
Next, in Table 3.4 we present the parameters of the trend analyses of our individual
dataset. For all thirteen countries we find a negative slope. For five out of the nine
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countries where we had data for more than two years, we find significant trends.
These countries are Australia, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway.
A comparison of the entries in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 shows that for the four
countries, except the Netherlands where there is a significant trend noted in Table
3.4, there is also a significant trend in Table 3.3. The fact that analysing our
aggregated dataset for the Netherlands does not yield a significant trend-parameter
and analysing our individual dataset does, is due to peculiarities of the developments
in class voting in that country. As an inspection of the graph for the Netherlands in
Figure 3.1 shows, the developments are non-linear, and therefore sensitive to the
period investigated. In addition, we find some countries for which a significant trend
is reported in Table 3.3, but not in Table 3.4. For most of these countries this is due
to the fact that the trend analyses in Table 3.3 are based on a larger number of cases.
This is the case in Austria, Denmark, Italy, Sweden, and the United States. However,
for the United States an additional remark can be made. As the graph for the United
States in Figure 3.1 indicates, the significant decline in class voting in that country
presented in Table 3.3 might be due to the exceptional high level of class voting in
1948.
Some special attention should be paid to the trend in class voting in Britain. The
graph for Britain in Figure 3.1 shows that the level of class voting was relatively
stable over the period 1945-1964. Just after this period, there was a strong sudden
decline in the level of class voting. Thereafter, from 1965 until 1990, the level of
class voting was relatively stable again. Thus, when Heath and his associates only
analysed data from 1964 until 1987, they could not find a long term trend. However,
when the period 1945-1964 is included in the analyses, a long term decline in the
level of class voting shows up.
Having ascertained that the levels of class voting in most Western industrialized
countries declined, we next examine whether the extent of these declines differed
between the countries. The figures in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show that of all the
countries featured in this study, Norway shows the strongest absolute decrease in the
Thomsen indices, followed by the other Scandinavian countries. In Germany and
Britain substantial absolute decreases in the Thomsen indices are also found. In the
other countries the decline in class voting is less marked, whereas in Canada and the
United States hardly any trend emerges. The question can then be raised whether
these results would also have been obtained if the level of class voting had beel)
measured by Alford indices.
3.4 Comparing Alford and Thomsen indices
Although we follow the theoretical considerations of scholars of the third generation
Description ofManuallNonmanual Class Voting 53
Table 3.5. Levels of class voting (measured by Alford index) in twenty countries,
1945-1990 (aggregated country dataset)
1945-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990
Australia 32.9 29.3 27.8 19.4
Austria 27.4 28.9 18.3
Belgium 25.4 17.9 16.4
Britain 37.3 38.3 24.3 23.4
Canada 7.0 7.7 4.0
Denmark 39.8 52.0 28.1 20.9
Finland 48.4 50.2 36.9 35.7
France 24.4 18.3 17.0 11.7
Germany 36.0 24.8 14.9 13.4
Greece 12.3 9.7
Ireland 14.1 8.7 7.3
Italy 26.6 14.5 17.8 13.1
Luxembourg 24.8 18.8
Netherlands 14.0 14.7 21.8 15.5
Norway 52.5 32.0 33.8 20.5
Portugal 14.9
Spain 18.4 15.5
Sweden 51.0 40.7 37.3 32.7
Switzerland 17.6 12.8
United States 16.2 7.7 10.9 8.1
Mean 32.2 26.5 22.2 16.6
Std. deviation 14.9 14.2 8.6 7.8
(Heath et al. 1985; Hout et al. 1993) in regarding the Thomsen indices as a better
measure of class voting for a two by two table than the Alford index, it is of interest
to examine the extent to which empirical testing does yield different results using the
Alford index or the Thomsen index. Therefore, we again use the data from our
aggregated country dataset in the twenty countries in the period 1945-1990. On the
basis of the 324 class voting cross-tabulations available, we calculated Alford indices
as measures of the levels of absolute class voting in the countries in the various
years.
Having calculated the Alford indices we first compared them with the Thomsen
indices from the same year and country. In Chapter 2, we have already argued that
in practice, for two by two class/vote tables, the advantages of the Thomsen index
over the Alford index should not be overstated. Only when the distribution of the
general popularity of political parties or the distribution of social classes is more
skewed than 25:75 or 75:25 - which is seldom the case -, the Alford and Thomsen
indices might yield substantially different conclusions. This idea is confirmed by our
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Table 3.6. Linear trends in the levels of class voting (measured by Alford index) in
twenty countries (aggregated country dataset)
Intercept (class Trend N. of Range
voting in 1980) (change / 10 years) cases
parameter s.c. parameter s.c. Rank
Australia 22.5* 1.4 -4.2* 0.7 10 17 1946-90
Austria 22.7* 2.5 -6.1* 3.0 4 5 1968-89
Belgium 17.7* 1.5 -4.3* 2.4 8 20 1968-90
Britain 27.3* 1.7 -5.9* 1.2 5 30 1945-90
Canada 5.4* 3.3 -0.7 1.4 17 13 1945-84
Denmark 24.5* 1.3 -4.9* 0.8 7 29 1945-90
Finland 36.4* 5.9 -6.1 4.6 3 5 1958-87
France 14.4* 1.0 -3.7* 0.8 14 25 1947-90
Germany 15.4* 1.1 -7.0* 1.0 2 25 1953-90
Greece 8.0* 3.0 4.4 5.7 19 10 1980-89
Ireland 8.5* 0.7 -2.3 1.3 16 18 1969-90
Italy 15.5* 1.0 -4.3* 1.2 9 20 1953-90
Luxembourg 22.0* 2.2 -3.8 4.1 13 17 1973-90
Netherlands 17.8* 1.0 -0.2 1.0 18 25 1950-90
Norway 26.0* 2.1 -9.1 * 1.5 1 11 1949-90
Portugal 10.9* 11.4 5.9 6.0 20 5 1985-89
Spain 18.3* 4.7 -4.1 7.1 11 6 1979-89
Sweden 35.2* 1.3 -5.5* 0.9 6 12 1946-88
Switzerland 15.4* 2.7 -3.8 4.4 12 4 1972-87
United States 8.8* 1.4 -2.8* 1.0 15 27 1948-90
Notes: * p < 0.05
The variable Year is centred around 1980.
analyses. The Pearson correlation between the Alford and the Thomsen indices of
the 324 years in the twenty countries has the value 0.97 (p=O.OOO). Thus, the
descriptions using Thomsen indices yield very much the same conclusions as
descriptions using Alford indices?
In addition, we compared the mean values per country per period of the Thomsen
indices with the mean values of the Alford index. Therefore, we first calculated the
average values of the Alford indices of each country in the periods 1945-1960, 1961-
1970, 1971-1980 and 1981-1990, and presented these in Table 3.5. Not surprisingly
when taking into account the high correlation between all Alford and Thomsen
indices, the rankings of the countries on both measures of class voting in all four
periods are very similar.
Finally, we compared the trends in the Alford indices and the Thomsen indices. To
do this, for every country, a linear regression was computed of the Alford indices
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in the specific years on the exact year of observation. The parameter estimates are
reported in Table 3.6. The results are almost identical to the results in Table 3.3. For
the countries we found positive trend-parameters in Table 3.3, positive trend-para-
meters are shown in Table 3.6. In addition, for the countries where we found
insignificant negative trend:-parameters and significant negative trend-parameters
respectively in Table 3.3, such parameters are also presented in Table 3.6.
Furthermore, if we compare the trendCparameters for the Alford indices to those for
the Thomsen indices - i.e. the trend-parameters in Tables 3.6 and 3.3 respectively -
we find that the ranking of the countries is almost identical. Scandinavian countries
are ranked highest, the United States and Canada lowest. The largest difference in
ranking number for the countries is for Switzerland which moved four places, down
from rank 12 to rank 16, and Denmark and Ireland which moved three positions,
from 7 to 4 and from 16 to 13 respectively. To illustrate the similarity in the
findings for the Alford and the Thomsen index, we also calculated the Pearson
correlation between the trend-parameters in Table 3.3 and those in Table 3.6. This
has the value 0.97 (p=O.OOO).
Concluding, although Heath et al. (1985) and Hout et al. (1993) are right in
regarding the Thomsen indices as a theoretically better measure of class voting for
a two by two table than the Alford index, we note that empirical testing does not
yield substantively different results. The conclusions of the first generation
researchers, who employed the Alford index, are unlikely to be largely biased by
their method of a..nalysis.
3.5 Conclusions
Following a long tradition of research on stratification and politics, in this chapter
we described the strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour in
many Western industrialized countries over the postwar period. In the firstgeneration,
such descriptions are given, focussing on absolute levels of class voting, i.e. when
employing the Alford index as a measure of the level of class voting. However,
scholars of the third generation of research on stratification and politics have cast
doubts on the conclusions drawn)n studies using this measure. These scholars have
claimed that the fmdings might be misleading, since the Alford index is sensitive to
changes in the overall popularity of the political parties. They therefore propose
focusing on the levels of so-called "relative class voting", i.e. when using the log-
odds-ratio as a measure of class voting in a country.
In the present chapter we followed the developments in this research area, and
investigated the between-country and over-time variation in the levels of relative
class voting in twenty Western industrialized countries in the postwar period. Our
56 Description of ManuallNonmanual Class Voting
main investigations were based on a dataset that consists of 324 tabulations cross-
classifying class (manual/nonmanual) and voting behaviour (left-winglright-wing).
On the basis of these tables we computed for each year in each country where data
were available, a log-odds-ratio - dubbed the Thomsen index - as a measure of the
level of relative class voting. Furthermore, we also analysed a more restricted
dataset, Le. our individual-level dataset of 113 surveys from sixteen countries over
the period 1956-1990. However, the analyses on both these datasets yielded the same
conclusions.
Summarizing, the analyses clearly indicated that substantial differences in levels
~f rel~tiv.e manuall~onn:anual class voti~g have eXiste~ a~ross dem.0cratic ~ .
Industrialized countrzes In the postwar perIOd. The ScandinaVian countrzes and II \
~, Bri~ain have had relatively high levels ofmanuallnonmanual class voting, while the IV
,I Untted States and Canada have had low levels.
1
In addition, our analyses showed that substantial declines in the level of relative
manuallnonmanual class voting have occurred in many of the democratic
industrialized countries in the postwarperiod. These declines have not occurred with
the same speed in all countries. The de&lines in class voting were largest in the~
Scandinavian coufltries, followed by Germany and Britain. In the United States the
smallest decline was found. Furthermore, in Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands no systematic declines in class voting at all were found over the last
decades. In Greece and Portugal rises in levels of class voting were found, however
nonsignificant.
In this chapter we also compared the levels of relative manuallnonmanual class
voting, i.e. measured by the Thomsen index, with the levels of absolute
manual/nonmanual class voting, i.e. measured by the Alford index. The obtained
Alford indices and Thomsen indices correlated at 0.97. More importantly, whether
using the Thomsen or the Alford index, the same rankings of the countries with
respect to the levels of class voting, as well as to the speed of decline of class voting
were obtained. Thus, although theoretically we regard the Thomsen index as a better
measure of class voting for a two by two table than the Alford index, we have to
conclude that empirical testing in this chapter does not yield substantively different
results when using the Alford index.
4 Effects of Social and Political Characteristics of
Countries on ManuallNonmanual Class Voting
4.1 Introduction!
Having established that there have been substantial differences in levels of relative
class voting between Western industrialized countries in the postwar period, and that
during the same period significant declines occurred in class voting levels within
these countries, we now attempt to explain these differences and trends. In the
present chapter we examine whether the variations in class voting between countries
and periods can be explained by variation in various social and political
characteristics of the countries and periods..
When examining the effects of such country characteristics on class voting, we
bnild on various studies of stratification and politics from the first up to and
including the third generation that have suggested how social and political
characteristics affect levels of class voting in countries. The characteristics raised by
such studies range from variations in ethnic diversity, via rises in the general
standard of living, to differences in the prominence of class issues in politics. Studies
suggesting these explanations, however, seldom tested these explanations by
analysing data from many countries and years and by employing strong tests. In
studies of the first generation, the link between social and political characteristics of
countries and their levels of class voting was at best weakly empirically tested. In
these studies limited comparable data were available on both class voting and on
explanatory variables. Furthermore, the attention was on levels of absolute rather
than relative class voting. In studies of the second generation, tests of explanations
of variation in class voting had a low priority on the research agenda. So far, studies
of the third generation have also paid little attention to these explanations. However,
this third generation has characteristically focused on relative class voting, and has
been able to take advantage of much larger datasets and more appropriate research
techniques.
This chapter aims to fill the gap in research to date, by using the possibilities with
respect to data and techniques of the third generation, and by addressing the
following two questions. The first is: To what extent can differences across
democratic industrialized countries in the levels ofrelative manuallnonmanual class
voting be explained by differences between these countries in their social and
political characteristics? and the second is: To what extent can changes within,
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democratic industrialized countries in the levels of relative manuallnonmanual class
voting be explained by changes within these countries in their social and political .
characteristics?
When addressing these questions, we aim to improve on earlier studies in several
ways. First, in our analyses we explain the level of class voting in a country by
using measures of specific social and political characteristics of that country, instead
of by simply referring to general explanations or to peculiarities of countries. Thus,
names ofcountries are replaced with scores on variables (cf. Przeworski & Teune
1970). In this respect our study differs from those electoral change studies that do
not employ measures for country characteristics in the final comparative analysis
(Dalton et al. 1984; Franklin et al. 1992). Instead, we follow the lead of Korpi
(1983) and Kerr (1990) who correlated country characteristics with indices of the
level of class voting. Second, the present chapter addresses its explanatory question
by subsuming a list of concrete hypotheses involving country characteristics under
a more general notion.. By doing so it avoids mere enumeration and grand
generalization and aims at systematic explanation. Third, this chapter presents
analyses of data for a considerable number of countries and over numerous points
in time. We analyse our aggregated dataset for twenty countries in the period 1945-
1990. In this way the present study goes beyond earlier studies involving a limited
number of countries (Alford 1963; Kerr 1990) and few points in time (Korpi 1983;
Lane & Ersson 1991). We hope that our expanded dataset lessens the chance of not
accepting hypotheses due to a lack of statistical power, when in reality these
hypotheses hold. Moreover, our dataset allows us to test hypotheses using
multivariate techniques. A test employing such techniques goes well beyond the best
earlier ones of Korpi (1983) and Kerr (1990).
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In the next section we review,
systematize, and correct current hypotheses concerning the levels of class voting in
Western industrialized countries over the postwar period. In the third section the
results of bivariate tests of the hypotheses are described. Section 4 contains a
comprehensive multivariate test of the hypotheses, while in Section 5 the tenability
of these hypotheses in light of the results is discussed.
4.2 Hypotheses
In studies addressing questions on class voting, several hypotheses have been
formulated concerning the effects of country characteristics on a country's level of
class voting at a certain point in time. In this section we review this literature and
list several of these hypotheses. No claim is made that the list of hypotheses is
exhaustive. We do claim, however, to have selected the current hypotheses that
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pertain to explanatory factors for which measurable variables are available.
As to absent hypotheses we would like to note that we formulated our hypotheses
without incorporating feedback effects. Country characteristics are assumed to have
an effect on a country's level of class voting, and not the other way around.
However, in some cases it might well be that a country's level of class voting affects
a particular characteristic of a country. For example, comparing the income
differences and the levels of class voting of a dozen Western industrialized countries,
Lenski et a1. (1991), and Lane & Ersson (1991) found that smaller income
differences and more classvoting go together. According to them, the comparison
suggested that class-based party systems tend to reduce income inequality somewhat.
Furthermore, it seems plausible that the higher the level of class voting in a country,
the more prominent class issues are in daily politics. However, we have decided not
,
to formulate and test hypotheses incorporating feedback effects in this study.
Although a research design with mutual influences could be regarded as ideal, such
a design goes well beyond what the presently available data allow.
Before listing our hypothes~s, a comment is in order on the degree to which
hypotheses remain unconnected in the literature and are connected in the present
study. When reviewing the literature, the hypotheses formulated in the various
studies neither seem to be related to each other nor to a general notion. In this
chapter we seek to incorporate the hypotheses into a single framework by using
general theories on individual voting behaviour. From these theories, we employ in
particular the general notion that people, at least with respect to voting, act to further
their interests. This idea may also be expressed as a hypothesis according to which
voters regard political parties as different means through which they can attain their
goals. In this view, individuals vote for the party that contributes most to the
realization of these goals. This idea is more or less implicit in Lipset (1960) and is
prominent in Downs (1957).
Material interests of voters
Let us start with hypotheses on the material goals or interests of voters. To specify
hypotheses about these interests, an assumption is required that states which political
party furthers the material interests of what kind of persons. According to revisionist
historical materialism (Bernstein 1899), manual workers have economic interests
opposed to those of nonmanual workers and the propertied classes. For manual
workers, voting for a left-wing party furthers these interests more than it would for
members of the nonmanual classes. Voting for a right-wing party would be against
the material interests of manual workers since these parties appeal more to the
interests of the nonmanual classes. A left-wing party promises manual workers better
60 Effects of Social and Political Characteristics of Countries
living conditions in general, and a higher income in particular. Aright-wing party
seeks to maintain or improve the material conditions of the nonmanual classes. With
this assumption and the idea that people act to further their economic interests,
. Lipset (1983: 239) explained the fmding of class voting.
To develop a more comprehensive theory about the economic interests of voters,
this first hypothesis should be supplemented with other predictions. One such
prediction holds that as income differences between the classes of a country increase,
the level of class voting in that country increases (Lane & Ersson 1991: 95). The
assumption - probably not always correct but sufficiently approximate - required for
deriving this prediction from our unifying statement has been made by Alford
(1963). It holds that if income differences between classes are larger, people stand
to win or to lose more in an economic sense, by voting for a particular party.
Therefore it can be expected that:
The larger the income differences between classes in a country at a certain point
in time. the higher that country's level of class voting at that moment.
Kerr et al.' s (1960) theory of industrial society maintains that in countries and in
times with a lower general standard of living, persons from the manual classes stand
to win more in economic respects by voting according to their economic interests
than would be the case in countries and periods where industrialization has led to a
higher standard of living. In countries and periods where standards of living are high,
persons from the nonmanual classes voting for a left-wing party incur less severe
losses than they would in countries and times of a lower standard of living.
Something like the phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility seems to be at work.
This yields the prediction that:
The higher the standard of living in a country at a certain point in time, thiT lower
its level of class voting at that moment.
It has often been held that social class mobility weakens class conflict (Sombart
1976 [1906]; Dahrendorf 1959; Alford 1963; Lenski 1987). This macro-level
hypothesis can also be derived from assumptions at the individual-level. It can
plausibly be held that the longer persons belong to a certain class, the higher the
likelihood of their acting in accordance with their present economic interests. After
all. for individuals it need not be immediately apparent what their economic interests
are. Since socially mobile persons may be presumed to belong to their present class
for a shorter period than socially stable persons, and consequently to be less
socialized into it, their voting patterns will be somewhere between the voting
behaviour of their origin class and their destination class. A line of research at the
individual-level stretching from Lipset & Bendix (1959) to De Graaf and his
colleagues (1995), has shown that persons mQving ont of the manual classes vote in
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a more right-wing way than those staying behind and in a more left-wing way than
those they are joining in their new station in life. Downwardly mobile persons are
more leftist than those staying in their class of origin and more rightist than those
stable in their class of destination. Thus, the odds for manual workers of voting for
left-wing parties rather than right-wing parties are determined by the percentage of
manual workers originating in the nonmanual classes. In a similar vein, it can be
maintained that as the probability of nonmanual class workers originating in the
manual classes increases, the chances of these workers voting for a right-wing party
decrease.
However, in order to move from separate hypotheses for individual.manual and
nonmanual classes members to a single hypothesis linking a country's level of
mobility and its level of class-based voting, more assumptions are required. For
example, it may be held that an increase in the inflow to a certain class goes together
with a stable or increasing inflow to another class. Under this assumption it follows
that the total percentage of mobility increases. Given this assumption, one obtains
the macro-hypothesis that in countries with a higher percentage of persons mobile
between the social classes, the level of class voting is lower. However, it will be
apparent that in cases where the inflow to one class decreases while increasing in the
other, no macro-predictions about mobility percentages and class-based voting can
be derived without yet further assumptions. We know of no comparative study in the
field of mobility that directly addresses the question of the tenability of the
assumption that an increase in the inflow to one class is not accompanied by a
decrease in the inflow to another class. Indeed, the figutes for eleven countries
assembled in Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992: 190) provide at least some evidence
against it. Nevertheless, accepting this assumption it can be predicted that:
The higher the percentage of intergenerational class mobility in a country at a
certain point in time, the lower that country's level ofclass voting at that moment.
Korpi (1983: 35) has argued that the higher the union density in a country, the
higher that country's level of class voting. This hypothesis was supported by a
correlation of 0.71 between union density and class voting for eighteen GEeD
countries in the 1970s. However, once again a difficulty arises with respect to the
derivation of this macro-hypothesis from individual-level assumptions.
When thinking of the effects of a rise in union density, it is quite clear that as
union density rises among the working classes of any country, the chances of manual
class members voting left-wing will be higher and thus the level of class voting in
that country will also be higher. In this case, we simply assume that for people with
certain economic interests, being a member of organizations representing these
interests, increases the chances of voting according to their economic interests.
Without the support of such organizations it would be less clear for persons what
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their economic interests are, and what behaviour these interests promote.
The effects of union membership among nonmanual workers on the chances of
voting for theJeft or right are also straightforward. From the earliest election studies
in small towns in the United States (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948), it has been shown at the
individual-level that labour union membership, iudependent of a person's social
class, increases the likelihood of voting for the left. Similarly, recent findings based
on data from various Norwegian election surveys from 1957 until 1985, have shown
that nonmanual workers who were union members were more likely to vote for the
left than were nonmanual workers who had no union affiliations (Listhaug 1989: 77).
This hypothesis yields the macro-prediction that the higher the rate of union
membership among the nonmanual classes of a country at a given point in time, the
greater the chances of nonmanual workers voting for the political left.
It is not immediately apparent, however, how the above derivations are to be
squared with Korpi's hypothesis that a higher union density makes for more class
voting. To do this, additional assumptions are required. In general, it may be
assnmed - as Korpi probably did - that the contribution of unionisation to left voting
by the manual classes is stronger than its contribution to left voting among
nonmanual classes. In addition, one might presume that an overall rise in union
density amounts to more or less the same rise for manual and nonmanual workers.
If these two assumptions hold, Korpi's hypothesis can be derived. The first
assumption is corroborated by casual inspection of published tables, the second by
the data in Visser (1989). Thus, as our final hypothesis on material interests we
propose that:
The higher the union density in a country at a certain point in time, the higher
that country's level of class voting at that moment.
Non-materi'al interests ofvoters
Apart from material interests, people have non-material interests linked to factors
such as the ethnic group they identify with or are assigned to, the language they
speak and the religion they practice. Ethnic minorities are in favour of positive
discrimination, people practising a language want it to be used in court and
government publications, and people with a certain religion want their children to
be taught about it in schools. Just as it can be assumed that voting to some extent
reflects people's economic interests, it can also be held that their non-material
interests in some degree influence their voting. In most countries, people with the
same economic interests do not fully share the same non-material interests. The
occurrence of these cross-cutting cleavages has been amply documented (Lipset &
Rokkan 1967; Lijphart 1979). In addition, it may be assumed that in most countries
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the non-material interests of symbolic minorities are represented by left-wing parties
(for instance, those of Jews and blacks in the United States by the Democrats), while
the non-material interests of symbolic majorities are championed by right-wing
political parties (for instance, those of Catholics and Lutherans in Gerniany by the
Christian-Democrats). Larger and more numerous symbolic minorities and smaller
majorities make for greater symbolic heterogeneity.
To make specific predictions about the effects of non-material interests on the
level of class voting in a country, it can be supposed that ethnicity, language and
religion are sources of non-material interests. The importance of these characteristics,
besides class, in explaining individual voting behaviour has been shown by Lijphart
(1979) and by Franklin and his colleagues (1992). Assuming cross-cutting of class
on the one hand and religion, language and ethnicity on the other, and assuming that
people act to further their interests, it can be predicted that in countries with high
religious and ethnic diversity both manual and nonmanual workers will be less apt
to vote according to their economic interests than in countries with low diversity.
Consequently, the following hypotheses can be formulated:
The higher the religious and ethnic diversity among the population of a country
at a certain point in time, the lower is that country's level of class voting at thal
moment.
. Characteristics ofpanies and politicians
Applying the unifying assumption that people act to further their own interests,
additional predictions on class-based voting in a country can be obtained by
regarding not only voters as actors during elections, but also the politicians and
parties they vote for. Coleman (1982) emphasized the importance for social theory
of corporate actors, as distinct from natural persons. Furthermore, Lane & Ersson
(1991), and Sartori (1990) have stressed the pertinence of institutional factors for
comparative voting research.
One concrete prediction stemming from this line of reasoning relates to the role
of issues in politics, or more precisely the matters that politicians debate and
legislate upon. Let us assume that the stronger class features are as an issue for
politicians, the more a person from a certain class stands to win by voting according
to economic interests. It then can be derived that the more class figures as an issue
in a country's politics, the more voting will be class-based in that country. This is
consistent with Lane & Ersson's (1991: 132) proposition, and leads us to the
hypothesis:
The more a country's politics involve class issues at a certain point in time, the
higher that country's level of class voting at that moment.
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These considerations lead us to derive a final hypothesis about the interaction
between voters and politicians. if politicians seek to govern and stay in business, and
if voters and politicians act to further their economic interests, then rational
politicians will respond to changes in a country's class stmcture. The greater the
proportion of manual workers in a country, the more politicians from left-wing
parties will try to win votes from that manual class part of the electorate.
Conversely, as Przeworski (1985) argued, the lower the percentage of manual
workers in a population, the more likely it is that politicians from left-wing parties
will adapt their policies "in order to attract votes of nonmanual workers. Kerr's
(1990) findings for eight industrialized nations in the 1970s, support this hypothesis
by showing a negative relationship between the ratio of blue collar to white collar
workers and the extent of class voting. We can thus predict that:
The lower the proportion ofmanual workers in a country's population, the lower
is that country's level of class voting at that moment.
4.3 Bivariate results
We now test our hypotheses proposed to explain the differences in the levels of class
voting across countries and trends in the levels of class voting within these countries.
In our analyses we use the set of country data discussed in Chapter 2 and in
Appendix A. In this dataset we have 324 Thomsen indices plus measures of country
characteristics for twenty countries over various years. This relatively large dataset
allows us to test hypotheses concerning the effect of one country characteristic, while
controlling for the effects of other characteristics. However, we start by simple tests
of our hypotheses by calculating the zero-order correlations between our explanatory
variables and levels of class voting.
Explaining differences between countries
To determine whether variation in the country characteristics adduced in the previous
section account for differences in the levels of class voting across countries, we
could calculate simple zero-order correlations on all data. However, since the 324
year/country combinations are not independent, we examine the effects of country
characteristics on the levels of class voting when using the mean values of the
observations for four periods: 1945-1960, 1961-1970, 1971-1980 and 1981-1990. In
this way thus eliminating the effects of period or year characteristics and eliminated
errors in the several observations for one country. We then calculated for these
periods the correlations between the mean levels of class voting for a country in that
- - -- --- - ---
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Table 4.1. Zero-order correlations between explanatory variables and the levels of
class voting per period, 1945-1990
1945-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990
(N""",=12) (N_=14) (N"",,=18) (N"",,=20)
Income differences -0.52* -0.60* -0.44* -0.38
Std. of living -0.37 -0.30 -0.04 0.04
Perc. mobile -0.08 -0.32 0.27 0.43*
Union density 0.63* 0.62* 0.78* 0.78*
Rel.-ethn. diversity -0.80* -0.57* -0.32 -0.31
Class as issue -0.11 -0.01 0.02 0.12
Perc. manual 0.71* 0.41 0.52* 0.40*
Note: * p < 0.05
period and the mean values of the explanatory variables in that period. The zero-
order correlations calculated for all data over the periods defined are presented in
Table 4.l.
The pattern in the columns of Table 4.1 is quite consistent. Four country
characteristics out of seven have significant effects on levels of class voting. These
characteristics are income differences, union density, religious- and ethnic diversity,
and the percentage of manual workers. Three of these effects are in the expected
direction. As predicted, the higher the religious and ethnic diversity in a country, the
lower the level of class voting. Similarly, the higher the union density in a country,
the higher the level of class voting. In addition, as predicted, the higher the
percentage of manual workers in a country, the higher the level of class voting.
However, the effect of the extent of income differences is not as predicted. The
negative sign of the correlation indicates that high income differences in a country
are linked to low levels of class voting, a finding which is contrary to our
hypothesis.
Our three other explanatory variables give' also results not fitting with the
formulated hypotheses. The correlation between the percentage mobility and the level
of class voting is only statistically significant in one out of the four periods, and
even then the correlation has a sign that is in the opposite direction to what our
hypothesis predicts. Furthermore, neither a country's standard of living, nor the
extent to which class is an issue in a country's politics, offer a significant
contribution to the explanation of differences in class voting across countries.
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Table 4.2. Zero-order correlations between explanatory variables and the levels of
class voting per country, 1945-1990
Standard of Perc. Union Perc. N. of cases
living mobile density manual
Australia -0.78* -0.72* -0.10 0.65* 17
Austria -0.73 -0.59 0.69 0.38 5
Belgium -0.44* 0.25 -0.37* 0.02 20
Britain -0.79* -0.80* -0.37* 0.72* 30
Canada -0.06 -0.Q3 -0.05 0.05 13
Denmark -0.74* -0.68* -0.81 * 0.59* 29
Finland -0.64 -0.45 -0.78 0.52 5
France -0.64* -0.58* 0.55* 0.09 25
Germany -0.85* -0.79* -0.19 0.69* 25
Greece 0.35 0.32 -0.66* 10
Ireland -0.Ql -0.14 0.30 0.35 18
Italy -0.67* -0.59* -0.31 0.40* 20
Luxembourg -0.14 -0.04 -0.18 17
Netherlands 0.09 -0.11 0.32* 0.11 25
Norway -0.89* -0.63* -0.39 0.85* 11
Portugal 0.22 -0.29 5
Spain. -0.25 -0.22 0.22 -0.28 6
Sweden -0.92* -0.88* -0.80* 0.90* 12
Switzerland 0.10 -0.50 0.08 4
United States -0.46* -0.37* 0.39* 0.45* 27
Note: * p < 0.05
Explaining trends within countries
We next tried to explain trends ·within countries using zero-order correlations.
However, before looking at these correlations, a remark about the actual scores on
the explanatory variables is necessary. Our hypotheses do not distinguish between
explaining differences in the course of time and explaining differences across
countries. Thus, on theoretical grounds, all explanatory factors can be expected to
explain both differences between countries and trends within countries. In fact,
however, the scores of some of our explanatory variables hardly show any variation
within countries, As the figures in Table Al in Appendix A make clear, the
measures for religious and ethnic diversity, and for class as an issue are almost
constant over-time within each country. In addition, our measure of income
differences comes from one source, and has a very small variation. Thus, knowing
that levels of class voting changed substantially over-time, these variables cannot
explain developments in the levels of class voting within countries. Consequently,
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we cannot test the hypotheses that trends in the levels of class voting within
countries can be explained by trends in the levels of religious and ethnic diversity,
the prominence of class as an issue and the extent of income differences in these
countries.
The zero-order correlations between the levels of class voting of countries at a
given point in time, and the values of the remaining explanatory factors - standard
of living, percentage mobile, percentage manual workers and union density - at that
time, are presented in Table 4.2.2 This shows that the correlations between standard
of living, percentage of mobility, and size of the manual class at various times and
the level of class voting at these times are, for almost every country, in the expected
direction and often significant: the higher the standard of living in a country, the
higher the percentage mobile, and the lower the percentage of manual workers, the
lower the level of class voting in that country. Thus, three of our hypotheses are
corroborated by these zero-order correlations. However, the effect of union density
on the level of class voting at a given point in time for any country is less clear. The
coefficients in Table 4.2 show that in some countries a higher union density makes
for a rise in the level of class voting,. while in other countries it is accompanied by
a decline in class voting.
4.4 Modelling the effects of country characteristics
To determine the extent to which a zero-order correlation between a country's
characteristic and a country's level of class voting is spurious, multivariate analysis
is needed. This allows us to control for the effects of other country characteristics.
In this chapter we used a multivariate technique to analyse our dataset containing
287 Thomsen indices over various year in sixteen countries out of the original
twenty countries. This restriction was due to the fact that for four countries - Austria,
Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal - there were missing data on one or two of the
explanatory variables (i.e. on income differences or percentage mobile).
In this analysis, rather than more traditional techniques like OLS regression, we
used so-called "multi-level" models, that distinguish between three levels, i.e. the
individual-level, the year-level and the country-level. There were two reasons for
this. First, the multi-level approach takes account of the layered character of our
data. In our dataset, for each country there is information about class voting from
various years. Compared to traditional techniques the multi-level method has the
benefit that, by estimating separate year- and country-level errors, it adjust for the
correlation of errors within years and within countries (Goldstein 1987). Second, the
multi-level technique is able to deal with the different reliabilities of our measures
of the level of class voting, i.e. the Thomsen indices? In our dataset some Thomsen
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indices were calculated for class voting tables containing many respondents, while
others were based on tables containing only a small number of respondents. By
including an individual-level in a multi-level model the Thomsen indices from small
surveys were given less weight than those from large surveys.
Some additional explanatory remarks are required about the multi"level models we
used to test our hypotheses. These hypotheses pertain to three types of effects: (I)
the effect of an individual's social class on the log-odds of voting for a left-wing
rather than a right-wing political party in a certain country and a certain year, (2)
year-level effects on the level of class voting within a specific country, (3) country-
level effects on cross-country differences in the level of class voting.4 An advantage
of the multi-level approach was that regression equations corresponding to these
three effects could be estimated simultaneously.
At the individual-level, for each individual i in year j and country k, the log-odds
of voting for a left-wing rather than a right-wing party was given by:
log((1t*Left;jk)/(l - 1t*Lefljjk)) =~Ojk + ~'jk Manual classijk + Cijk (I)
where the variable for the voting behaviour of individuals, Left, is coded (l) when
they vote for a left-wing party and (0) when they vote for a right-wing party. In this
, equation, the ~Ojk-parameter represents the log-odds for nonmanual workers of voting
for a left-wing rather than a right-wing party. This parameter is taken as random at
both higher levels. Thus, it varies over countries and years, implying that the number
of left-wing party adherents may differ between years and among countries.s ~Ojk is
defined as a random parameter since our major concern is neither with the voting
behaviour of the manual class as such nor with that of the nonmanual class per se.
Instead, we are predominantly interested in the differences in voting between these
two classes. The ~ljk coefficient in the individual-level equation represents the
difference in voting behaviour between the manual and the nonmanual class. This
~'jk coefficient is defined as the difference between the log-odds for manual workers
of voting for a left-wing rather than a right-wing political party and the log-odds for
nonmanual workers of voting for a left-wing rather than a right-wing party. As
discussed in Chapter 2 of this study, this difference in log-odds for the manual and
nonmanual class is eqnivalent to the Thomsen index.
Since the major research aim in this chapter was to explain the differences in
Thomsen indices across countries and between years within countries, the level of
class voting within countries, indicated by the ~ljk-parameter, was first predicted at
the year-level by the following equation:
~ljk = ~lOk + ~110 Std. of livingjk + ~120 Perc. Mobilejk +
~130 Union densitYjk + ~140 Perc. Manua~k + Yljk (2)
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This year-level equation does not contain all our explanatory variables. As we have
already stated in the previous section of this chapter, some country characteristics -
income differences, religious and ethnic diversity, and class as an issue - did not
show over-time variation. Consequently, it made no sense to include these
characteristics)n this year-level equation. Since the formulated hypotheses do not
state that the strength of the effects of the country characteristics differ between
countries, the 13110 to 13140 coefficients in the year-level equation were constrained to
be equal across countries. This implied that the effects of the explanatory variables
on the levels of class voting were constant over the countries. Thus, in equation (2)
it is only the intercept f3lOk that has to be allowed to vary from country to country.
The intercept parameter f3lOk then serves as dependent variable in the country-level
equation that uses the means per country of the explanatory variables as predictors:6
f3lOk = 13100 + 13101 Income diff'k+ 13102 Std. of livingk + f3I03 Perc. Mobil~ +
f3I04 Union densitYk + f3I05 Religious and ethnic diversitYk +
f3I06 Class as an issu~ + 13107 Perc. Manualk + SIOk (3)
In order to obtain sensible and interpretable parameter estimates, we had to make a
decision on how to choose the location of the intercepts and the slopes in the multi-
level equations (see Bryk & Raudenbush 1992: 25-29). In this study we decided to.
centre the original within-country predictors in equation (2) around their country
means. By doing so, the intercept-parameter in equation (2) - which is also the
dependent variable in equation (3) - represented the mean level of class voting in
each country in our dataset. A benefit of this centring strategy was that the
explanatory variables at the year-level were uncorrelated with the between-country
variance (cf. Ganzeboom et al. 1989: 36).
4.5 Multivariate results
To investigate to what extent social and political characteristics of countries explain
over-time and between-country variation in class voting, we first examined how
much variation there was in class voting. To do this we fitted a null multi-level
model, which is the same as the model described7, but without including the listed
explanatory variables. As mentioned before, the discussed multi-level model was
applied to data for sixteen out of our original twenty countries. This was because for
four countries - Austria, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal - there were missing data
on one or two of the explanatory variables (i.e. on income differences. or percentage
mobile). Table 4.3 contains the estimated parameter coefficients of this null model.
The parameter estimates of interest are those pertaining to the variable Manual class.
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The fixed effect-parameter of this variable indicates that the average of the Thomsen~
indices over all years and countries in the dataset has the value 0.887. Furthermore,
the variance components pertaining to that variable show that the Thomsen index
varies significantly both at the year-level (0.082) and at the country-level (0.168). In
addition, these parameters show that of the total variance in Thomsen indices, the
greatest variance, i.e. 0.168/(0.082 + 0.168), or 67 per cent, was across countries,
with 33 per cent between years.
Next, to investigate how much of the between-country and over-time variation in
class voting can be explained by variation in social and political characteristics of
countries, as a second step, we fitted the full multi-level model, including all
explanatory variables.s The estimated parameters of this model are presented in the
last two columns of Table 4.3.9 The variance component parameters of this full
model show that of the original variance in the Thomsen indices at the country-level
(0.168 - 0.034)/0.168, or about 80 per cent, is explained by the included explanatory
variables. Of the year-level variance (0.082 - 0.039)/0.082, or about 52 per cent, is
explained. The parameters also indicate that significant variance at the year- and
country-level exist in the full model. lO
However, our goal was not simply to determine the percentages of variance in class
voting that could be explained by variation in the social and political characteristics
of the countries, we also and primarily aimed to test the formulated hypotheses.
Therefore, next we examined the effects of the explanatory variables on the levels
of class voting, as measured by the Thomsen index. These effects are represented by
the fixed components presented in the last two columns of Table 4.3. The question
is, to what"extent do the parameters of these fixed components lend support to the
formulated hypotheses?
Explaining differences between countries
Let us first review the seven hypotheses that have been modelled to explain
differences between countries. To do this, we have to pay attention to the fixed
components at the country-level in Table 4.3. The signs for two of the coefficients,
i.e. for religious and ethnic diversity in a country and union density in a country, are
significant and in the expected direction. Thus, two of our hypotheses are
corroborated: the lower the religious and ethnic diversity, and the higher the
percentage of union members in a country, the higher the level of class voting in that
country.
The two other promising candidates from the bivariate analyses - a country's
income differences and the size of its manual class - are not statistically significant.
Thus, their significant zero-order correlations have to be regarded as spurious given
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Table 4.3. Parameter estimates of multi-level models explaining the levels of class
voting in sixteen countries. 1945-1990
Null model Full model
parameter s.e. parameter s.e.
Fixed components
COUNTRY-LEVEL
Manual*Income differences ~101 -0.068 0.Q38
Manual*Std. of living ~102 -0.016 0.048
Manual*Perc. mobile ~103 0.088* 0.030
Manual*Union density ~104 0.009* 0.004
Manual*Rel.-etbn. diversity ~105 -0.227* 0.091
Manual*Class as issue ~106 -0.133 0.078
Manual*Perc. manual. ~107 0.003 0.013
YEAR-LEVEL
Manual*Std. of living ~llO -0.076* 0.011
Manual*Perc. mobile ~120 -0.002 0.009
Manual*Union density ~130 -0.011* 0.003
Manual*Perc. manual ~140 0.003 0.003
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL
Constant Pooo -0.675* 0.108 -0.678* 0.109
Manual ~IOO 0.887* 0.105 0.357 1.629
Variance components
COUNTRY-LEVEL
Constant var(800k) 0.180* 0.066 0.181 * 0.067
Manual var(81OJ 0.168* 0.063 0.034* 0.014
YEAR-LEVEL
Constant var(YOjk) 0.087*' 0.008 0.087* 0.008
Manual var(Yljk) 0.082* 0.009 0.039* 0.005
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL
Constant var(E;jk) 1 0
Notes: * p < 0.05
N =431,424 individuals within 287 years witbin 16 countries.
Table 4.4. Linear trends (change/IO years) in the levels of class voting, standard of living, percentage of manual workers,
percentage of intergenerationally mobile and union density in twenty countries, 1945-1990
Class voting Std. of living Perc. mobile Union density Perc. manual N. of
Trend s.e. Trend s.e. Trend s.c. Trend s.c. Trend s.e. cases
Australia -0.18* 0.03 1.93* 0.08 2.15* 0.21 0.07 0.37 -8.03* 0.77 17
Austria -0.27* 0.13 2.37* 0:17 3.64* 0.61 -3.09* 0.67 -8.81 * 2.60 5
Belgium -0.20* 0.11 1.74* 0.07 -0.23* 0.10 7.98* 0.29 0.40 1.32 20
Britain -0.22* 0.03 1.66* 0.05 2.31 * 0.14 1.00* 0.53 -3.17* 0.63 30
Canada -0.01 0.06 2.05* 0.24 0.96* 0.20 1.74* 0.32 -2.81 1.88 13
Denmark -0.30* 0.05 1.96* 0.06 1.93* 0.17 7.36* 0.51 -3.29* 0.62 29
Finland -0.30 0.21 2.72* 0.06 7.89* 2.25 18.79* 4.07 -9.19* 2.04 5
France -0.15* 0.00 2.29* 0.08 1.75* 0.18 -2.35* 0.45 -1.68* 0.80 25
Germany -0.31 * 0.04 2.3'5* 0.05 1.89* 0.17 0.16 0.31 -6.16* 1.56 25
Greece 0.16 0.34 0.55* 0.09 - - 0.72* 0.11 -21.76* 7.19 10
Ireland -0.15 0.13 0.54* 0.10 0.81 * 0.13 -3.26* 1.41 -0.18 2.53 20
Italy -0.19* 0.05 2.49* 0.07 4.58* 0.36 4.06* 1.08 -5.57* 1.39 19
Luxembourg -0.14 0.19 2.58* 0.17 - - -0.30 0.94 -1.42 2.54 17
Netherlands -0.01 0.05 1.89* 0.09 2.05* 0.16 -4.72* 0.54 -4.71 * 0.86 25
Norway -0.44* 0.06 2.83* 0.21 0.93* 0.29 1.63 0.93 -5.74* 1.01 11
Portugal 0.27 0.72 2.16* 0.30 - - - 22.77 13.96 4
Spain -0.16 0.30 0.96* 0.39 12.63* 2.73 -8.53* 1.85 9.07 7.64 6
Sweden -0.27* 0.04 2.02* 0.09 1.80* 0.25 7.62* 0.83 -3.29* 0.77 12
Switzerland -0.07 0.25 1.84* 0.65 - 0.13 2.21 -14.33* 1.63 4
United States -0.12* 0.05 2.47* 0.09 1.34* 0.16 -4.09* 0.31 -5.57* 0.46 27
Note: * p < 0.05
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their links with union density and religious and ethnic diversity and the connection
between the last two factors and the level of a country's class voting. The standard
of living factor and the factor of class as an issue had no effects in the bivariate
analysis, and again have no effects in the multivariate analysis.
Furthermore, in the multivariate analysis the coefficient for the effect of the
percentage of mobile persons in a country does have a significant effect. Its sign
indicates that the higher the percentage of mobile persons in a country, the higher
the level of class voting in that country. This is evidence against the hypothesis
stated in Section 2, and it suggests that assumptions used when deducing this macro-
hypothesis from micro-theory need to be revised.
Explaining trends within countries
When explaining the decline in class voting in most countries we adduced four
factors. We hypothesized that if the standard of living in a country increases, the
percentage of its population that is mobile grows, its union density descents, and the
size of its manual class decreases, then the level of class voting in that country will
decrease. In our multi-level model, of the four coefficients for these explanatory
variables at the year-level, only the coefficients for the standard of living and union
density factors differ significantly from zero. The coefficient for standard of living
is in the expected direction, but the sign of the coefficient for union density is not.
Furthermore, on the basis of the multivariate multi-level analyses, the hypotheses
concerning the effects of the percentage of mobile and percentage of manual workers
on levels of class voting have to be rejected.
A surprising result of our analyses is that the sign of the coefficient pertaining to
union density at the year-level is in the unexpected direction. This result implies that
the higher the level of union density in a country becomes, the lower the level of
class voting in that country becomes; The figures on union density in Table A.l in
Appendix A, hint at an explanation for this unexpected fmding. The listed
percentages indicate that in most countries the union density has been relatively
stable over-time, but that in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, substantial changes in
union density have occurred. In these countries, the levels of union density were high
to begin with, and increased over the period under investigation. For example, in
Sweden the percentage of the labour force that belonged to a union, increased from
62 per cent in 1950 to 93 per cent in 1990. Therefore, it is plausible that the growth
in union density was not only a growth in density among manual workers, but
disproportionably one among nonmanual workers. This might explain, under the
assumption that nonmanual class workers who are union members are more likely
to vote for a left-wing party than nornnanual class workers who are not union
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members, why the growth of union density led to a decline in the level of class
voting in these countries. In the theoretical section of this chapter, when deriving
macro-hypotheses from individual hypotheses, we already hinted that the relationship
between union membership and class voting was not straightforward.
In concluding our presentation of the coefficit<nts from.the multi-level models, we
should add one further piece of evidence. Applying multi-level models, we tested the
hypothesis that the higher the standard of living in a country at a certain point in
time, the lower that country's level of class voting at that time. An extra prediction
that can be deduced in line with this hypothesis, states that in countries where the
standard of living rose more sharply than in other countries, the levels of class
voting dropped more strongly. A test of this prediction is not superfluous since we
found a decrease in the level of class voting for most countries. Furthermore, we
know that the standard of living in a country is positively correlated with time. II
Evidence bearing on the prediction that larger rises in the standard of living in a
country lead to more marked declines in class voting in that country, is presented in
Table 4.4. In this table we present the linear trend-parameter in the level of class
voting, in the standard of Jiving, in the percentage of manual workers, in the
percentage of intergenerational mobile and in union density in all twenty countries.
The trend-parameters for the level of class voting are, of course, the same as those
presented in Table 3.3 in Chapter 3. If our prediction holds, we expect that the more
positive the trend-parameters for standard of Jiving are, the more negative the trend-
parameters for the level of class voting in this country will be. As expected, the
correlations of the trend in standard of living with the trend in class voting takes the
value -0.39 (p=O.04).12 This result therefore corroborates our hypothe~is. The
correlation between the trend-parameter of union density and that of the level of
class voting also has a large negative value (-0.36; p=0.07). The correlations between
the trend-parameter of the level of class voting and the trend-parameters of the two
remaining explanatory variables, percentage manual (0.25; p=0.14) and percentage
mobile (-0.04; p=0.44), do not significantly differ from zero. Concluding, this extra
test confIrms the results from the earlier analyses: the higher the standard of living
in a country becomes, the lower the level of class voting becomes. Furthermore,
these results confirm the idea that rising union density in some countries generated
a decline in the level of class voting within these countries.
4.6 Conclusions
Recognizing that substantial differences in levels of class voting existed between
countries and that declines in these levels occurred in most of the Western
industrialized countries over the postwar period, in this chapter we aimed to test
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explanations for this variation in levels of class voting. The specific explanations we
tested were mainly suggested in studies that appeared during the first and second
generation of research on stratification and politics. The general idea of these
explanations was that variations in the social and political characteristics of countries
were responsible for differences in levels of class voting between these countries and
trends within these countries. The social and political characteristics suggested
ranged from variations in ethnic diversity to rises in the general standard of living,
to differences in the prominence of class issues in politics. However, until now these
explanations had not been subjected to strong empirical tests of large datasets and
using multivariate techniques.
In this chapter we improved upon earlier studies by putting the suggested
explanations to strong tests. On the basis of individual-level assumptions we
formulated concrete hypotheses explaining the level of class voting in countries in
terms of seven social and political characteristics of these countries. Subsequently,
we tested these hypotheses using a dataset containing data for twenty Western
industrialized countries and over numerous points in time in the period 1945-1990.
This large dataset lessened the chance of not accepting hypotheses due to a lack of
statistical power, when in reality these hypotheses hold. Furthermore, our large
dataset allowed us to test hypotheses using multivariate techniques. The employed
tests of the hypotheses resulted in somewhat different conclusions for explanations
for between-country and over-time variation in class voting.
When examining bet>Veen"country variation, the test revealed that two out of the
seven characteristics had a significant effect in line with what was expected by our
hypotheses. First, the higher the religious and ethnic diversity among a country's
population, the lower its level of class voting. Second, the higher the union density
in a country, the higher the level ofclass voting in that country. Consequently, our
analyses investigating differences across countries, suggested a rejection of the other
five hypotheses. For four characteristics - a country's income differences, the size
of the manual class, standard of living, and class as an issue - no significant effects
were found. Of a fifth characteristic an effect was found that was significant, but in
the unexpected direction: "the higher the percentage of mobile persons in a country,
the higher the level of class voting in that country.
When investigating the extent to which changes over-time within countries could
be explained by changes in the social and political characteristics within these
countries, significant effects were found for only two factors. One was in the
expected direction: the higher the standard ofliving in a country, the lower the level
of class voting becomes in that country. The other was in the unexpected direction:
the higher a country's union density, the lower the level of class voting becomes in
that country. An additional analysis showed how a growth in union density could
lead to a decline in the level of class voting, probably because of a rise in union
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membership among nonmanual workers in some countries.
The falsification of many of the hypotheses of this chapter, in our view, does not
necessitate their outright rejection. In this chapter we sought to derive various
specific macro-hypotheses from a single general individual theory. We did so to
bring order into a seemingly unrelated list of hypotheses. Yet, this was not a goal
in itself. When deriving macro-predictions from micro-statements, additional
assumptions were made. In some cases these assumptions appeared plausible. In
other cases they seemed less so. For example, we made the assumption that as the
overall union density in a country increases, the density among manual workers
increases to more or less the same degree as that among members of the nonmanual
classes. We have already provided some indication that this assumption might be
wrong. We would like to stress that where hypothesis testing indicates that a derived
hypotheses can not pass an empirical test, such an outcome does not require the
outright rejection of the general theory. We would say that the general theory is
needed to suggest ways in which our specific hypotheses might be amended. A
rejection of derivations thus supports the goal of building a complete theory, because
it suggests the limits of current specific hypotheses. An occasionally forgotten goal
in deriving current macro-hypotheses from corroborated micro-statements is to find
conditions under which these macro-hypotheses might not hold. In fact, such
conditions form the bridge between micro- and the macro-levels of analysis
(Silverman 1991; Pammett 1991).
To make progress On the existing literature on stratification and politics, we
continue by focusing on two explanations for variation in countries' levels of class
voting that apply such a macro-micro-macro link. When doing so, we remain firmly
within a class perspective. We do so, not only because a fullbfooming alternative
perspective explaining the findings of differences between countries and trends
within countries seems to be lacking.13 We also do so, because a refutation of the
hypothesis that a person's social class - measured in a certain way - displays in all
Western industrialized countries in all elections the same relationship with voting -
calculated in a certain way -, does not imply the abandonment of a class perspective.
It may be that the specific assumptions behind the measurement of class may be at
fault. These assumptions may have their shortcomings, because the strength of the
relationship between class and voting has been determined using the wrong analytical
techniques. Furthermore, the assumptions may be flawed, because it is not only a
person's own social class that influences that person's vote, but also the class of that
person's significant others, such as parents.
It is in this spirit that in Chapter 5 we focus on the effects of varying composition
of the manual and nonmanual classes on class voting. This class composition
explanation implies the micro-level assumption that the voting behaviour of
individuals can be explained by their membership of a sub-class of the manual or
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nonmanual class. Furthermore, the explanation invokes the bridge-assumption, or
condition, that the countries differ in the composition of the manual and nonmanual
class. If both the micro- and bridge assumptions hold, then the macro-level effect of
the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes on the level of class voting
in that country, might be in order.
In Chapters 7, 8 and 9 of this study we pay attention to the macro-micro-macro
explanation of variation in class voting which invokes rates of intergenerational class
mobility as an explanatory variable. (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: 380-381). Macro-
statements such as "the more mobility within a country, the lower this country's
level of class voting" leave the individual mechanism by which mobility has its
effects unspecified, but hint at several quite different mechanisms. It may be that
mobile individuals display voting behaviour which is different from that of stable
individuals; it also may be the case that the voting behaviour of stable individuals
in a society with more mobility differs from the voting behaviour of stable
individuals in a society with less mobility (cf. De Graaf & Ultee 1990; De Graaf et
al. 1995). In the first instance, aggregating a statement with individuals as units and
using the absolute properties of these individuals, yields a macro-hypothesis like the
one tested in this chapter; in the second instance the statement to be aggregated also
has individuals as units but this statement involves contextual characteristics of these
individuals. Again, such statements fonn an attractive bridge between micro- and
macro-levels of analysis.

5 Effects of Composition of Manual and
Nonmanual Classes on
ManuaVnonmanual Class Voting
5.1 Introduction1
In this chapter we once more address a question on the relationship between
stratification and voting behaviour. In previous chapters concerning this
relationship, we used a manual/nonmanual class dichotomy when measuring
levels of class voting. In Chapter 3, we found trends in levels of class voting
within most countries and substantial differences in these levels between
countri~s. In Chapter 4, we tested, using multivariate analysis, several macro
hypotheses explaining these trends and differences, and suggested that it would be
worthwhile to re-examine the individual hypotheses behind these macro
hypotheses. Indeed the way the fIrst generation ascertained a country's level of
class voting presupposes such an individual hypothesis. It states that a person's
vote depends upon this person's belonging to either the manual or the nonmanual
class, with t.'1e implicit assumption that these classes are internally homogeneous
or that the sizes their "sub-classes" have not changed or do not differ between
countries.
In the present chapter we focus on an explanation ofvilryirig levels of .class
voting that goes back to the individual-level and invokes a more detailed
individual hypothesis than the one behind our indices of a country's level of class
voting. This class composition explanation - as we call it - was already hinted at
in studies of the fIrst generation of research into social stratifIcation and politics
(Alford 1963; Lipset 1960), and was fully stated in studies of the third generation
(Heal;h et al. 1991; Goldthorpe 1994; Hout et al. 1994).2 The class cQIllposition
explanation holds that the voting behaviour of an individual can be explained in
terms of that individual's membership of a sub-class of the manual or nonmanual
class. The explanation furthermore holds that there are differences in the
composition of the manual and nonmanual classes between countries and periods.
Therefore, variations in levels of class voting found between countries or between
periods, when using a manual and nonmanual class distinction might, to some
extent, be explained by variations in the composition of the manual and the
nonmanual classes. For example, when the relative size of the skilled manual
worker group increases while that of the unskilled manual workers decreases, and
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when - as generally is the case - skilled workers are less left-wing than unskilled
workers, then the manual class as a whole will become more right-wing, and a
decline of manuallnonmanual class voting would be registered. This decline
would then not be due to a process of class dealignment, but solely due to a class
composition effect. A similar argnment can be given to explain differences in
levels of manual/nonmanual class voting between countries. The finding that in
some countries the level of class voting is higher than in others might be due to
the fact that in certain countries the proportion of unskilled manual workers
within the manual class as a whole, is smaller than in other countries.
In studies of the first generation of research on stratification and voting
behaviour no comparable detailed class scheme was available to test the class
composition explanation. Recent developments in measurement procedures in this
research area, however, have made it possible to apply more detailed class
schemes in cross-national or over-time comparative studies. One such class
scheme is the so-called "EGP" class scheme, that was originally developed for
class mobility research (Erikson et al. 1979; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992), but can
be applied in research on stratification and politics (Heath et al. 1985; Evans et
al. 1991). This class scheme distinguishes between class members that have
distinct interests (Evans 1992) and consequently might be expected to have
different voting behaviour (Evans et al. 1989). The EGP classification, as outlined
in Chapter 2, divides the manual classes into the skilled manual class, the
unskilled manual class, and the agricultural workers class, and the nonmanual
class into the service class, the routine nonmanual class, the petty bourgeoisie,
and farmers.
Using this EGP classification, we test the class composition explanation for
variation in class voting, by addressing the following question: To what extent
can differences across democratic industrialized countries and changes within
these countries in levels of class voting, when measured by the
manuallnonmanual class distinction, be explained by differences between these
countries and changes within these countries in the composition of the manual
and the nonmanual classes?
When addressing this question we analyse survey data from many countries and
from various years over a substantial period, that contain information about
respondents' occupations such that it is possible to classify respondents into the
detailed EGP classes. For this study, as discussed in Chapter 2, we collected such
surveys and merged these into a single datafi1e. It is this datafile on individual
respondents from 113 surveys held in sixteen countries covering the period 1956-
1990, that is analysed in this chapter. From these data we selected male
respondents aged eighteen years or older who had a valid score on class and
voting behaviour. These restrictions left us with a total of 75,783 respondents.
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The outline of this chapter is as follows. In· Section 2, we discuss relevant
characteristics of the sub-classes. Furthermore, we formulate and test hypotheses
on the voting behaviour of the EGP classes. In Section 3, we investigate the
extent to which changes in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes
have occurred, and the extent to which cross-country differences exist. Thereafter,
in Section 4, we answer the central question of this chapter, i.e. we examine the
extent to which variations in levels of manuallnonmanual class voting can be
explained by variations in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes
in these countries and periods. In Section 5 we discuss the results.
5.2 Sub-classes and their'voting behaviour
Before investigating the extent to which differences in the composition of the
manual and nonmanual class can account for differences in the levels of class
voting, we test the hypothesis that the voting behaviour of the various sub-classes
of the manual and nonmanual class differs. This is of relevance, because if these
sub-classes did not differ in voting behaviour, variations in the class composition
would not be able to explain variations in class voting. Therefore, some relevant
characteristics of the classes that can be distinguished according to the EGP class
scheme are discussed. On the basis of these characteristics predictions about the
voting behaviour of the classes are specified. A sumnlllry of the main
characteristics of the sub-classes and their expected voting behaviour is presented
in Table 5.1.
Following Goldthorpe, the main interests of EGP class members can be traced
back to their conditions of employment stipulated in their labour contracts (see
Goldthorpe 1982; Erikson & Go1dthorpe 1992). This leads to several
characteristics that are pertinent to the voting behaviour of members of the
different classes. These include the amount of income, the degree of occupational
security (unemployment prospects, sick pay regulations, promotional aspects,
etcetera), the collectivistic possibilities to strive for their interests, and the chances
of inheriting capital (see also: Evans 1992; Heath et al. 1985). On the basis of
these characteristics, members of the various EGP classes make the decision to
vote for a specific political party. In this way we assume - as we did in Chapter 4
- that voting behaviour has an economic purpose.3 People know on which side
their bread is buttered, and they realize that they can benefit from voting for a
party that has political goals nearest to their own economic interest. Members of a
certain class therefore vote for the party that serves their class interests best.
When doing so, class members can vote for left-wing and right-wing political
parties. In general, left-wing parties are in favour of active redistribution of
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Table 5.1. Characteristics and expected left-wing voting behaviour of EGP
classes
EGP classes Security Wages Collective Inherit
Action
Service class ++ ++ +-
Routine nonmanual + + +-
Petty bourgeoisie +- +
Farmers +- +
Skilled manual +
Unskilled manual +
Agricultural labourers +
Left"wing
Voting
+-
+
++
+
wealth by central government, whereas right-wing parties are not (Lipset 1960).
Furthermore, left-wing parties are more in favour of better occupational security
regulations than are right-wing parties. The left-wing parties try to accomplish
their preferred policies by raising taxes and by wage regulations. In addition, left-
wing parties are more in favour of collective organizations like labour unions, and
of regulations on heritages than are right-wing parties.
The main economic interests of the EGP classes and the related policy
preferences of left-wing and right-wing political parties allow us to make'
predictions about the voting behaviour of class members. In doing so, a major
distinction between employer and employee classes should be recognized.
Employer classes, i.e. the petty bourgeoisie and farmers, can be expected to
have the least left-wing voting behaviour of all classes. On the basis of their
interests, employers are not in favour of wage regulations beneficial to the non-
employer classes, have a high degree of occupational security, and strong
possibilities for collective action among their employees in general. Furthermore,
because left-wing parties strive for greater equality, they might do so by higher
taxes on inheritances. Since the petty bourgeoisie and farmers in particular are
inclined to donate their property to their children, members of these classes can
be assumed to be opposed to left-wing parties.
Employee classes can on the basis of their interests be expected to have more
left-wing voting behaviour than employers. However, within the employee classes
there are also significant differences in labour contracts and conditions of
employment. Consequently, significant differences in voting patterns between the
service class, manual worldng classes, and the routine nonmanual class can be
expected.
According to their interests, members of the service class are likely to be the
most right-wing of the employee classes. Members of the service class enjoy
Effects of Class Composition on Class Voting 83
conditions of employment which are decidedly advantaged relative to those of
other grades of employees, especially when viewed in lifetime perspective. The
service class, therefore, has a substantial stake in the status quo. Thus, the
expectation must be that this class will constitute an essentially conservative
element within modern societies (Goldthorpe 1982: 179-80), and that members of
this class are likely to vote for a right-wing political party.
The manual classes (skilled, unskilled and agricultural labourers) can be
expected to be the most left-wing. Their members have least occupational
security, lowest wages, and consequently strongest incentives for collective action.
Thus, it is in their interest to vote for parties that are in favour of a policy that is
beneficial to them. Within the manual working classes, it can be expected that
unskilled workers are more likely to vote for left-wing parties than are skilled
workers. In general, the employment conditions of the unskilled are poor
compared to tjIose of the skilled manual workers. Furthermore, the skilled manual
workers have higher job security, and better chances of getting a job when they
are unemployed. However, Evans (1992) failed to find clear differences between
the employment relations of skilled workers and unskilled workers in Britain. If
this also holds for other countries, these classes can be expected to have similar
voting behaviour.
Special attention must be paid to the voting behaviour of agricultural labourers,
whose voting behaviour is difficult to predict. In principle, agricultural labourers
are in the same position as skilled or unskilled labourers. Therefore, they are
expected to have left-wing voting tendencies. However, many agricultural
labourers are sons of farmers, and some know that they will inherit their father's
farm in the near future. Thus, agricultural labourers are a mixture of "real"
agricultural labourers and (future) farmers. Here we are applying the idea that
voting behaviour is not only based on present interests, but also on future
interests. Thus, because it is the interest of farmer's sons that the state does not
restrict inheritance possibilities, and because farmer's sons are likely to vote
according to their future interests, the voting behaviour of agricultural labourers'
can be expected to be somewhere between that of "real" agricultural labourers and
that of farmers.
Finally, the employment conditions of the routine nonmanual class are between
those of skilled manual workers and service class workers. The members of this
class have levels of job security, and wages which in general are higher than
those of skilled manual class members, but lower than those of service class
members. Therefore, it can be anticipated that the voting patterns of the routine
nonmanual class will be less left-wing than those of the skilled manual classes,
and mor~ left-wing than those of the service class.
The next question is whether our predictions on the differences in voting be-
Table 5.2. Percentages left-wing voters by EGP classes in sixteen countries, 1956-1990
Unskilled Skilled Agric. Routine Service class Petty bourg. Fanners
manual manual labourers nonmanual
Australia 1961-70 70.3 69.4 62.7 49.3 37.5 47.2 19.6
1971-80 69.6 74.1 66.6 50.1 35.6 42.3 12.8
1981-90 68.6 63.7 49.4 52.6 43.9 40.9 16.6
Austria 1971-80 74.1 74.5 30.7 43.5 52.0 26.0 11.1
1981-90 62.1 63.3 35.7 57.6 47.6 24.3 5.7
Belgium* 1971-80 44.7 54.4 - 24.1 21.0 15.7 13.0
Britain 1961-70 65.8 67.8 56.2 40.2 24.6 23.8 14.4
1971-80 58.0 57.3 25.4 33.0 24.5 15.1 5.4
1981-90 55.9 52.4 44.0 30.6 23.8 27.0 13.9
Canada 1971-80 . 17.5 17.8 23.8 16.1 12.6 6.8 24.1
Denmark* 1971-80 73.1 74.0 - 50.3 31.4 19.4 3.9
1981-90 70.2 77.9 - 49.2 18.0 5.8 8.0
Finland 1971-80 73.1 75.6 68.4 53.3 32.7 31.4 9.3
France 1971-80 72.4 63.9 58.0 60.2 45.0 30.3 25.2
Gennany 1961-70 63.0 62.3 53.3 53.9 46.9 30.6 3.3
1971-80 54.1 58.4 39.5 41.5 39.0 15.4 7.1
1981-90 50.9 49.7 33.3 36.0 33.5 ' 17.8 12.5
Table 5.2. (Continued)
Unskilled Skilled A$ric. Routine Service class Petty bourg. Fanners
manual manual labourers nonmanual
Ireland 1981-90 22.6 21.0 21.4 26.3 10.3 3.0 2.8
Italy 1961-70 63.9 58.1 45.7 38.1 25.0 42.9 40.8
1971-80 73.9 68.7 50.0 46.4 53.1 53.9 30.6
1981-90 57.9 53.8 55.3 46.6 42.2 32.7 33.3
Netherlands 1961-70 45.0 38.9 30.7 27.2 19.8 17.8 5.1
1971-80 51.2 50.8 27.1 34.4 27.8 16.8 5.8
1981-90 47.4 43.8 32.6 31.7 27.4 21.3 10.5
Norway 1961-70 75.6 76.8 45.4 60.3 26.7 48.4 21.9
1971-80 70.0 65.0 69.2 50.0 30.2 39.3 13.0
1981-90 52.2 54.6 46.7 36.4 26.6 37.1 23.9
Sweden 1971-80 71.4 80.7 46.1 50.0 38.9 26.6 6.6
1981-90 47.8 50.9 20.0 29.0 29.2 18.5 7.1
Switzerland 1971-80 45.6 39.8 0.0 29.8 16.5 14.8 5.3
United States 1956-60 48.6 51.7 66.6 42.3 33.4 49.0 43.4
1961-70 68.3 61.1 58.4 61.3 56.7 55.9 53.8
1971-80 54.9 48.4 53.0 42.4 36.1 45.6 31.5
1981-90 47.3 40.0 27.3 37.6 31.0 29.4 41.8
All data 1945-90 56.9 55.3 43.4 40.6 32.6 29.8 18.3
Note: Not all figures for Belgium and Denmark could be given, because in these countries agricultural labourers are classified as unskilled
manual workers.
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haviour between the EGP classes can be confrrmed empirically. To answer that
question we examine the voting behaviour of the various EGP classes in our
dataset. Therefore, in Table 5.2 the percentages of left-wing voters in the various
EGP classes are presented for the sixteen countries and, where our dataset is
sufficient, for four periods: 1956-1960, 1961-70, 1971-1980, and 1981-1990. We
find that the voting behaviour of the unskilled and skilled manual classes is very
similar in most of the countries. This hints at the fact that - similar to the
situation in Britain as described by Evans (1992) - the employment relations of
these two classes are not very different. However, the major conclusion that can
be drawn is that substantial differences in voting behaviour exist between the
other EGP classes. Agricultural labourers are in gener!li less left-wing than
unskilled and skilled manual workers. Their voting behaviour resembles that of
the routine nonmanual class. The service class is significantly less inclined to vote
for left-wing parties than is the routine nonmanual class. The voting behaviour of
the petty bourgeoisie does not differ much from that of the service class. Only in
Austria, Denmark and Germany are the petty bourgeoisie far more right-wing
than the service class. Finally, the farming class by far contains the most right-
wing voters. Only in Canada and the United States are farmers relatively left-
wing. Thus, the conclusion is that in all countries and periods under investigation,
the EGP classes differ substantially in their voting behaviour, and that in general
the pattern of differences in voting behaviour between the EGP classes is like we
expected.
5.3 Variation in composition of mannal and nonmannal classes
Having established the expected differences in voting behaviour between the sub-
classes of the manual and nonmanual classes, it is of interest to pay attention to
the composition of manual and nonmanual classes. In particular, we raise the
question of whether cross-national differences in the composition of the manual
and nonmanual classes have existed and whether changes have occurred in the
countries under investigation. After all, if it is assumed that the composition of
the manual and nonmanual classes did not vary at all, then any detected variation
in manuallnonmanual class voting can not possibly be explained by the class
composition explanation.
In Table 5.3 the distributions of the EGP classes are presented over four
periods for the various countries. Because we are interested in composition
changes within the manual and within the nonmanual classes, the percentage
figures for the unskilled, skilled, and agricultural labourers sum to 100. So do the
percentages for the routine nonmanual, service class members, petty bourgeoisie
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and fanners. According to the figures in Table 5.3, there are substantial
differences between countries with respect to the composition of the manual and
nonmanual classes. The composition of the manual class shows some variation
with respect to the agricultural class, although the differences become smaller
over-time. This percentage is largest in the earliest period in Italy, and is smallest
in Switzerland and the United States. For Italy in the period 1961-1970, however,
the percentage of agricultural workers (28 per cent) has to be considered as an
outlier. This is probably due to the small number of cases in the data for Italy in
that period. With respect to the unskilled and skilled manual classes, it can be
seen that the Irish case is an extreme one, with only 38 per cent of manual
workers in the skilled manual class and 55 per cent in the unskilled manual class.
The other extreme is France were 77 per cent of manual workers are in the
skilled manual class and only 19 per cent in the unskilled manual class. The
composition of the nonmanual class differs mainly in the percentages of fanners
and service class members. In Britain, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden and the United States, the service class forms the largest part of
the nonmanual class. Furthermore, the fanners constitute a relatively large group
in Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Italy.
In order to get an impression of the class-composition changes over-time in the
composition of the manual and nonmanual classes, we present, in Table 5.4,
summary measures for trends in the distribution of EGP classes within the manual
and nonmanual classes.' For every country a linear regression analysis was
performed, where the percentages in a year were regressed on a variable "year".
The obtained trend-parameters represent the change in the relative percentages of
distribution per year. For example, a trend-parameter that has a value one,
indicates that the relative size of that class grows by one per cent each year.
Positive trend-parameters indicate a growth and negative trend-parameters a
decline in the relative size of a class. Since only one survey was available for
Belgium, Canada, and France, and since for Ireland only two surveys in
successive years were accessible, no trend-parameters for these countries were
estimated.
The parameters in Table 5.4 show that within the nonmanual class the major
change during the last decades has been the substantial growth of the service
class. Furthermore, a decrease in the size of the fanner population has occurred in
all countries. Except in Australia, Denmark, Ireland and Norway, there has also
been a decline of the petty bourgeoisie. The picture for the routine nonmanual
class is more mixed. With regard to the manual class, there has been a decrease
in the percentage of agricultural labourers in almost all countries. For unskilled
and skilled manual workers, the general picture is somewhat vague.
Summarizing, it is clear that substantial differences between countries exist in
Table 5.3. Composition (in percentages) of manual and nonmanual classes in sixteen countries, 1956-1990
Manual classes Nonmanual classes
Unskilled Skilled Agric. Routine Service Petty Farmers
manual manual labourers nonmanual class bourg.
Australia 1961-70 38.4 56.2 5.3 21.5 48.8 8.7 20.9
1971-80 42.6 52.0 5.3 21.5 44.9 19.7 13.7
1981-90 42.1 52.5 5.2 19.1 62.1 11.3 7.2
Austria 1971-80 45.3 49.3 5.2 ·16.6 42.7 9.8 30.7
1981-90 30.3 66.7 3.5 26.0 44.8 8.6 20.4
Belgium* 1971-80 49.0 50.9 - 57.5 16.1 19.8 6.5
Britain 1961-70 43.5 53.3 3.1 23.9 54.1 16.3 5.5
1971-80 43.0 52.6 4.2 17.2 62.1 15.9 4.7
1981-90 40.4 57.1 2.4 12.5 70.0 14.8 2.5
Canada 1971-80 42.6 53.1 4.2 15.4 50.9 12.9 20.7
Denmark* 1971-80 53.2 46.7 - 23.2 32.7 17.4 26.6
1981-90 44.3 55.6 - 38.0 28.4 19.3 14.2
Finland 1971-80 29.2 65.5 5.1 14.4 36.3 11.2 37.9
France 1971-80 19.0 76.8 4.0 19.7 45.3 14.9 19.8
Germany 1961-70 31.8 65.0 3.1 18.4 60.8 10.2 10.4
1971-80 26.0 71.8 2.0 26.0 59.1 8.5 6.2
1981-90 22.6 74.8 2.4 21.7 64.1 9.4 4.6
Table 5.3. (Continued)
Manual classes Nonmanual classes
Unskilled Skilled Agric. Routine Service Petty Farmers
manual manual labourers nonmanual class bourg.
Ireland 1981-90 55.2 37.6 7.1 8.8 42.9 15.4 32.7
Italy 1961-70 25.3 46.6 27.9 41.1 13.7 27.2 17.8
1971-80 35.2 54.0 10.7 25.5 28.5 31.0 14.8
1981-90 33.9 59.8 6.2 30.9 41.5 16.3 11.1
Netherlands 1961-70 38.3 53.3 8.3 23.2 49.0 15.4 12.2
1971-80 35.0 59.0 5.9 26.4 51.9 10.4 11.1
1981-90 37.7 57.3 4.9 26.1 59.9 7.6 6.2
Norway 1961-70 54.4 42.7 2.8 15.3 48.2 8.7 27.7
1971-80 37.6 59.5 2.8 12.4 52.0 14.9 20.6
1981-90 35.2 59.5 5.2 14.1 62.3 11.4 12.1
Sweden 1971-80 35.0 57.7 7.2 13.4 53.0 16.7 16.7
1981-90 45.1 50.0 4.9 17.4 59.5 15.1 7.8
Switzerland 1971-80 35.7 63.0 1.2 23.2 45.4 13.8 17.4
United States 1956-60 54.4 44.7 0.7 16.6 47.5 16.3 19.4
1961-70 48.9 46.2 4.7 19.4 48.2 18.5 13.6
1971-80 47.0 51.1 1.8 19.6 64.0 8.2 8.1
1981-90 50.1 48.1 1.6 19.5 64.2 9.8 6.3
Note: Not all figures for Belgium and Denmark could be given, because in these countries agricultural labourers are dassified as unskilled
manual workers.
Table 5.4. Linear trends (change /year) in composition of manual and nonmanual classes in sixteen countries
Manual classes Nonmanual classes Range N. of
Unskilled Skilled Agric. Routine Service Petty Farmers cases
manual manual labourers nonmanual class bourg.
Australia 0.17 -0.08 0.00 -0.13 0.78 0.00 -0.64 1965-90 9
Austria -1.04 1.17 -0.12 0.57 0.30 -0.20 -0.67 1974-89 4
Belgium - - - - - 1975 1
Britain -0.24 0.29 -0.04 -0.58 0.80 -0.07 -0.14 1964-90 12
Canada - - - - - - - 1984 1
Denmark 0.08 -0.09 - 0.74 0.61 0.34 -1.70 1971-81 6
Finland -1.74 3.71 -1.96 4.04 4.08 -0.01 -8.11 1972-75 2
France - - - -
-
1978 1
Germany -0.49 0.48 0.00 -0.27 0.58 -0.03 -0.27 1969-90. 13
Ireland - - - - - 1989-90 2
Italy 0.46 0.76 -1.22 -0.52 1.60 -0.69 -0.39 1968-85 3
Netberlands 0.24 -0.09 -0.15 0.08 0.70 -0.40 -0.38 1970-90 14
Norway -0.61 0.46 0.14 0.02 0.68 0.02 -0.73 1965-90 7
Sweden 0.56 -0.43 -0.12 0.22 0.36 -0.08 -0.49 1972-90 2
Switzerland 1.18 -1.46 0.27 -1.65 2.78 -1.04 -0.08 1972-76 2
United States -0.13 0.16 -0.02 0.04 0.65 -0.28 -0.41 1956-90 24
I
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the compositIOn of the manual and nonmanual classes. Countries differ partic-
ularly in the (relative) size of the farming and agricultural labourer groups.
Furthermore, substantial changes have occurred in the composition of the manual
and nonmanual classes during the past decades. Of these changes a growth of the
service class and a decrease in the farming population are the most notable. Thus,
these findings imply that it is possible that variation in the composition of the ,
manual and nonmanual classes to some extent are responsible for variation in
levels of manual/nonmanual class voting.
.5.4 Results
To examine the extent to which variation in manual/nonmanual class voting can
be explained by variation in the composition of the manual and nonmanual
classes, we again analyse our dataset on individual respondents from sixteen
countries over the years 1956-1990.
To begin with we constructed two by two tables cross-classifying class
(manuallnonmanual) by vote (left-wing/right-wing). On the basis of these class
voting tables, Thomsen indices were calculated as measures of the strength of the
relationship between class and vote. These observed Thomsen indices give us a
picture of the differences between countries and the trends within countries in
class voting. These indices are presented in column A of Table 5.5. We find that
the observed Thomsen indices differ substantially betWeen the countries. Because
the same data are involved as in Table 3.2 and 3.4, we again find that the
Scandinavian countries and Britain have the highest levels .of class voting,
whereas the United States has the lowest. In addition, we. also find substantial
within-country variance in levels of class voting, i.e. we fmd a declining trend in
class voting within most countries.
Explaining differences between countries
Next, we address the research question central in this chapter, i.e. we investigate
the extent to which differences in manual/nonmanual class voting between
countries are due to differences in the composition of manual and nonmanual
classes between these countries. The most obvious way to examine the link
between the class compositions and the level of class voting in a country, is to
directly link a single measure of a country's class composition with a single
measure of class voting in that country. However, because differences might exist
in the composition of both the manual and the nonmanual class, and since within
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the manual and nonmanual class more than two classes can be distinguished, no
single measure of a country's class composition is applicable. For this reason,
following Heath and his colleagues (1985: 36) when they analysed the effects of
changing class structures on the election results, we will do some simulations.
These simulations take two consecutive steps.
As a fIrst step, we constructed two by two class voting tables and calculated
the Thomsen indices of each year, assuming constant voting behaviour for the
EGP classes across countries and time. To be able to do this we had to decide
what voting behaviour of the EGP classes to choose as a baseline. To avoid
dependence upon incidental changes we decided not to choose the voting
behaviour of a single country in a specifIc period but rather the average voting
behaviour of the EGP classes over all countries and years in our dataset. We
already presented this average voting behaviour of the EGP classes in the bottom
row of Table 5.2. The Thomsen indices obtained in this way are reported in
column B of Table 5.5.5 The closer the Thomsen indices obtained in this fIrst
step are to the observed Thomsen indices, the more the varying composition of
the EGP classes can be held responsible for differences in class voting between
countries. These outcomes, however, do not tell us about the relative amount of
variation that can be explained by variation in the class composition and variation
in the voting behaviour of the EGP classes.
Therefore, as a second step, we examine the extent to which variation in the
voting behaviour of the EGP classes, controlling for variation in the composition
of these classes, is responsible for variation in manuallnonmanual class voting. To
do this, we calculated Thomsen indices under the assumption of constant sub-
class distributions over countries and time, but varying voting behaviour of the
EGP sub-classes. As a baseline we chose the mean class distribution over all
years and countries. The calculated Thomsen indices obtained from this analysis
are presented in column C of Table 5.5. The closer the Thomsen indices obtained
in this second step are to the observed Thomsen indices, the more the variation in
voting behaviour of the EGP classes can explain variation in levels of class
voting. Furthermore, if the Thomsen indices obtained in this second step are
closer to the observed Thomsen indices than the Thomsen indices obtained in the
fIrst step, then the between-country variation in the composition of the manual
and nonmanual classes explains to a lesser extent the between-country variation in
class voting, than does the between-country variation in the voting behaviour of
these sub-classes.
When examining the relative contributions of the two factors in explaining the
variation in levels of class voting between countries, we fIrst take a superficial
look at the entries in Table 5.5. Subsequently, to come to more quantitative
conclusions, we apply linear regression to the entries of the tabk
Table 5.5. Observed and simulated levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen
index) in sixteen countries. 1956-1990
Observed Between-country simulations Over-time simulations
Vote Class yote& Vote Cla,ss Vote &
Constant Constant Class Constant Constant Class
Constant Constant
A B C D E F G
Australia 1965 1.43 1.02 1.48 1.10 1.26 1.34 1.15
1967 1.24 0.99 1.39 1.10 1.22 1.22 1.15
1973 1.62 1.00 1.76 1.10 1.20 1.61 1.15
1979 1.12 0.94 1.06 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.15
1984 0.79 0.93 1.16 1.10 1.11 0.84 1.15
1985 0.66 0.91 1.00 1.10 1.10 0.74 1.15
1986 0.90 0.92 1.13 1.10 1.09 0.94 1.15
1987 1.10 0.94 1.39 1.10 1.12 1.13 1.15
1990 0.89 0.95 1.18 1.10 1.13 0.83 1.15
Austria 1974 1.55 1.10 152 1.10 1.27 1.47 1.14
1985 1.30 0.95 1.38 1.10 1.04 1.43 1.14
1988 0.55 0.98 1.04 1.10 0.99 0.81 1.14
1989 0.97 1.02 0.97 1.10 1.14 0.94 1.14
Belgium 1975 1.30 0.83 1.10 1.30 1.30 1.30
Britain 1964 1.83 0.92 2.03 1.10 133 1.89 1.37
1%6 1.68 0.90 1.83 1.10· 1.31 1.80 1.37
1970 1.48 0.96 1.51 1.10 1.38 1.45 1.37
1974 1.48 0.93 1.72 1.10 1.36 1.49 1.37
1979 1.29 0.94 153 1.10 1.36 1.30 1.37
1983 1.46 0.94 1.84 1.10 1.37 1.45 1.37
1985 1.51 0.94 1.72 1.10 1.38 1.50 1.37
1986 1.29 0.96 1.27 1.10 1.41 1.23 1.37
1987 1.33 0.94 1.56 1.10 1.38 1.32 1.37
1988 1.34 0.94 1.32 1.10 1.38 1.31 1.37
1989 1.01 0.95 1.30 1.10 1.39 0.99 1.37
1990 1.00 0.95 1.25 1.10 1.38 1.04 1.37
Canada 1984 0.23 1.04 0.14 1.10 0.23 0.23 0.23
Denmark 1971 1.% 1.00 1.10 1.89 2.12 2.05
1972 2.77 1.25 1.10 2.48 2.26 2.05
1975 1.99 1.09 1.10 2.12 1.89 2.05
1977 2.13 1.07 1.10 2.03 2.18 2.05
1979 1.72 1.06 1.10 2.04 1.74 2.05
1981 2.11 0.95 1.10 1.80 2.36 2.05
Finland 1972 . 2.75 1.26 2.23 1.10 2.32 2.57 2.08
1975 1.69 1.07 1.74 1.10 1.92 1.86 2.08
France 1978 0.% 1.01 1.24 1.10 0.96 0.% 0.96
Germany 1%9 0.84 0.96 1.18 . 1.10 0.89 0.73 0.83
1975 1.05 0.91 1.22 1.10 0.87 1.00 0.83
1976 0.93 0.91 1.19 1.10 0.86 0.89 0.83
1977 1.03 0.89 1.46 1.10 0.81 1.02 0.83
1978 0.94 0.89 1.14 1.10 0.81 0.95 0.83
1979 0.75 0.90 0.92 1.10 0.81 0.77 0.83
1980 0.80 0.91 1.02 1.10 0.81 0.81 0.83
1982 0.77 0.92 0.87 1.10 0.84 0.76 0.83
1984 1.01 0.89 1.43 1.10 0.80 1.03 0.83
1986 0.70 0.90 1.14 1.10 0.79 0.75 0.83
1987 0.50 0.93 0.77 1.10 0.80 0.48 0.83
1988 0.99 0.89 0.91 1.10 0.80 0.89 0.83
1990 0.58 0.92 0.84 1.10 0.85 0.56 0.83
Table 5.5. (Continued)
Observed Between-country simulations Over~time simulations
Vote Class Vote & Vote Class Vote &
Constant Constant Class Constant Constant Class
Constant Constant
A B C D E F G
Ireland 1989 1.26 Ul U8 uo 1.05 1.32 U5
1990 1.09 U9 0.58 UO 1.28 0.92 U5
Italy 1%8 0.73 0.82 U9 UO 0.59 0.91 0.65
1975 0.85 0.95 U2 UO 0.68 0.82 0.65
1985 0.58 0.01 0.11 UO 0.69 0.61 0.65
Netherlands 1970 1.04 0.94 1.33 UO 0.97 0.99 0.91
1971 1.09 0.96 1.29 1.10 1.00 0.99 0.91
1972 0.81 0.96 1.01 UO 0.98 0.76 0.91
1974 0.82 0.90 UO UO 0.90 0.82 0.91
1976 0.94 0.90 1.41 UO 0.91 0.97 0.91
1977 U6 0.90 1.50 UO 0.90 U8 0.91
1979 1.12 0.91 1.14 UO 0.91 1.04 0.91
1981 0.86 0.89 0.78 UO 0.89 0.85 0.91
1982 0.77 0.89 1.36 UO 0.88 0.83 0.91
1985 0.93 0.90 1.25 UO 0.88 0.93 0.91
1986 0.76 0.89 1.01 UO 0.89 0.78 0.91
1987 0.78 0.91 1.05 UO 0.89 0.81 0.91
1989 0.80 0.90 U7 UO 0.89 0.87 0.91
1990 0.55 0.90 0.84 UO 0.88 0.59 0.91
NOlWay 1965 1.85 UO 1.77 UO 1.35 1.80 1.29
1972 2.02 1.08 2.05 1.10 1.33 1.88 1.29
1977 1.36 1.05 1.42 UO 1.29 134 1.29
1981 1.26 1.00 U9 UO 1.24 1.27 1.29
1985 1.49 0.98 1.29 UO 1.27 1.44 1.29
1989 0.84 0.99 0.82 UO 1.29 0.83 1.29
1990 0.73 0.93 0.90 UO 1.23 0.77 1.29
Sweden 1972 1.81 1.01 1.76 UO 1.61 1.74 1.54
1990 0.98 0.95 1.16 UO 1.46 1.03 1.54
Switzerland 1972 1.28 1.00 1.39 1.10 U9 1.30 1.21
1976 1.22 1.01 1.55 UO 1.24 U8 1.21
United 1956 0.31 1.07 0.20 UO 0.45 0.37 0.46
States 1958 0.57 1.05 0.59 UO 0.46 0.61 0.46
1%0 0.56 1.04 0.58 UO 0.42 0.65 0.46
1%4 1.01 0.99 1.04 UO 0.45 1.02 0.46
1966 0.88 1.01 1.06 UO 0.45 0.86 0.46
1968 0.61 0.97 0.81 UO 0.41 0.65 0.46
1970 -0.53 1.00 -0.55 UO 0.43 -0.58 0.46
1972 0.72 0.95 0.95 UO 0.48 0.68 0.46
1973 0.59 0.96 0.71 UO 0.47 0.58 0.46
1974 0.49 0.92 0.73 UO 0.47 0.49 0.46
1975 0.56 0.94 0.88 UO 0.47 0.61 0.46
1976 0.20 0.97 0.32 UO 0.46 0.17 0.46
1977 0.94 0.97 0.78 UO 0.48 0.92 0.46
1978 0.52 0.93 0.44 UO 0.46 0.50 0:46
1980 0.48 0.96 0.73 110 0.46 0.53 0.46
1982 0.71 0.95 0.80 UO 0.46 0.69 0.46
1983 0.59 0.95 0.68 UO 0.46 0.60 0.46
1984 0.64 0.92 0.46 UO 0.47 0.62 0.46
1985 0.32 0.96 0.36 UO 0.49 0.34 0.46
1986 0.55 0.96 0.63 UO 0.48 055 0.46
1987 0.38 0.95 0.40 UO 0.48 0.37 0.46
1988 0.19 0.93 0.16 UO 0.48 0.18 0.46
1989 0.22 0.94 0.15 uo 0.47 0.19 0.46
1990 0.28 0.95 0.03 UO 0.49 0.24 0.46
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A visual inspection of Table 5.5 reveals that the Thomsen indices obtained in the
first step show only a limited variation between countries. The Thomsen indices
obtained in the second step show a similar pattern of variation between countries
as the observed Thomsen indices. In addition, the Thomsen indices that were
obtained in the second step (column C) are in general closer to the observed
Thomsen indices (column A), than to the results obtained in the first step (column
B). However, in Germany and in the Netherlands, the Thomsen indices in column
B are more similar to the indices in column A than to those in column C. For
these countries in all years the Thomsen indices in column C have a larger value
than those in columns A and B.
In order not to be too dependent on individual datasets and possible error in
them, we present in Table 5.6 for each country the mean values of the calculated
Thomsen indices of three periods: 1961-1970, 1971-1980, and 1981-1990. For
these three periods we find that the mean of the Thomsen indices obtained under
the assumption that voting behaviour was constant across the countries (and the
EGP class distribution was allowed to vary), has a smaIl level of variation across
the countries. The mean of the Thomsen indices obtained when assuming the
class distribution to be constant across countries (and the voting behaviour of the
classes to differ), shows more variation across countries. More importantly, the
Thomsen indices of the various countries, predicted under the assumption of
constant class distribution, very much resemble the observed Thomsen indices,
whereas the Thomsen indices predicted under the assumption of constant voting
behaviour do to a much smaller extent. In other words, it seems that the
differences between countries in the observed Thomsen indices can to a far
smaller extent be explained by differences in the compositions of the manual and
nonmanual classes in these countries, than by differences in the voting behaviour
of the sub-classes between these countries.
To quantify the relative contribution of both explanations in accounting for
variations in class voting, we estimated parameters of a simple linear regression
model on the entries of Table 5.6. To do this, we took for each period separately
the observed Thomsen indices as the dependent variable, and the Thomsen indices
obtained in the first and second step as explanatory variables:
Observed Thomsen index =
130 + 131*(Thomsen index: Vote constant) + 132*(Thomsen index: Class constant)
The standardized parameter estimates 131 and 132 then represent the relative effects
of differences in class composition and of differences in voting behaviour on the
differences in class voting between the countries. It is to be noted that due to the
way we set up our analyses, these two effects together explain all variation in
Table 5.6. Observed and simulated levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen index) per period in sixteen countries, 1961-
1990
1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990
Observed Simulated Observed Simulated Observed Simulated
Vote Class Vote Class Vote Class
constant constant constant constant constant constant
Australia 1.34 1.01 1.44 1.37 0.97 1.41 0.87 0.93 1.17
Austria - - - 1.55 1.10 1.52 0.94 0.98 1.13
Belgium - - - 1.30
Britain 1.66 0.93 1.79 1.39 0.94 1.63 1.28 0.95 1.47
Canada - - - - - 0.84 1.04 0.14
Denmark - - - 2.11 1.09 - 2.11 0.95 2.11
Finland - - - 2.22 1.17 1.99
France - - 0.96 1.01 1.24
Germany 0.84 0.96 1.18 0.92 0.90 1.16 0.74 0.91 0.99
Ireland - - - - - - 1.18 1.15 0.88
Italy 0.73 0.82 1.19 0.85 0.95 1.12 0.58 0.91 0.71
Netherlands 1.04 0.94 1.33 0.99 0.92 1.24 0.78 0.90 1.07
Norway 1.85 1.10 1.77 1.69 1.06 1.74 1.08 0.98 1.05
Sweden - - - 1.81 1.01 1.76 0.98 0.95 1.16
Switzerland - - - 1.25 1.00 1.47
Uoited States 0.83 1.00 0.97 0.56 0.95 0.69 0043 0.95 0041
Mean 1.18 0.97 1.38 1.36 1.01 1.41 0.98 0.97 0.93
Std. deviation 0040 0.10 0.28 0047 0.10 0.33 0041 0.00 0.35
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levels of class voting between the countries. Therefore, it holds that the variation
in the observed Thomsen indices between the countries can for Cl3/(~1+~2))*IOO
per cent be explained by variation in class composition, and for (~,1(~1+~2))*100
per cent by variation in voting behaviour of the sub-classes.
Analyses for the three periods demonstrate that in the period 1961- I970 a
proportion of 0.3 15/(0.315+0.845), or 27 per cent of the variation in class voting
was due to variation in class composition between the countries. For the period
1971-1980 this was 0.240/(0.240+0.800), or 23 per cent, and for the last period
0.438/(0.438+0.925), or 32 per cent.6 Conversely, in the three subsequent periods
about 73 per cent, 77 per cent and 68 per cent of the variation in class voting
between the countries can be explained by variation in the voting behaviour of
the EGP classes between these countries.
Thus, the conclusion is that of the total variation in levels of class voting
between countries, when measured by the manual and nonmanual class
distinction, on average about a quarter can be explained by variations in the
composition of the manual and nonmanual classes between these countries. The
remaining three-quarters of the variation in manuallnonmanual class voting
between countries can be explained by differences between these countries in the
voting behaviour of the sub-classes of the manual and nonmanual class. Thus, the
claim by scholars of the third generation (Heath et al 1985; Hout et al. 1994), that
the different levels of class voting found.between countries, when measured by
manual and nonmanual class distinction, to some extent are the result of
differences in the class composition of the manual and nonmanual classes in these
countries and not totally due to differences in the relationship between class and
voting behaviour, seems to be correct.
&plaining changes over-time
We next investigated the extent to which changes in the composition of the
manual and nonmanual classes are responsible for the observed decline in class
voting within most countries, when employing the manuallnonmanual distinction.
For this purpose we applied similar analyses as those used when investigating
differences between countries. The contrast is that we now do not assume that
voting behaviour and class distributions are constant over time and countries, but
that voting behaviour and the EOP class distribution are constant over-time within
countries. Doing so, we avoid confounding the effects of between-country and
over-time variation in class composition. In fact, we followed the same idea as in
Chapter 4, that years are nested within countries.
Thus, as a fIrst step Thomsen indices of each year were calculated, while
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assuming constant voting behaviour over-time (not over countries) for the seven
EGP categories. In order not to be dependent upon incidental changes we chose
the average voting behaviour for each class in each country as a baseline. The
calculated Thomsen indices obtained are presented in colunm E of Table 5.5. As
a second step, we calculated Thomsen indices under the assumptions of varying
voting behaviour but constant class distributions over-time. The average voting
behaviour within each country was chosen as a baseline. The results are reported
in colunm F of Table 5.5.
If changes in the composition of the EGP classes are to a substantial extent
responsible for changes in class voting within countries, we would expect the
Thomsen indices obtained in the first step (colunm E) to be closer to the observed
Thomsen indices, than the Thomsen indices obtained in the second step (colunm
F). We find, however, that there is hardly any over-time variation in column E in
Table 5.5 within countries, whereas we find much over-time variation in colunm
F. This suggests that most of the over-time variation in observed levels of class
voting is due to changes in the voting behaviour of the EGP classes, and only to
a small extent, if at all, to changes in the composition of the manual and
nonmanual classes.
Just like for the between-country differences, we can quantify the extent to
which the observed over-time variation in levels of manuallnonmanual class
voting can be explained by variation in the class composition and by variation in
the voting behaviour of the EGP classes. We take for each country separately the
observed Thomsen indices as the dependent variable, and the Thomsen indices
obtained in the first and second step as explanatory variables? We find in the
nine countries where we have data from more than two points in time, that
changes in the class composition to some extent explain changes in levels of
manuallnonmanual class voting: In Australia the over-time variation in the
composition of the manual and nonmanual classes explains 12 per cent of the
over-time variation in the levels of class voting within that country. In Austria it
explains 31 per cent of the variation in class voting, in Britain 17 per cent, in
Denmark 52 per cent, and in Germany 18 per cent. Furthermore, the over-time
variation in the class composition explains 41 per cent of the variation in class
voting in Italy, 20 per cent of the variation in the Netherlands, 3 per cent in
Norway, and 5 per cent in the United States. Thus, we can conclude that on
average changes in levels of class voting within countries, when measured by the
manual and nonmanual class distinction, call for about a fifth be explained by
changes in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes within these
countries. The remaining four-fifths of the over-time variation in levels of
manuallnonmanual class voting within countries is due to changes in the voting
behaviour of the sub-classes of the manual and nonmanual class.
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In the first and second generation of research on the relationship between class
and voting behaviour, studies appeared that used the Alford index as a measure of
the level of class voting in a country. This index examines the absolute
differences in voting behaviour between the manual and the nonmanual class in a
country at a certain point in time. Scholars from the third generation have raised
two points of criticism on the use of this strategy. First, they argue that one
should not focus on absolute differences in voting behaviour between classes, but
on relative differences. In Chapter 3, we paid attention to this criticism and
examined the relative levels of class voting, using the log-odds-ratio. We
concluded that this criticism was right in itself, but that descriptions with both
measures yielded about the same results. A second point of criticism on the
traditional research strategy was on the use of a dichotomous class scheme. When
applying the manuallnonmanual class distinction in studies of the first generation,
substantial variations in the levels of class voting across countries and over-time
within countries were found. Scholars from the third generation claimed that this
variation might to some extent not be due to real variation in the strength of the
relationship between class and voting behaviour, but due to variation in the
composition of the manual and nonmanual classes.
In this chapter we tested the hypothesis embedded in this second criticism. We
investigated the extent to which the variations in class voting can be explained by
differences and changes in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes.
It was presumed that the manual and the nonmanual classes can be divided into
sub-classes according to the so-called "EGP" class scheme.
The main finding in this chapter was that between-country and over-time
variation in the levels of class voting can to some extent be explained by
variation in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes. In general,
around one quarter of the variation across democratic industrialized countries in
levels of class voting, when measured by the manuallnonmanual class distinction,
could be explained by differences between these countries in the composition of
the manual and the nonmanual classes, when distinguishing between seven EGP
classes. Our analyses showed that in the period 1961-1970 about 27 per cent, in
the period 1971-1980 about 23, and in the period 1981-1990 about 31 per cent of
the differences in class voting between countries could be explained by
differences in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes between
countries under investigation.
Furthermore, our analyses yielded the conclusion that on average around a fifth
of the over-time variation within democratic irulustrialized countries in levels of
class voting, when measured by the manuallnonmanual class distinction, could be
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explained by over-time variations within these countries in the composition of the
manual and the nonmanual classes, when distinguishing seven EGP classes. In
Denmark and Italy we found the highest percentage of variance explained, i.e.
more than 40 per cent In Norway and the United States- only about 5 per cent
could be explained. These results then indicate that scholars of the third
generation were right, when they claimed that not all variation detected when
examining rnanualJnonmanual class voting, was due to variation in the strength of
the relationship between class and voting behaviour.
However, our findings also imply that differences and changes in the voting
behaviour of theEGP classes do appear to be the foremost causes of variations in
class voting. Our results imply that in general a substantial part (i.e. more than
three-quarters) of the variation in class voting is due to "real" changes in the
strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour. This then makes
it of interest to address once more our descriptive question on the differences
between countries and trends within countries in class voting, but now measured
by the EGP class scheme, and therefore controlling for variation in the
composition of the manual and nonmanual classes.
6 Description of EGP Class Voting
6.1 Introduction]
Traditionally, in studies on stratification and politics, substantial differences in the
levels of class voting between Western industrialized countries have been found,
when distinguishing between manual and nonmanual classes. The Scandinavian
countries show the highest levels of class voting, and the United States and
Canada the lowest. Furthermore, when using the manual and nonmanual class
distinction, declines in the levels of class voting have been found in most of the
Western industrialized countries in the postwar period. Indeed, in Chapter 3 of
this study we confirmed the results of these traditional studies of the first
generation of research on stratification and politics.
However, in studies of the third generation the manual/nonmanual class scheme
has been criticized as too crude to be useful in descriptive studies on class voting.
In these studies it has been argued that when a more detailed class· scheme - like
the EGP class scheme - is used, descriptive studies on levels of class voting
might result in different conclusions. This argument has been given some merit
by the results of the previous chapter. In that chapter we found that in general
about a quarter of the between-country and about a fifth of the over-time
variation in manual/nonmanual class voting was due to variation in the
composition of the manual and the nonmanual classes. Thus about three-quarters
of the between-country variation in manual/nonmanual class voting was due to
"real" variation in the strength of the relationship between class and voting
behaviour, and four-fifth of the over-time variation.
In this chapter we readdress our descriptive research questions on the between-
country and over-time variation in levels of class voting, but now while
employing a detailed class scheme and techniques of analyses that are typical for
the third generation. We address the following question: To what extent did the
levels of class voting, when measured by EGP classes, differ across democratic
industrialized countries in the postwar period?, and: To what extent was there a
decline in the levels of class voting, when measured by EGP classes, in these
countries over that period?
The answers to these questions are of interest in themselves. However, we are -
of course - also interested in the extent to which the variation in levels of EGP
class voting differs from the variation in manuallnonmanual class voting found in
Chapter 3. For example, it is of interest to examine whether the ranking of
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countries with respect to their levels of class voting, when measured by EGP
classes, is the same as the ranking when investigating the levels of
manuallnonmanual class voting. In addition, it is of interest to examine whether
the same countries show a decline in class voting. The results of Chapter 5
indicated that about four-fifths of the over-time variation in manuallnonmanual
class voting was due to changes in the strength of the relationship between class
and voting behaviour, but the analyses in that chapter did not show in which
direction these changes were. Furthermore, in this chapter we test whether the
speed of decline differs for manuallnonmanual and EGP class voting.
In addressing the formulated research questions, this chapter is one of a
growing list of studies addressing such descriptive questions. Since the beginning
of the third generation, scholars have been using detailed class schemes, focusing
on relative levels of class voting, and applying appropriate techniques to
investigate the relative levels of class voting. The present study distinguishes
itself from earlier studies by its scope. So far studies in the third generation have
predominantly focused on trends in class voting within a single country. For
example, Evans et al. (1991) and Heath et al. (1995) analysed data for Britain.
They found no trend, but only trendless fluctuation in the level of class voting.
Hout et al. (1994) came to a similar conclusion for the United States when
applying a detailed class scheme. Furthermore, Weakliem & Heath (1994b) found
little evidence of a continuing decline of class voting in Britain, France, and the
United States. The aim of this chapter is not only to examine the existence of
trends in EGP class voting in single countries, but also to study differences in
class voting across many countries, and to compare the speed of the trends in
class voting that occurred within these countries.
To answer the questions posed in this chapter, we use the same data as in the
previous chapter. These pertain to 75,783 male respondents aged eighteen years or
older from 113 surveys held in sixteen countries and covering the period 1956-
1990. For all years in each country for which data were available, cross"
tabulations of the EGP classes versus voting behaviour were constructed.
According to the EGP classification seven class categories were distingnished, i.e.
service class, routine nonmanual class, petty bourgeoisie, farmers, skilled manual
workers, unskilled manual workers, agricultural labourers. For voting behaviour
the traditional categories left-wing and right-wing were distinguished. Since for
some years in some countries several surveys were available, this resulted in 103
class voting tables that are analysed in the present chapter.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a description of the
differences in voting behaviour between classes in the various countries during
the postwar period, based on a visual inspection of tables. Section 3 discusses
specific models that we apply to describe the levels of class voting, when using
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the EGP class scheme. By using these models, Section 4 describes differences
across countries and trends within countries in EGP class voting. Section 5
compares the levels and trends in EGP class voting with the levels and trends in
manual/nonmanual class voting. In the last section, Section 6, the results are
discussed.
6.2 Differences in voting behaviour between EGP classes
When using the manual/nonmanual class distinction in this study, the log-odds-
ratio (which we called the Thomsen index) is used to measure differences in
voting behaviour between the manual and nonmanual classes in a country. As
suggested by, among others, Heath et al. (1985) and Hout et al. (1994), the log-
odds-ratio can also be applied to assess differences in voting behaviour between
classes, using a more detailed class scheme. When analysing these tables the
advantages of log-odds-ratios become more clear. When investigating levels of
class voting using EGP classes, the distribution of the classes and the voting
behaviour are regularly far more skewed than 25:75. Thus, when applying EGP
classes, the advantages of the log-odds-ratio over the Alford index as explained in
Chapter 2 are clear.
In Table 6.1 we present log-odds-ratios representing the differences in voting
beh;lViour between the EGP classes for sixteen countries and for four periods. To
compute these log-odds-ratios we fIrst calculated the mean percentage of left-
wing voters per EGP class in each period based on our survey data, Le. within
each period we took the weighted mean of the percentages of the surveys in that
period. Consequently, surveys with a small number of respondents were less
heavily weighted than surveys with many respondents. This had the benefIt that
the results were not too much dependent on data from a single small survey. The
calculated percentages of left-wing voters per class were already presented in the
previous chapter, i.e. in Table 5.2. On the basis of these presented percentages,
we computed the log-odds-ratios. These log-odds-ratios are listed in Table 6.1,
where the classes are ordered from the generally most left-wing class, the
unskilled manual workers, to the typically least left-wing class, the farmers. When
calculating the log-odds-ratios, the unskilled manual class was chosen as the
reference category. Consequently, the calculated log-odds-ratios represent the
difference in voting behaviour between the unskilled manual class and the other
classes.2
Let us fIrst get some overall idea of the differences in voting behaviour
between EGP classes. Therefore, we present in the bottom row of Table 6.1 log-
odds-ratios that are based on all respondents in all countries and periods in our
Table 6.1. Difference in voting behaviour (in log-odds-ratios) between the unskilled manual class and the other EGP classes in
sixteen countries, 1956-1990
Unskilled Skilled Agric. Routine Service Petty . Farmers
manual (ref.) manual labourers nonmanual class bourg.
Australia 1961-70 0 0.04 0.34 0.89 1.37 0.97 2.27
1971-80 0 -0.02 0.14 0.83 1.42 1.14 2.75
1981-90 0 0.22 0.81 0.68 . 1.03 1.15 2.39
Austria 1971-80 0 -0.03 1.86 1.31 0.97 2.09 3.13
1981-90 0 0.05 1.09 0.19 0.59 1.63 3.29
Belgium* 1971-80 0 -0.39 - 0.93 1.11 1.47 1.69
Britain 1961-70 0 -0.09 0.41 1.05 1.77 1.82 2.43
1971-80 0 0.03 1.40 1.03 1.45 2.05 3.18
1981-90 0 0.14 0.48 1.05 1.40 1.23 2.06
Canada 1981-90 0 -0.02 -0.38 0.10 0.38 1.07 -0.40
Denmark* 1971-80 0 -0.05 - 0.99 1.78 2.42 4.19
1981-90 0 -0.41 - 0.89 2.37 3.63 3.30
Finland 1971-80 0 -0.13 0.23 0.87 1.72 1.78 3.28
France 1971-80 0 0.39 0.64 0.55 1.16 1.79 2.05
Germany 1961-70 0 0.07 0.44 0.42 0.70 1.39 3.93
1971-80 0 -0.17 0.59 0.51 0.61 1.86 2.73
1981-90 0 0.05 0.73 0.61 0.71 1.57 1.98
I
Table 6.1. (Continued)
Unskilled Skilled Agric. Routine Service Petty Farmers
manual (ref.) manual labourers nonmanual class bourg.
Ireland 1981-90 0 0.09 0.07 -0.20 0.94 2.24 2.30
Italy 1961-70 0 0.25 0.74 1.06 1.67 0.86 0.94
1971-80 0 0.25 1.04 1.18 0.91 0.88 1.86
1981-90 0 0.17 0.11 0.46 0.63 1.04 1.01
Netherlands 1961-70 0 0.25 0.61 0.78 1.20 1.33 2.71
1971-80 0 0.01 1.04 0.69 1.00 1.65 2.82
1981-90 0 0.15 0.62 0.67 0.87 1.20 2.04
Norway 1961-70 0 -0.07 1.31 0.71 2.14 1.19 2.40
1971-80 0 0.23 0.04 0.85 1.68 1.28 2.75
1981-90 0 -0.09 0.22 0.65 1.11 0.62 1.25
Sweden 1971-80 0 -0.52 1.07 0.92 1.37 1.93 3.56
1981-90 0 -0.13 1.30 0.81 0.80 1.39 2.48
Switzerland 1971-80 0 0.24 - 0.68 1.44 1.57 2.69
United States 1956-60 0 -0.12 -0.75 0.26 0.63 -0.01 0.21
1961-70 0 0.32 0.43 0.31 0.50 0.53 0.62
1971-80 0 0.26 0.08 9·50 0.77 0.37 0.97
1981-90 0 0.30 . 0.87 0.40 0.69 0.77 0.22
All data 1945-90 0 0.06 0.56 0.66 1.00 1.13 1.77
Note: Not all figures for Belgium and Denmark could be given, because in these countries agricultural labourers are classified as unskilled
manual workers.
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dataset. In this way these log-odds-ratios represent the mean differences in voting
behaviour between the EGP classes in all countries and years under investigation.
The figures in this bottom row show that on average the difference in voting
behaviour between the two most left-wing classes - the unskilled and the skilled
manual classes - can be represented by a log-adds-ratio of 0.06. Thus, in general
these classes have about the same voting behaviour. The difference in voting
behaviour between the unskilled manual class and the service class is represented
by a log-adds-ratio of 1.00. Furthermore, the log-adds-ratio for the difference
between the two classes with the most different voting behaviour - the unskilled
manual class and the farmers - has the value 1.77. The log-adds-ratio for the
difference between the service class and the farmers can be calculated by
subtracting from the log-adds-ratio for the difference between the unskilled
manual class and the farmers (1.77), the log-odds-ratio for the difference between
the unskilled manual class and the service class (1.00). Thus, this log-adds-ratio
has the value 0.77.
In the other rows of Table 6.1, the log-adds-ratios represent the differences in
the voting behaviour of the unskilled manual class and the other EGP classes,
separately for each country and period under investigation. These figures reveal
that the differences between the classes vary substantially from country to
country. For example, in Norway during the period 1971-80 the difference
between the most left-wing class and the most right-wing class, that is between
the unskilled manual workersand the farmers, is 2.75, while in the United States
for the same period the difference between these classes is only 0.97. Differences
between the other classes are also larger in Norway than in the United States.
The figures in Table 6.1 also give a global indication that a decline occurred in
class voting within some countries. This can be made clear by examining the
differences in voting behaviour between the unskilled manual class and the
service class. In many countries, i.e. in Australia, Britain, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, and Sweden, the log-odds-ratios for the more recent periods are smaller
than those for the earlier periods.
However, the log-odds-ratios in Table 6.1 are insufficient to conclude that a
general decrease in class voting has occurred within these countries. Examining
so many log-odds-ratios to investigate the extent to which the overall levels of
class voting differ between countries and over-time, is inconvenient. As already
discussed in Chapter 2, Hout et al. (1994: 20), therefore, have suggested using the
standard deviation of the log-odds-ratios measuring the difference in voting
behaviour between the classes, as a measure of the overall level of class voting in
a country in a cem.un year. They labelled this measure the kappa index. The
higher the value of the kappa index, the more the sub-classes differ in their voting
behaviour. Or in other words, the higher the value of the kappa index, the higher
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Table 6.2. Levels of class voting (measured by kappa index) in sixteen countries,
1961-1990 (individual dataset)
1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Britain
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United States
Mean
Std. deviation
0.81
0.99
1.37
0.55
0.90
0.96
0.20
0.83
0.34
1.00 0.78
1.14 1.18 c-
0.83
1.12 0.74
0.50
1.62 1.71
1.23
0.76
1.05 0.73
1.08
0.61 0.42
0.98 0.68
1.01 0.52
1.33 0.89
1.00
0.35 0.32
1.00 0.80
0.30 0.37
the level of class voting in a country. The advantage of this kappa index is that it
reports a single standardized score that reflects the level of class voting for a
particular country in a particular year or period, and therefore provides a uniform
metric for making cross-national and over-time inferences.
However, a disadvantage of the kappa index is that, when calculating the index
on a set of log-odds-ratios, the separate log-odds-ratios are given equal weights.
When analysing small datasets with different numbers of respondents in the
distingnished classes, the· separate log-odds-ratios are computed on different
numbers of respondents. This then yields estimates of the log-odds-ratios that
differ in reliability. For example, the log-odds-ratio for the difference in voting
behaviour between the agricultural workers - a small class - and the unskilled
manual class, will be less reliable than the log-odds-ratio for the difference in
voting behaviour between the service class - a large class - and the unskilled
manual class. The fact that log-odds-ratios which differ in reliability are given
equal weights might bias the results of descriptive analyses when applying the
kappa index. We deal with this drawback later, but since we use the kappa index
in later chapters and our dataset contains many respondents in almost all classes,
we first examine the levels of EGP class voting with the kappa index. We
calculated kappa indices for each country and period on the basis of the present-
108 Description of EGP Class Voting
Table 6.3. Linear trends in the levels of class voting (measured by kappa index)
in thirteen countries (individual dataset)
Intercept (class Trend (change I N. of Range
voting in 1980) 10 years) years
parameter s.e. parameter s.e.
Australia 0.90* 0.06 -0.04 0.07 9 1965-90
Austria 1.22* 0.16 0.24 0.22 4 1974-89
Belgium I 1975
Britain 0.94* 0.50 -0.15* 0.06 12 1964-90
Canada I 1984
Denmark 1.40* 0.21 -0.34 0.38 6 1971-81
Finland 0.77 -0.77 2 1972-75
France I 1978
Germany 1.03* 0.05 -0.41* 0.08 13 1969-90
Ireland 1.54 -0.62 2 1989-90
Italy 0.50* 0.06 -0.08 0.08 3 1968-85
Netherlands 0.92* 0.04 -0.11 0.Q7 14 1970-90
Norway 0.81 * 0.06 -0.25* 0.Q7 7 1965-90
Sweden 1.13 -0.24 2 1972-90
Switzerland 0.71 -0.15 2 1972-76
United States 0.52* 0.05 -0.04 0.04 24 1956-90
Notes: * p < 0.05;
The variable Year was centred around 1980.
ed log-odds-ratios in Table 6.1, and these are reported in Table 6.2. In Table 6.2
it is shown, for example, that the kappa index for Australia in the period 1961-
1970, i.e. the standard deviation over the seven figures given in the first row of
Table 6.1, has the value 0.81. When examining all presented kappa indices in
Table 6.2 it is clear that in each of the distinguished periods the kappa indices
differ considerably between the countries. In fact, the same picture comes up as in
Chapter 3, where we described the level of manuallnonmanual class voting with
the Thomsen index. Canada and the United States have the lowest levels of class
voting, while Britain and the Scandinavian countries have the highest levels of
class voting.
To investigate whether the level of EGP class voting has declined over_time like
the levels of manuallnonmanual class voting in these countries, we present Table
6.3. In that table summary measures are reported for the decline in class voting in
each country, measured by the kappa index. For every country a linear regression
was computed, in which the kappa index was defined as the dependent variable,
and year of survey as the independent variable. Any decline in the kappa indices
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would be evidenced by negative trend-parameters. The more the decline in the
kappa indices, the stronger the decline in class voting in that country. The figures
in Table 6.3 show negative trend-parameters for all countries under investigation,
except Austria. Thus, we can carefully conclude that - similar to the
developments in levels of manuallnonmanual class voting - declines in the levels
of EGP class voting in most countries have occurred. The trend-parameters differ
significantly from zero in only Germany, Britain, and Norway. The fact that some
trend-parameters are not statistically significant different from zero, might be due
to the fact that for the pertinent countries only a limited number of datasets were
available. However, for the United States and the Netherlands, i.e. countries
where we have data from more than 10 years, we can be reasonably sure that no
systematic decline has occurred.
To summarize, on the basis of these results we can conclude that substantial
differences in the levels of EGP class voting, when measured by the kappa index,
existed in the post war period between the Western industrialized countries.
Furthermore, we can also conclude that. notable declines in the levels of EGP
class voting, when measured by the kappa index, occurred in the postwar period
in most of these countries.
6.3 Modelling the description of EGP class voting
When using the kappa index. as a measure of the level of EGP class voting in a
country - as already discussed - we have to realize that the kappa index is
calculated on sets of log-odds-ratios that represent differences in voting behaviour
between two particular classes. When calculating these log-odds-ratios on the
basis of a dataset these measures have sampling errors. These sampling errors
depend, of course, on the number of respondents in the two particular classes.
Thus, calculating log-odds-ratios in countries where some classes are small, and
where we have a dataset with only a small number of respondents, yields unre-
liable estimates of the log-odds-ratios. Consequentially, this also yields unreliable
estimates of the kappa index, and possibly biased descriptions of between-country
and over-time differences in levels of EGP class voting.
Therefore, to describe the differences in levels of class voting between countries
and the changes in class voting within countries, we need models that avoid this
problem. Such models should make it possible to examine the relationship
between class and voting behaviour net of changes in the sizes of the classes and
the popularity of the parties. Furthermore, these models should assume that
differences in voting behaviour between classes can be measured by log-odds-
ratios, and that these log-odds-ratios are simultaneously estimated. Or in other
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words: "classes can be ranked according to an unchanging order that corresponds
to the left-to-right ranking of parties even if the strength of association between
class and voting might change from election to election and from country to
country" (Hout et al. 1994: 29). Models that take these considerations into
account have been developed by Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992) and independently
by Xie (1992), and are called uniform difference models. The name refers to the
fact that in these models it is assumed that differences between all the classes in
their voting behaviour, measured by log-odds-ratios, vary uniformly by a constant
proportion across countries and years? A benefit of these uniform difference
models is that they provide a single measure of the strength of the association
between class and voting for each country and year.
The general uniform difference model,. can be represented by the following
equation:
log((1t*Left)/(1 - 1t*Left)) =
~Ojk + Bjk * [ ~1*(Skilled manual class)
~3*(Routine nonmanual class)
~5*(Petty Bourgeoisie)
+ 13z*(Agric. labourers) +
+ ~4*(Service class) +
+ ~6*(Farmer) ]
where the variable for the voting behaviour of the respondents, Left, is coded (1)
when respondents vote for a left-wing party and (0) when they vote for a right-
wing party. Furthermore, in this equation the seven EGP classes are represented
by six dummy variables. Again the unskilled manual class is defmed as the
reference category. Consequently, the ~c to ~6-parameters represent the average
differences in voting behaviour, measured by log-odds-ratios, between the
unskilled manual class and the other EGP classes.
According to the equation, the intercept, ~Ojk represents the log-odds for
unskilled manual workers of voting for a left-wing rather than a right-wing party.
This intercept is allowed to vary over years G) and countries (k) in order to
control for the variations in the general popularity of left-wing parties in the
various countries and years. This parameter, however, is of limited interest
because our concern is with class differences in voting behaviour and not with the
absolute popularity of left-wing and right-wing parties.
Our main interest lies in the Bjk-parameters of the model. Under the fitted
model, the Bjk-parameters give a measure of the overall differences and changes in
the strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour. They
therefore show in which direction and to what extent class differences in voting
behaviour uniformly (i.e. by a constant proportion) vary across ,.years G) and
countries (k). Thus, these Bjk-parameters can be regarded as the "overall" level of
class voting in a specific year in a specific country. .
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To test statistically whether the overall levels of class voting differed significantly
across countries and whether significant trends had occurred within these
countries, some variations of the Uniform difference models were applied.4 Each
model gives a different representation of the country-differences and trends. To
select the model that summarizes our data best, we compared the fit of one model
with the fit of a less general one nested within the first. The traditional
Likelihood-ratio test and the BIC (Bayesian Information Coefficient) were used to
detect whether the fits of models differed significantly. When comparing several
models, the model with the most negative BIC is the one to be preferred.
Furthermore, the BIC shows whether a model describes the data reasonably. In
that case the BIC takes a negative value.
We used both the Likelihood-ratio test and the BIC statistic since both have
advantages· over the other measure. On the one hand, the BIC statistic has the
advantage over the Likelihood-ratio test that it takes into account the number of
cases in the analyses. To select between two models, when analysing a large
dataset (as we do in this chapter) and using the Likelihood-ratio, differences
between models can too easily turn out to be statistically significant (Raftery
1986). On the other hand, the HIC statistic has the disadvantage over the
Likelihood-ratio test that it is biased in favour of parsimony as against fit
(Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: 101). The addition of a parameter to a model
resulting in a substantially refinement in the representation of the data might not
yield a smaller BIC, but might yield a significant improvement in the Likelihood-
ratio.
In addition to the Likelihood-ratio and the BIC we used the dissimilarity index
to compare the fit of the models. This index shows the percentage of all cases in
the table analysed that are misclassified, that is the percentage allocated to the
wrong cell. The fit statistics of all models are presented in Table 6.4.
We wanted to investigate whether differences existed. in levels of EGP class
voting between countries, and whether trends in these levels had occurred within
these countries. To do this, we fitted models that represent various possibilities.
We first fitted the Independence model, which assumes that there is no
association between class and voting behaviour in all countries and years (Le. all
Ojk-parameters are assumed to be zero). The HIC for this model is only slightly
negative, and the. dissimilarity index is twelve. Thus, this model gives a poor
representation of our data. This model serves as a baseline, a model upon which
to asses the degree of improvement provided by more specific models. Therefore,
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Table 6.4. Results of fitting uniform difference models to class voting data for
sixteen countries
L2 df rL2 BIC DI
A. Independence model (15'1< =0) 6567.9 612 0 -308.3 12.0
B. No differences model (l5jk = 1) 1648.1 606 74.9 -5160.7 5.3
C. Country differences model (15,1< =Ook) 842.7 591 87.2 -5797.6 4.3
D. Country differences and general linear 793.0 590 87.9 -5836.0 4.1
trend (~k =Ook + 151 * Year)
E. Country differences and country 728.3 577 88.9 -5754.7 4.0
specific linear trends
(l5jk = 00k + l5'k* Year)
F. Country differences and country 622.1 504 90.5 -5040.7 3.5
specific nonlinear trends (l5jk = I5jJ
Notes: N. of cases =75,783; df: Degrees of freedom; e: Likelihood-ratio; rL2: Percentage
reduction in the L2 compared to the independence model; BIC: Bayesian Information
Coefficient; BIC = L2-df_*10g(N); Dr: Dissimilarity index, showing the percentage of all
cases in the tables analysed that are misclassified - that is, allocated to the wrong cell - by a
particular model.
for the other models in Table 6.4 the percentage reduction in the Likelihood-ratio
(L2) compared to the Independence model is given.
With the second model we applied, we wanted to investigate whether a
relationship existed between class and voting behaviour. Therefore, the No
differences model was fitted. This model presumes that in general there is an
association between class and vote. In addition, it assumes that the strength of
this association, Le. the level of class voting, is the same in all countries and
years. To do this, in the model all Ojk-parameters are assumed to have the value
one. This model provides, both according to the Likelihood-ratio (AI} = 4919.8,
df= 6) and the BIC (.tUnc = -4852.4), a much better representation of the data
than does the Independence model. The Likelihood-ratio compared to that model
is reduced by 74.9 per cent. This, of course, is not surprising when we consider
the findings of the earlier chapters of this study, and the findings of Section 5.2.
Furthermore, the large negative BIC indicates that the No difference model gives
a good representation of the data. Consequently, we have to reject the assUIIlption
that there is no relationship between social class and voting behaviour in the
countries under investigation.
Next, we tested whether levels of class voting differed between countries. To do
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this, we fitted the Country differences model that, like the No difference model,
assumes that the strength of the relationship between class and vote is constant
over-time, but that levels of class voting vary across countries. Therefore the 8jk-
parameter is allowed to have a different value for each country (Le. 8jk =; 80J. The
figures in Table 6.4 reveal that according to both the Likelihood-ratio test (M} =;
805.4, df =; 15 ) and the BIC (LillIC =; -636.9 ) this model provides a significantly
better fit than the No difference model. Thus, we have to reject the assumption
that levels of class voting are the same in all countries under investigation, and
can accept that countries differ in their levels of class voting.
Next, we tested for the occurrence of trends in levels of class voting within
countries. First, we examined whether we could detect a general linear trend in all
countries in their levels of class voting. We fitted the Country differences and
general linear trend model, which assumes that levels of class voting vary across
countries, but also that these levels vary in a linear way over-time. In this model,
we assume the same trend in class voting for all countries. The 8jk-parameter is
assumed to be linearly dependent on the year variable, according to the equation:
8 jk =; 8 0k + 8]*Year. Because of interpretation, the variable year was linearly
transformed by subtracting 1980 from its original value. The estimates of the
country-parameters (80k) therefore represent the levels of class voting in the
various countries in the year 1980. According to both the Likelihood-ratio (M}=;
49.7, df=;1) and the BIC (LillIC =; -38.4) this model represents the data
significantly better than the preceding models. Therefore, on the basis of t.he fit
statistics and the estimated general trend-parameter (i.e. -0.014, s.e. =; 0.002) we
provisionally conclude that in general a decline in levels of class voting has
occurred in the countries featured in this chapter.
Our next models tested whether trends differed among countries, and whether
these trends were non-linear. For this reason we estimated first the parameters of
the Country differences and country specific trends model. This model assumes
that levels of class voting vary across countries, but also that these vary in a
linear way over-time (Le. 8 jk =; 8 0k + 8]k*Year). Furthermore, we fitted the
Country differences and non-linear trends model. This model assumes that
differences in class voting exist between countries, and that in each country a
different non-linear trend has occurred in levels of class voting. To represent
these non-linear trends for each country/year combination a separate 8jk-parameter
was estimated (i.e. 8jk =; 8jk). Compared to the Country differences and general
linear trend model, both these models show a significant improvement in fit
according to the Likelihood-ratio test (&2 =; 64.7, df =; 13, and &2 =; 170.9, df =;
86 respectively). However, the BIC's have less negative values than the Country
differences and general linear trend model (LillIC =; 81.3 and 795.3 respectively),
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and thus do not suggest a substantial improvement in fit. Given our large sample
size we teud ~o prefer the more parsimonious Country difference and general
linear trend model. However, we note that although according to the BIC this last
mentioned model has a better fit, this does not necessarily imply that there exists
. no trend differences at all among countries or that all trends are linear. For
example, the model representing country specific linear trends uses for each of
the thirteen countries where we have data of more than a single year, an extra
trend-parameter compared to model E. Therefore, this model uses thirteen degrees
of freedom more than the Country difference and general linear trend model.
Furthermore, we already mentioned that the BIC statistic is biased in favour of
parsimony as against fit. Hence, it is very possible that the BIC comparison does
not detect that in some countries substantially different trends occurred, when in
most countries indeed comparable trends occurred.5 Furthermore, in the model to
represent non-linear trends within the countries, for each country many extra
parameters are necessary, compared to the linear trend models.
Concluding, of an the fitted models the Country difference and general linear
trend model gives, when using the Likelihood-ratio and the BIC simultaneously,
the best representation of our data. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate the
parameters of this most parsimonious fitting model. However, because our interest
is not ju~t to give the most parsimonious representation of the data, but also to
give a fair description of the processes of dealignment in all countries and
periods, in the next sections we also pay attention to the parameters of the
Country differences and Country specific linear trend model and the Country
difference and non-linear trend model.
Before we interpreted the parameters of these models, we first checked whether
the Country differences and general linear trend model satisfactorily fits with the
data of tables of the individual countries and specific years. It might of course be
that our preferred model in general gives a good representation of our data, but
that for some countries or years this model does not provide a sufficient
representation of the data. Analyses reveal that for 88 out of the 103 tables the
model fits according to the classic criterion of statistical inference (i.e. L2 / df).
For the 15 tables for which we do not obtain a good fit on this criterion we can
see that they are in general those tables with a relative large number of cases. It
is therefore not surprising that the BIC statistic results in a negative coefficient
for 101 tables. Only the 1970 United States data and the 1979 Australian data
yield positive BICs. Hence the model appears to provide an adequate summary of
the class voting pattern in each country and each year. Therefore; we are
confident in interpreting the parameters of that model.
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The parameter estimates of the preferred model, i.e. the Country differences and
general linear trend model, are presented in Table 6.5.6 In the upper part of this
table we present the estimates of the BI- to B6-parameters for the model
representing the general pattern of association between the EGP classes and their
voting behaviour. The separate parameters represent the differences in voting
behaviour between the unskilled manual class and the other EGP classes.
According to the estimates of the B-parameters, the difference between the
unskilled manual class and the skilled manual class is 0.07, while between the
unskilled manual class and the farmers it is 1.88. The pattern of class voting·
obtained from the estimated B-parameters is - as could be expected - almost
identical to that found in the last row of Table 6.1 where we calculated log-odds-
ratios on class voting tables based on our total dataset.
The levels of class voting in the countries are represented by the country-
parameters, i.e. the 80k-parameters. These parameters are presented in the bottom
part of Table 6.5. Because in our model the variable Year was linearly
transformed by subtracting 1980 from its original value, the estimates of the
country-parameters represent the differences in the levels of class voting between
countries in 1980. The country-parameters indicate that levels of class voting
differed substantively from country to country in 1980. Canada and the United
States had the lowest levels of class voting. Denmark had the highest level of
class voting, followed by Finland, Sweden and Britain. The other countries are
between these two groups. The interpretation of the parameters is that for
example in Norway alilog-odds-ratios are 1.205 times that in the general pattern.
Hence, in that country in 1980 the log-odds-ratio indicating the differences in
voting behaviour between the unskilled manual workers and the service class
yields 1.22 * 1.02 = 1.24. The parameters for the United States imply that all 10g-
odds-ratios in the United States are 0.35 times smaller than. in the general pattern.
The parameters also allow to compare countries with each other. For example, the
parameters indicate that in Norway alilog-odds-ratios are 1.22/0.35, or 3.5 times,
larger than in the United States.
The estimated trend-parameter (81) of the Country difference and general trend
model, represents the general linear trend in levels of class voting within all
countries. This parameter takes the negative value -0.14 (s.e. 0.02), which implies
a decline in the association between class and vote. More particularly, all the log-
odds-ratios representing the difference in voting behaviour between the EGP
classes, i.e. the Be to B6-parameters, decrease 14 per cent points per decade. This
has serious implications for the levels of class voting. For example, it means that
in Norway the log-odds-ratio representing the difference in voting behaviour
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Table 6.5. Parameter estimates of the Country differences and general linear
trend model
General pattern
Unskilled manual class
Skilled manual class PI 0.07
Agricultural labourers 130 0.58.
Routine nonmanual class P3 0.66
Service class P4 1.02
Petty Bourgeoisie P, 1.21
Farmers P. 1.88
Intercept
(Class voting in 1980)
parameter (000 s.e.
Trend
(change I 10 years)
parameter (Ol) s.e.
All countries
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Britain
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Switzerland
United States
. 1.16*
1.35*
1.28*
1.43*
0.01*
1.75*
1.71*
0.97*
0.97*
1.25*
0.59*
1.04*
1.22*
1.53*
1.30*
0.35*
0.13
0.17
0.26
0.13
0.18
0.15
0.20
0.15
0.13
0.23
0.14
0.13
0.14
0.22
0.19
0.13
-0.14* 0.02
Notes: * p < 0.05
The variable Year was centred around 1980.
between the unskilled manual workers and the service class, that has the value
1.24 in 1980, will be in the year 2000: 1.24 - (2*0.14*1.24) = 0.92.
As mentioned earlier, we do not only pay attention to the parameters of the
Country difference and general linear trend model, but also to the parameters of
two other models. The trend-parameters of the Country difference and country
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Table 6.6. Parameter estimates of the Country differences and country specific
linear trends model
General pattern
Unskilled manual class
Skilled manual class 131 0.07
Agriculnrrallabourers 132 0.58
Routine nonmanual class 13, 0.66
Service class 13. 1.02
Petly Bourgeoisie 135 1.21
Farmers 136 1.88
Intercept
(class voting in 1980)
Trend
(change / 10 years)
Parameter (0,.) s.e. parameter (On) s.e.
Australia L15* 0.13 -0.16* 0.05
Austria 1.37* 0.17 -0.22 0.15
Belgium 1.35* ·0.26
Britain 1.45* 0.13 -0.25* 0.05
Canada -0.00 0.18
Denmark 1.64* 0.18 -0.40 0.24
Finland 0.80 0.67 -1.59 1.05
France 0.96* 0.16
Germany 0.97* 0.13 -0.19* 0.07
Ireland 4.68 3.50 -3.77 3.69
Italy 0.63* 0.14 -0.02 0.08
Netherlands 1.04* 0.13 -0.21 * 0.06
Norway 1.21* 0.14 -0.41 * 0.06
Sweden 1.50* 0.22 -0.45* 0.20
Switzerland 1.37 0.21 0.04 0.26
United States 0.42* 0.13 0.01 0.03
Notes: * p < 0.05
The variable Year was centred around 1980.
specific linear trends model make it possible to check whether or not trends
differed from country to country. These are reported in Table 6.6. The country
specific trend-parameters, the 0lk-parameters, represent the linear trends in class
voting within the countries. Table 6.6 shows that in eleven out of the thirteen
countries the country specific trend-parameter has a negative value.
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Switserland and the United States have positive trend-parameters, but the standard
errors of these are so large that no definite conclusions of an increase in class
voting can be drawn. Of the negative trend-parameters six are statistically
significant, i.e. for Australia, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and
Sweden. The strongest decline (ignoring Ireland where our two years of survey
are too close to interpret trends) is found in Finland, Norway and Denmark.
Obviously, for those countries for which we have many datasets over a longer
period of time we have a higher chance of finding a significant trend.
The country-parameters of this model are similar to those of the Country
differences and general linear trend model, and indicate that levels of class voting
differed substantially from country to country in 1980. Canada and the United
States had class voting the lowest level, while Denmark had the highest level of
class voting, followed by Norway, Sweden and Britain. For Finland and Ireland .
we fmd an extremely high and an extremely low estimate of the country-
parameter respectively. This is due to the fact that for these two countries we
only had two datasets in a short period and that levels of class voting in these
datasets/years differed substantially.7
The parameters of the Country differences and non-linear trend model are
important when examining whether non-linear trends have occurred in some
specific countries. For example, some researchers have shown that the trend in
Britain has been non-linear, since it goes down until 1970 and from 1970 onward
does not show any particular trend at all (Heath et al. 1985; Goldthorpe 1994;
Heath et al. 1995). The country and year specific Ojk-parameters of the Country
differences and country specific non-linear trend model, that give the levels of
class voting for all countries and years, are reported in Table 6.7. We find that in
all countries, except the United States and Switzerland where an increase in class
voting is found, in general. the decline in the level of class voting has been fairly
monotonic. Furthermore, in all countries where we have data from more than two
\
years, we fmd that around this monotonic trend fluctuations are visible. However,,
on the basis of the trend-parameters of the Country differences and country
specific linear trend model, we claim that in all countries - except the United
States and Switzerland - these fluctu,ations have to be regarded as part of an
overall declining trend, and not as trendless fluctuations. Britain is no exception
to this observation.
6.5. Comparing manual/nonmanual class voting with EGP class voting
Traditionally, scholars of the first generation of research into stratification and
politics studied class voting using the manual and nonmanual class dichotomy. In
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Table 6.8. Comparison of levels of class voting in 1980 according to Thomsen
indices and delta indices
Country dataset Individual dataset
Thomsen index Thomsen index delta index
(Table 3.3) (Table 3.4) (Table 6.6)
Level Rank Level Rank Level Rank
Australia 0.93 8 1.07 8 1.15 9
Austria 0.96 7 1.29 6 1.37 5
Belgium 0.86 9 1.35 7
Britain 1.06 5 1.39 4 1.45 4
Canada 0.28 20 -0.00 16
Denmark 1.15 3 1.95 2 1.64 2
Finland 1.57 11 -0.06 13 0.80 13
France 0.60 6 0.96 12
Germany 0.64 14 0.84 10 0.97 11
Greece 0.40 18
Ireland 0.76 12 2.86 1 4.68 1
Italy 0.64 15 0.68 11 0.63 14
Luxembonrg 0.99 6
Netherlands 0.77 11 0.89 9 1.04 10
Norway 1.09 4 1.36 5 1.21 8
Portugal 0.43 17
Spain 0.74 13
Sweden 1.48 2 1.44 3 1.50 3
Switzerland 0.80 10 1.16 7 1.37 6
United States 0.37 19 0.47 12 0.42 15
Chapter 3 we followed this tradition and examined the levels of manual/
nonmanual class voting in twenty countries in the postwar period. We showed
that substantial differences between countries existed and that declining trends
within these countries had occurred. However,scholars of the third generation
claimed that variation in manuallnonmanual class voting might not just reflect
real variation in the strength of the relationship between class and voting
behaviour, but might also be due to variation in the composition of the manual
and nonmanual classes. We tested this claim in Chapter 5, and concluded that
variation in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes to some extent
can be held responsible for variation in levels of manual/nonmanual class voting.
Therefore, it became of interest to investigate whether variation between countries
and periods in class voting also could be found when using a detailed class
scheme. We carried out such descriptive analyses in the present chapter, and
established that also when using the EGP class scheme, substantial variation
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between countries and declining trends within many countries could be identified.
This implies that the third generation claim that the decline in class voting in
some countries can only be identified when using the manual/nonmanual class
distinction, and not using a detailed class scheme, has to be mitigated.
However, it might be that the speed of the decline in class voting in a country
is different, depending on whether the focus is on EGP class voting or on
manual/nonmanual class voting. In addition, it might be that the ranking of
countries with respect to both types of class voting differs. Therefore, we directly
compare the results of the descriptions of manual/nonmanual class voting with the
results of the descriptions of EGP class voting.We start by comparing the
differences between countries for the EGP class voting and for the
manual/nonmanual class voting. Measures of the differences between countries in
EGP class voting are obtained from the Country difference and country specific
linear trend model. We presented these parameters in Table 6.6. As discussed
above, these country-parameters indicate the level of EGP class voting in the year
1980. Measures of the observed country differences in manual/nonmanual class
voting in the year 1980 were given in Chapter 3 in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4. We
brought together these measures from the earlier tables, and listed them in Table
6.8. According to the delta indices for the levels of EGP class voting, the ranking
of the countries (given in the last column of Table 6.8) is as follows (ignoring the
strange results in Ireland and Finland): Denmark, Sweden, and Britain are the
three countries with the highest levels, followed by Austria, Switzerland,
Belgium, Norway and Australia. The countries with low levels of class voting are
the Netherlands, Germany, France, Finland, and Italy. The twocountries with the
lowest levels are the United States and Canada. The question then is whether this
ranking can also be found when examining the levels of manual/nonmanual class
voting in these countries in the year 1980. To answer that question we compare
the ranking of the countries in the last column with that for the Thomsen indices
in Table 6.8. We find that the ranking of the countries is fairly similar. The main
exceptions are obtained for Finland and Ireland. These exceptions, however, are
more due to the fact that only two datasets for these countries were available (and
thus the parameters are not robust), than to the fact that different class schemes
were used. Leaving these countries aside, the Pearson-correlation between the
entries in the second and the last main columns is 0.87 (N=14, p=O.OO) and
between the entries in the first and the last main columns 0.94 (N=11, p=0.OO).8
Thus, it can be concluded that the ranking of the countries, when measured by the
EGP class scheme, is fairly similar to the ranking of the countries, when using
the manual and nonmanual class scheme.
Next, we investigate whether the amount of decline differs for the two types of
class voting, and whether the ranking of countries with respect to the amount of
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Table 6.9. Comparison of linear trends (change/IO years) in levels of class voting
according to Thomsen indices and delta indices
Country dataset Individual dataset
Thomsen index N. of Thomsen index delta index N. of
(Table 3.3) cases (Table 3.4) (Table 6.6) cases
Australia -0.18* 17 -0.26* -0.16* 9
Austria -0.27* 5 -0.50 -0.22 4
Belgium -0.20* 20
Britain -0.22* 30 -0.21 * -0.25* 12
Canada -0.01 I3
Denmark -0.30* 29 -0.38 -0.40 6
Finland -0.30 5 -3.51 -1.59 2
France -0.15* 25
Germany -0.31 * 25 -0.16* -0.19* I3
Greece 0.15 10
Ireland -0.15 18 -1.78 -3.77 2
Italy -0.19* 20 -0.10 -0.02 3
Luxembourg -0.14 17
Netherlands -om 25 -0.15* -0.21 * 14
Norway -0.44* 11 -0.46* -0.41 * 7
Portugal 0.27 5
Spain -0.16 6
Sweden -0.27* 12 -0.46 -0.45* 2
Switzerland -0.07 4 -0.14 0.04 2
United States -0.12* 27 -0.06 om 24
Note: * p < 0.05
decline in class voting differs for EGP and manuallnonmanual class voting. The
trends in class voting, when measured by EGP class scheme, in each of the
countries are represented by the linear trend-parameters (Olk) of the Country
difference and country specific linear trend model listed in Table 6.6. In all
countries, except Switzerland and the United States, a negative trend-parameter is
listed, implying a decline in the level of EGP class voting in these countries. The
decline is most pronounced (ignoring Ireland and Finland) in Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, followed by Britain, Austria, and the Netherlands, and modest in
Germany, Australia, and Italy. Small increases in the levels of class voting are
detected in Switzerland and the United States.
To examine whether the trends in class voting, when measured by the EGP
class scheme, are comparable to the trends in class voting measured by the
manuallnonmanual class scheme, we compare the linear trend-parameters in Table
6.6 with the linear trend-parameters concerning manual/nonmanual class voting
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presented in Table 3.3, and Table 3.4. These trend-parameters are brought
together and presented in Table 6.9.
A comparison of the trend-parameters for the manuallnonmanual class voting
with those for the EGP class voting, shows that in all countries, except
Switzerland and the United States, a declining trend is found, both when focusing
on manuallnonmanual class voting and on EGP class voting. However,
considering the f<\ct that the trends for both types are not statistically significant,
it can be assumed that for both types of class voting no increase or decrease has
taken place in these countries. In the other countries it is clear that in general the
larger the decline in manuallnonmanual class. voting, the larger the decline in
EGP class voting. The Pearson-correlation between the trend-parameters from
Table 3.3 and those from Table 6.6 (again leaving Finland and Ireland aside) has
the value 0.67 (N=ll, p=0.012), and the correlation between those from Table 3.4
and Table 6.6 has the value 0.80 (N=11, p=O.OOI).9
Concluding we can say that, although measuring class voting with EGP classes
is theoretically preferable, it is fairly incentive for variation in the composition of
classes. Descriptions of the levels of class voting using both class schemes in
general result in the same ranking of the countries with respect to the level of
class voting and the amount of decline.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we again addressed the descriptive research question on the
differences between countries and changes over-time in levels of class voting in
Western industrialized countries in the postwar period. In doing so, we followed
the suggestions of third generation studies on stratification and politics. In studies
of that generation criticisms had been made about the tendency in this research
area to use a dichotomous class scheme, and measures of absolute differences in
voting behaviour between classes. Scholars of the third generation argued that
although substantial differences in levels of class voting across countries and
declines in levels of class voting within countries were found when applying a
manuallnournanual class distinction and a measure of absolute class voting, this
might not be the case when applying a more detailed class scheme and measures
of relative class voting.
In this chapter we investigated whether differences between countries and trends
within countries in levels of relative class voting could be found when applying a
detailed class scheme. To examine this, data from 113 national representative
surveys of sixteen Western industrialized countries over the period 1956-1990
were analysed. These survey data allowed us to distinguish between detailed
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classes according to the EGP class scheme. To deal with detailed classes and to
use log-odds-ratios as measure of the strength of the relationship between these
two variables, we used special loglinear models for -analysing the strength of the
relationship between two categorical variables, such as social class and voting
behaviour.
A major finding of this chapter was that substantial differences in levels of class
voting, when measured by EGP classes, have existed between democratic
industrialized countries in the postwar period. In fact, the ranking of the countries
was similar to that found when examining the differences between countries in
manual/nonmanual class voting. The Scandinavian countries had the highest levels
and the United States and Canada the lowest. Furthermore, we found that in many
democratic industrialized countries in the postwar period a declining trend
occurred in levels of class voting, when measured by EGP classes. Again, these
results resemble those of our examinations of the manual/nonmanual class voting
in these countries. The strongest declines were found in the Scandinavian
countries. In Switzerland and the United States no trends were found.
Our results thus correspond to the conclusions of Hout et al. (1994) that claims
of the declining significance of class are unfounded in the United States. This is
not obvious, since they used a different class scheme, and analysed data from the
American Election Studies for the period after 1970, while for that period we
used data from the General Social Surveys. We decided not to use the American
National Election Studies, since we were unable to come to a comparable EGP
class scheme with these data.
Our [mdings, however, do not correspond to those obtained by Heath et al.
(1985), Evans et al. (1991) and Heath et al. (1995). They found over-time
variations in levels of class voting in Britain over about the same period, but
argued that this was trendless fluctuation. We found for the same period a
declining trend in class voting in Britain. These different conclusions might be
due to different analyses. First, we used not only data from the British Election
studies as they did. We also analysed data from the International Social Science
Program ongoing since 1985. Second, we restricted our analyses to men, while
their analyses were based on both male and female respondents. The different
conclusions, however, might also be due to different interpretation of the same
type of findings. Heath et al. (1995) for example found that a model of linear
trend resulted in a better fit than a no trend model, but did not fit better than the
non-linear trend model (when classifying respondents to the class of the head of
household). They concluded that no linear trend existed, where we concluded on
similar results that trended variation took place.
However, leaving the findings for Britain aside, we suggest that in general
substantial differences between countries have existed in levels of class voting
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and that in most democratic industrialized countries significant declines in these
levels have occurred. It thus remains of interest to search for explanations of the
variation in class voting. In the next three chapters we pay attention to one
particular explanation, i.e. one concerning the effects of intergenerational class
mobility on levels of class voting.

7 Effects of Individual Intergenerational Class
Mobility on Voting Behaviour
7.1 Introductionl
In this study our prime concern is with explaining the varying strength of the
relationship between social class and voting behaviour in societies. Some of these
explanations such as those tested in Chapter 4 concern solely the macro-level.
Other explanations also take the micro-level into account. In the present and the
next two chapters we focus on an explanation that makes assumptions at both the
micro- and the macro-level. This explanation concerns the effects of rates of
intergenerational class mobility in countries on the levels of class voting in these
countries.
This explanation, that in particular has been suggested in studies of the fIrst
and third generation of research on stratifIcation and politics, holds that we have
to realize that classes in modem societies may be seen as comprising two types of
persons: one more or less permanent "core" members, i.e. the intergenerationally
immobile, the other made up of individuals of relatively recent membership, i.e.
in our case the intergenerationally mobile. The latter are those who have either
ascended or descended the social ladder with regard to their parents' social
positions. Such- intergenerational class mobility occurs in all Western countries,
although its extent and pattern tend to differ across countries and over-time.
Processes of class mobility, it is therefore argued, may help to explain "class-
deviant" behaviour within a country (Abramson 1972) and cross-national and
over-time variations in levels of class voting (Alford 1963; De Graaf & Ultee
1990). We examine the macro-level explanation linking the mobility patterns of
countries with the levels of class voting in these countries in Chapter 9.
However, before doing that, in this and in the following chapter we investigate
the micro-level relationship between intergenerational class mobility and
individual voting behaviour. As was already indicated in Chapters 1 and 4, it is
important to take the micro-level assumptions, upon which macro-level
hypotheses are built, into account. Results of studies of the three generations of
research on stratifIcation and politics suggest that "intergenerational mobility may
affect attitudes through two fundamentally different processes (Lipset &
Zetterberg 1956; Lipset & Bendix 1959; Barber 1970; Abramson & Books 1971;
Abramson 1972; Knoke 1973; Turner 1992; Weakliem 1992). Mobile individuals
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may change their social and political attitudes as a result of their own mobility; or
people may change their attitudes because they perceive other individuals as
mobile" (Abramson & Books 1971). In the next chapter, we pay attention to the
second process, but in the present chapter we focus on the fIrst process when
addressing the question: What are the effects of individual intergenerational class
mobility on the voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile persons?
The present chapter is, as discussed in Chapter 1, not the fIrst study that
examines the effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour. Studies
from all three distinguished generations have investigated these effects. Over
these three generations considerable progress has been made with respect to the
content of hypotheses, measurement procedures, data collection and techniques of
analyses. In studies of the fIrst generation relatively unspecifIed hypotheses were
tested by inspecting with the naked eye percentage figures in tables cross-
classifying manual and nonmanual classes with voting behaviour. These cross-
tabulations were constructed from relatively small datasets. In studies of the third
generation more precise hypotheses were tested. Furthermore, these studies
analysed good quality data from large scale surveys containing information about
detailed class schemes. In addition, complicated and - more importantly -
substantively appropriate techniques of analyses were employed.
In this chapter we build on the studies of the third generation in various ways.
First, we discuss two main explanations of the relationship between class and
voting behaviour that are central in these studies. Based on these explanations, we
suggest some precise hypotheses about the effects of individuals' intergenerational
class mobility on their voting behaviour. Second, we employ, as. in the previous
two chapters, our individual dataset containing data from sixteen· countries. These
data contain detailed information about current and former class position of
respondents. Also as in the previous two chapters, we select from the data male
respondents, aged eighteen years or older who had a valid score on all relevant
variables. This reswts in a dataset comprising 63,120 respondents. Third, to
analyse these data we use models that are especially designed to analyse the
effects of class mobility.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss two main
explanations of the relationship between class and voting behaviour. On the basis
of these explanations we suggest some hypotheses about the effects of
individuals' intergenerational class mobility on their voting behaviour. In Section
3 we discuss the models we use to test these hypotheses. The results of these tests
are presented in Section 4. In the last section, Section 5, some conclusions are
drawn.
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7.2 Hypotheses
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In order to gain insight into the consequences of intergenerational class mobility,
we begin with two main approaches of individual voting behaviour. The fIrst is
the so-called "economic theory of political behaviour" (Downs 1957), sometimes
also known as the "instrumental theory". Its basic idea is that voting behaviour is
rational and self-interested: people vote for the party whose policies will bring
them the greatest utility. Class voting can then be explained on the grounds that
people in lower social classes have an interest in egalitarian redistributive
policies, which are typically espoused by left-wing parties, while the members of
higher social classes have an interest in opposing such policies (Lipset et al.
1954).
The second approach, labelled by Heath et al. (1985: 9) the "expressive
theory", conceives voting as a social act rather than an instrumental one. In this
theory, it is assumed that people have a political identity and that this identity is
developed through interaction with others. Individual voting behaviour is thus an
expression of a person's political identity and will in tum reflect the norms and
values of a person's normative membership group. With this theory, too, it is
relatively straightforward to explain the relationship between class position and
voting behaviour. In many cases people associate with others occupying the same
class position. They are raised by them, live in the same area as them, attend the
same schools, work together as colleagues, and thus learn the traditional culture
of their shared class. Consequently, they will vote in the way their fellow class
members traditionally vote.
These two approaches are quite different with respect to their initial
assumptions but, in predicting the relationship between class and voting
behaviour, they are not contradictory but complementary (Heath et al. 1985: 9;
see also: Weakliem & Heath 1994a). This complementary relationship can be
stated thus: people vote for the same party both because of their analogous
interests and because they are influenced by each other and this influence carries
on in later periods. We might add that associating with others from the same class
and thus having similar interests, may make people more conscious of their
interests and of the party that best serves them. These interests will then become
part of people's political identity.
When we tum to the relationship between individual class mobility and voting
behaviour, according to the simplest· version of the theories, intergenerationally
mobile persons are only assumed to interact with people of their newly obtained
class. Furthermore, they are assumed to base their voting behaviour on their
current class interests. Thus, the simplest application of the instrumental and
expressive theory predicts that the voting behaviour of the mobile is only affected
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by their current class position, and not by their class of origin. This yields what
De Graaf & Ultee (1990) have labelled the strict economic hypothesis:
The voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile people will be identical to
the typical voting behaviour of their class ofdestination.
This hypothesis may seem superfluous, because it is unlikely that people's origins
have no effect on their voting behaviour. Although the interests of mobile people
may change, their identities do not change so quickly. However, this hypothesis
provides a baseline against which other more plausible hypotheses can be tested.
In fact, this baseline hypothesis was already discussed and tested in Chapter 6.
A number of empirical studies from the various generations of research on
stratification and politics have investigated the impact of class mobility on
individual voting behaviour (Lipset & Zetterberg 1956; Lipset & Bendix 1959;
Barber 1970; Abramson 1972; Knoke 1973; Turner 1992; Weakliem 1992).
Almost invariably they have shown that the political behaviour of the mobile is
somewhere between that of the stable members of their origin and destination
classes.
Some modest influence from social origins might also be expected if we
consider an elaboration of instrumental and expressive theories. People might
expect their current class positions to be temporary and might anticipate returning
to their class of origin; hence they might defme their long-run interests to be
those of their class of origin.2 For example, in many cases sons of farmers, who
are currently agricultural labourers, know that in the near future they will take
over their fathers' farms and become farmers themselves. This may cause them to
exhibit patterns of political behaviour that are more in line with .the class from
which they came (and that to which they are likely to return) than the class to
which they currently belong. Another reason why class origins may influence
people's political identities and their voting behaviour is that, as Goldthorpe
(1980) points out, people are likely to interact with members of their former
class, and not only with members of their own current class. Therefore, the weak
economic hypothesis reads:
The voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile people will be betwe(jm the
typical voting behaviour of their class of destination and the typical voting
behaviour of their class of origin.
This hypothesis only says that the voting behaviour will be "somewhere" between
that of the origin and destination class. A less vague hypothesis predicts that
social origins will have a more important role for young people than for older
people. This specification is in line with Elau's "pattern of acculturation" (1956)
and follows the expressive theory of voting behaviour. The culture of people's
origin class is likely to be particularly important in early political socialization
(Campbell et al. 1960; Butler & Stokes 1974; Nieuwbeerta & Wittebrood 1995).
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Furthermore, social networks change slowly and it may take time for the mobile
to integrate socially into their class of destination and thereby lose their old social
identities. Thus, assuming that older respondents in general have had longer
periods in their class of destination than have younger people, the acculturation
hypothesis can be formulated: 3
The voting behaviour of older intergenerationally mobile people will be closer
to the typical voting behaviour of their class of destination relative to the
typical voting behaviour of their class of origin, than will the voting behaviour
of younger intergenerationally mobile people.
Another specification of the weak economic hypothesis assumes an asymmetry in
the patterns of adaptation of upwardly and downwardly mobile people. Lipset
(1960), for example, found when analysing data for the United States in 1948,
that upwardly mobile people adapted more quickly to their destination class than
did those who were downwardly mobile. Lipset's eJ>planation of this finding was
that people in general prefer to adopt the more prestigious identity and, thereby,
to maximize their status. That is, people may prefer to perceive their normative
reference group as whichever is the higher of their classes of origin and
destination. Similar statements have been made by Parkin (1971: 51, 54),
Thorburn (1979), Abramson (1972), and De Graaf & Ultee (1990). The status
maximization hypothesis, then, is that:
Upwardly intergenerationally mobile persons orient their voting behaviour
relatively more to the typical voting behaviour of their class of destination,
than do downwardly intergenerationally mobile persons.4
The acculturation hypothesis and the status maximization hypothesis are not
mutually exclusive, since the latter does not say how fast the maximization
process proceeds. Therefore, three additional possibilities can be specified
regarding how the voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile persons might
be affected by their individual class mobility. A first combination of the
acculturation and the status maximization hypothesis implies that the upwardly
mobile who have just arrived in their class of destination· instantly adjust more
than the downwardly mobility wh(j have just arrived in their class of destination.
Subsequently, for both the upwardly and downwardly mobile it takes the same
number of years to adopt to their new class. A second combination implies that,
while for the upwardly and downwardly mobile the initial adjustment to their
destination class is the same, the acculturation to their new class takes less years
for the upwardly mobile than for the downwardly mobile. Since the upwardly
mobile gain status, they adapt faster to their class of destination than the
downwardly mobile. A third combination implies that the first two combinations
are simultaneously valid.
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7.3 Modelling the effects of individual class mobility
The formulated hypotheses distinguish between the voting behaviour of mobile
and imtnobile individuals. Furthermore, in these hypotheses the voting behaviour
of the immobile is taken as a reference for the. voting behaviour of the mobile.
The importance of taking the. immobile as the reference has been suggested by -
among others - Sorokin (1959 [1927]: 509-10), when he argued that "if we want
to know the characteristic attitudes of a farmer, we do not go to a man who has
been a farmer for a few months, but go to a farmer who is a farmer for life".
Even better, we would argue, go to a farmer who was born and bred a farmer.
We thus think of the. immobile respondents as representing the core of the class
and defining its norms and values to which newcomers mayor may not
acculturate. We therefore need a statistical model which corresponds to these
substantive concerns.
As discussed in Chapter 1, scholars from the first generation of research on
stratification and voting behaviour. analysed cross-tabulations with the naked eye,
when examining the effects of class mobility on voting behaviour. Scholars from
the second generation were the first to use statistical models to investigate the
effects of individual class mobility on people's voting behaviour (Knoke, 1973;
Jackman 1972a, 1972b; Thorburn 1979). In these models, voting behaviour was
the variable to be explained, while origin, destination and a term for interaction
between origin and destination were explanatory variables. These second
generation models, however, did not correspond to the substantive concerns
expressed above. As Hope (1971) and Sobel (1981) made clear, in these
conventional models the explanatory (reference) categories include - probably
different - mixtures of mobile and immobile respondents.5
Fortunately, studies of the third generation have at their disposal a model that
takes the voting behaviour of the immobile as a reference for the voting
behaviour of the mobile. This substantively more appropriate model is Sobel's
diagonal mobility model (Sobel 1981, 1985).6 In this model the voting behaviour
of mobile individuals is modelled in such a way that it is a weighted average of
the voting behaviour of the immobile in their classes of origin and that of the
immobile in their classes of destination. The model therefore does away with
vague conclusions that the voting behaviour of mobility is somewhere in between
the voting behaviour of their origin and destination class. The diagonal mobility
model allows us to examine precisely how much closer the voting behaviour of
the mobile is to the voting behaviour of the immobile members in their class of
destination than to that of the immobile members in their class of origin. These
diagonal mobility models were introduced into research on stratification and
politics by De Graaf & Ultee (1987, 1990), when they examined the effects of
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class mobility on voting behaviour in the Netherlands. Since then these diagonal
mobility models have been employed in various studies analysing the effects of
mobility on voting behaviour in other countries (Weakliem 1992; Clifford &
Heath 1993; Breen & Whelan 1994; De Graaf et al. 1995).
The logistic version of the diagonal mobility model that we apply in this
chapter to test the hypotheses can be expressed as followS:>
(1)
where Left;od is the value of the dependent variable, i.e. left-wing voting behaviour
of respondent i, whose origin class was 0, and whose current (destination) class is
d. Obviously, for immobile class members the origin and destination classes are
the same (o=d). The variable Left is coded (1) for voting for a left-wing political
party and (0) for voting for a right"wing party. The ~-parameters represent the
log-odds of voting for a left-wing rather than a right-wing party for the immobile
class members in the destination class of the respondent. The 0.0 -parameters
represent the voting behaviour of the immobile class members in the origin class
of the respondent. Therefore, the parameters p and (l-p) are destination and origin
weights which indicate for mobile respondents the relative importance of the
voting behaviour of the destination and the origin classes (Sobel 1981).8
When fitting the models we include various dummies as covariates (cov) and
estimate a ~-parameter for each covariate. Consequently, if we have L dummies
we have to estimate L p-parameters. The covariates are included because when
testing the formulated hypotheses on the effects of individual class mobility we
have to realize that, as we also found in Chapter 4, people vote not only
according to their material interests, but also according to their non-material
interests. Therefore, we can assume that people's voting behaviour, as well as
being influenced by their current and former class positions, is also affected by
their religion, age, ethnicity and the period the live in. When investigating the
effects of their current and former class positions, it is therefore important to
control for the effects of these variables. In our models religion is divided into
five groups: Catholic, Protestant, Rereformed (for The Netherlands only), other
denomination and no religion. Given the importance of ethnicity for predicting
voting behaviour in the United States we include ethnicity (0 = non-black; 1 =
black) for the United States. For the other countries there are so few blacks that
ethnicity can not sensibly be included as an independent variable. Furthermore, to
take account of the main effects of age we include three age groups (18-30;
31-50; 51+) as covariates since there appears to be non-linear relationships
between age and party preference. In addition, we recode the variable period into
a set of dummies representing several periods in which the surveys were held:
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1961-1965, 1966-1970, 1971-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, and 1986-1990.9 This
controls for the varying popularity of the left-wing and right-wing political parties
over-time. In our models we have chosen the reference category as: no religion,
age group 31-50, non-black, and period 1981-1985. However, for countries where
no information on respondents in this reference category were available, other
reference categories are taken.
The model that is given by equation (1), model A (in Tables 7.2 and 7.3),
represents the weak economic hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the voting
behaviour of mobile persons will be between the typical votin behaviour of their
class of destination and that of their class of origin. To test the other formulated
hypotheses, we adjust model A by constraining the p-parameter, or by including
extra parameters in the model.
The strict economif hypothesis predicts that the voting behaviour of the mobile
will only be affected by current class position, and not by class of origin.
Therefore, the voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile people will be
identical to the typical voting behaviour in their class of destination. This
hypothesis is represented by constraining the weight-parameter p to unity. This
gives model B:
(2)
The acculturation hypothesis states that the older people are, the greater is the
influence of their destination class relative to that of their origin class. In other
words, this hypothesis implies that the weight-parameter p varies according to the
length of time that a person has been a member of a class. Model C represents
the acculturation hypothesis and therefore includes an interaction between age and
the origin and destination weights:
10g«1t*Lef~o.J/(1 - 1t*Lef~od)) =
(Po + o*age) * ()(d + (1- (Po + o*age)) * ()(o + PL*COVUod (3)
A positive value of the o-parameter estimate in this equation implies that the
older mobile persons are, i.e. the longer they have been members of their
destination class, the more likely it is that they vote according to the voting
behaviour in their destination class and the less likely it is that they vote
according to the voting behaviour in their origin class. In order to get
interpretable parameter estimates for the Po variable, when applying this model
the continuous variable age was recoded to: years of age minus 40. Thus, the
value zero represents respondents with the age of 40 years. This is about the
average age in each country.
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The status maximization hypothesis predicts that upwardly intergenerationally
mobile persons orient their voting behaviour relatively more towards the voting
behaviour of their class of destination than do downwardly intergenerationally
mobile persons. To test this hypothesis we use Model D, which is identical to the
model that represented the acculturation hypothesis, except that the variable age is
replaced by a variable up/down:
log((1t*Lef~oJ/(1 - 1t*Lef~od» =
(Po + o*up/down) * ad + (1- (Po + o*up/down» * a o + ~L*COVUod (4)
The variable up/down in this equation takes the value 1 for upwardly mobile, -1
for downwardly mobile, and 0 for stable class members. To be able to define
whether a class member is upwardly mobile, downwardly mobile or stable, an
ordering of the EGP class categories is necessary. However, the EGP scheme is
not constructed around one single principle from which a full ordering .of the
classes can be derived. But, following Erikson & Goldthorpe (1992: 45), a
threefold hierarchical division between classes, in terms of their prestige, socio-
economic status, or "general desirability", can be distinguished. According to this
hierarchical division the highest class is formed by the service class, the lowest
class by the unskilled manual workers and agricultural workers, and the other
classes, i.e. the skilled manual class, the routine nonmanual class, the petty
bourgeoisie and farmers, form the intermediate class.
To test the three combinations of the acculturation hypothesis and status
maximization hypothesis that we discussed, we include both the age and up/down
variables in our models. A first combination of the acculturation and the status
maximization hypotheses implies that upwardly mobile persons who have just
arrived in their class of destination instantly adjust more than the downwardly
mobile persons who have just arrived in their class of destination, but also that
there are no differences in the acculturation or age effect between upwardly and
downwardly mobile. To test this combination hypothesis, we use Model E where
both the additive effects of up/down and age are included:
log((1t*Leftiod)/(1 - 1t*Lef~od» =
(Po+ 01 *age + 02*up/down)* ad +
(l-(po+ 01*age + 02*up/down» * a o + ~*COVUod (5)
A second combination implies that, since the upw,ardly mobile gain status, they
will adapt faster to their class of destination thall. will the downwardly mobile.
Thus, the acculturation to their new class taked more years for the upwardly
mobile than for the downwardly mobile. To test this combination hypothesis we
Table 7.1. Percentage of left-wing voters by origin and destination class in Germany, Britain, the Netherlands and the United
States
Destination class
Unskilled Skilled Agric. Routine Service Petty bourg. Farmers Total
manual manual Labourer nonmanual class
Origin class
Germany
Unskilled manual 56 64 60 48 47 16 0 55
Skilled manual 59 61 44 46 45 17 31 53
Agric. labourers 61 60 52 52 36 21 0 55
Routine nonmanual 58 57 67 45 40 17 0 46
Service class 51 44 11 34 32 22 33 35
Petty bourgeoisie 37 37 52 28 28 12 0 28
Farmers 37 38 18 19 21 15 7 25
Total 53 56 41 40 37 16 8 44
N.of cases 1353 3892 126 1250 3146 484 345 10596
Britain
Unskilled manual 61 61 46 39 28 28 0 52
Skilled manual 63 61 35 39 26 17 0 49
Agric. labourers 55 56 41 34 15 34 58 47
Routine nonmanual 46 39 - 33 15 25 - 28
Service class 42 29 10 22 13 14 9 19
Petty bourgeoisie 34 29 0 20 14 11 0 20
Farmers 57 41 24 7 16 25 8 27
Total 57 56 34 32 20 19 9 40
N. of cases 1410 1833 96 507 1725 483 113 6168
Table 7.1. (Continued)
Destination class
Unskilled Skilled Agric. Routine Service Petty bourg. Farmers Total
manual manual Labourer nonmanual class
Origin class
Netherlands
Unskilled manual 60 53 42 39 36 34 . 48 48
Skilled manual 54 50 51 40 37 28 13 44
Agric. labourers 49 53 37 43 31 23 32 42
. Routine nonmanual 44 47 33 34 28 13 50 33
Service class 36 39 22 26 21 24 26 25
Petty bourgeoisie 38 36 25 28 19 7 6 23
Farmers 29 26 12 16 18 11 5 16
Total 48 46 28 32 26 15 8 33
N. of cases 954 1557 155 1183 2443 390 404 7086
United States
Unskilled manual 53 49 23 52 39 38 54 47
Skilled manual 49 45 40 35 32 35 28 41
Agric. labourers 68 43 63 95 50 73 72 62
Routine nonmanua1 32 36 - 21 35 49 0 33
Service class 40 39 14 31 31 23 9 33
Petty bourgeoisie 48 40 43 54 33 39 54 41
Farmers 53 42 43 39 33 39 34 41
Total 39 44 39 38 33 35 35 40
N. of cases 2122 2271 87 930 3148 447 367 9372
"T
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use Model F, where - in addition to the acculturation or age effect" an interaction
effect between the variables age and up/down is included:
log((1t*Left;od)/(1 - 1t*Left;od)) =
(Po+ ol*age + 02*age*up/down) * ad +
(l-(po+ o,*age + 02*age*up/down)) * a o + ~L*COVLiod (6)
The third combination implies that both the instant adjustment and the
acculturation over the years are different for the upwardly and downwardly
mobile. Therefore, in Model G we include both the additive effect of up/down
and the interaction effect between the variables age and up/down in the diagonal
mobility models:
log«1t*Left;od)/(l " 1t*Left;od)) =
(Po+ ol*age + o2*up/down + 03*age*up/down) * ad +
(1- (Po+ 01*a.ge + o2*up/down + 03*age*up/down)) a o + ~L*COVLiod (7)
Models A to G are fitted on the data for all sixteen countries separately. To select
the model that represents the data best, we compare the fit of one model with a
less general one, i.e. one that is nested within that model.
7.4 Results
Before applying the diagonal mobility models, we frrst make clear the difficulties
that scholars of the frrst generation of research on social stratification and voting
behaviour had, when they had to examine the effects of mobility on voting
behaviour by analysing cross-tabulations. In studies of the first generation
scholars typically presented cross-tabulations on the voting behaviour of the
mobile and immobile class members. In Table 7.1 we give an example of such a
table based on data from our own dataset. This table displays the proportion of
respondents with left-wing voting behaviour in each category of the
intergenerational mobility table. Although in subsequent analyses we look at data
for all sixteen countries, in Table 7.1 figures for only four countries are presented,
i.e. Germany, Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States. These countries
were selected for two reasons. First, there are obvious technical advantages of
using countries for which large datasets are available (for example, respondents
are included in almost all cells of the table). Second, the countries chosen allowed
us to include considerable variation in levels of class voting. In Britain the level
of class voting is relatively high, in Germany and the Netherlands it is moderate,
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and in the United States it is relatively low.
In Table 7.1 we fInd, as already discussed in Chapter 6, that class has a clear
relationship with voting behaviour. In all countries except the United States
farmers form the least and the unskilled manual class the most left-wing class.
Table 7.1 also shows that in all four countries the voting behaviour of mobile
people is typically different to that of the stable members of their destination
class. For example, unskilled manual class workers from service class
backgrounds display lower levels of left-wing voting behaviour than is the case
among the stable members of the unskilled manual class. Conversely, persons
who move into the service class from the unskilled manual class tend to display
lower levels of left-wing voting behaviour than do the intergenerationally stable
service class members. In general, Table 7.1 shows that the voting behaviour of
the mobile is in between that of their origin and destination class. However,
whether the voting behaviour of the mobile in these countries is also statistically
different from the origin and/or destination class, and whether the voting
behaviour of the upwardly mobile is statistically closer to that in their destination
class than is the case for the downwardly mobile, can not be analysed by simply
looking at the figures in Table 7.1. To answer these questions, we employ the
diagonal mobility models designed for this purpose.
Model selection
To test our hypotheses for all our countries, we need to choose between the
diagonal mobility models A to G, each representing a single hypothesis. We fIt
these models separately for each country. Thus, let us fIrst examine the fit
statistics of the diagonal mobility models. As in Chapter 6, we use the
Likelihood-ratio test and the BIC to detect whether the fits of the various models
differ signifIcantly. These fit statistics are presented in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3.
In Model A, representing our weak economic hypothesis, it is assumed that
there are no differences between upwardly and downwardly mobile people and no
acculturation effect. On the basis of the negative BIC in each country, we
conclude that this model gives a reasonable presentation of the data. To examine
whether this hypothesis can be accepted, we next test the other fonnulated
hypotheses.
The strict economic hypothesis assumes that the voting behaviour of the mobile
will only be affected by their current class position. This hypothesis is represented
by Model B. This model uses one degree of freedom less than Model A.
However, according to the Likelihood-ratio test and the BIC, Model A give~ a
much better representation of our data in most countries. Only in Belgium and
Table 7.2. Fit statistics (£2) of diagonal mobility models for the relative influence of respondent's origin and destination class
on his voting beHaviour
model A Change in L' compared to model A
-
df L' B C D E F G N. of
Mf=-I Lldf=1 .<ldf=1 Lldf=2 Lldf=2 .<ldf=3 cases
Australia 18 10051.6 -174.7 3.9 4.7 8.2 9.9 11.7 8,083
Austria 15 946.0 -39.1 5.4 1.2 6.5 9.4 9.5 837
Belgium 10 357.8 -3.2 0.9 0.2 0.9 1.2 1.2 345
Britain 18 7038.4 -179.3 8.0 3.7 1.8 0.9 1.7 1,107
Canada 13 919.2 -1.2 1.8 1.2 17.7 13.1 17.9 3,149
Denmark 10 3499.0 -211.1 12.6 4.3 13.2 13.1 13.2 648
Finland 10 635.0 -66.0 13.0 0.0 2.1 1.8 2.1 1,954
France 11 2421.6 -41.9 1.9 0.2 8.6 12.1 12.4 10,596
Germany 17 13090.3 -276.8 8.3 0.0 4.2 1.7 4.2 791
Ireland 13 576.8 -13.6 1.3 3.5 10.7 6.4 13.4 3,496
Italy 12 4686.3 -15.5 5.1 5.9 17.1 19.2 19.3 7,086
Netherlands 18 7438.6 -174.6 17.1 0.1 1.7 1.4 2.2 4,096
Norway 15 4584.4 -291.6 0.4 1.2 2.4 2.9 3.7 , 583
Sweden 11 . 612.4 -49.3 2.3 0.2 6.2 3.6 6.7 1,107
Switzerland 15 1006.3 -18.0 0.6 5.8 11.9 10.9 13.4 6,168
United States 19 11949.8 -54.7 15.3 0.2 15.3 16.5 16.6 13,074
Note: The variable Year was centred around 1980.
Table 7.3. Fit statistics (BIC) of diagonal mobility models for the relative influence of respondent's origin and destination
class on his voting behaviour
model A Change in BIC compared to model A
df BIC B C D E F G N. of
1l.df=-1 1l.df=1 1l.df=1 1l.df=2 1l.df=2 1l.df=3 cases
Australia 18 -62513.4 165.7 5.2 4.3 9.8 8.1 15.3 8,083
Austria 15 -4585.9 32.4 1.3 5.5 7.0 4.0 10.6 837
Belgium 10 -1599.8 -2.7 5.1 5.7 10.8 10.5 16.3 345
Britain 18 -46633.5 170.6 0.7 5.0 5.6 6.7 12.8 6,168
Canada 13 -6749.1 -5.8 6.1 5.3 12.2 13.1 19.0 1,107
Denmark 10 -21785.1 203.0 -4.5 3.8 -1.6 3.0 6.2 3,149
Finland 10 -3495.3 59.5 -6.6 6.5 -0.3 0.1 6.2 648
France II -12301.8 34.3 5.7 7.4 13.1 13.3 20.6 1,954
Gennany 17 -84958.3 267.6 1.0 9.2 9.8 6.4 15.4 10,596
Ireland 13 -4615.1 6.9 5.4 3.2 9.2 11.6 15.8 791
Italy 12 -23743.9 6.7 3.5 2.7 6.4 10.8 12.4 3,496
Netherlands 18 -55225.4 165.8 -8.2 8.8 0.7 1.4 7.3 7,086
Norway 15 -29360.4 283.3 7.9 7.1 15.0 15.2 22.8 4,096
Sweden II -3030.2 42.9 4.1 6.2 10.3 9.8 15.4 583
Switzerland 15 -6648.0 11.0 6.4 1.2 7.8 10.5 14.3 1,107
United States 19 -106790.0 45.2 -5.8 9.3 3.7 2.4 11.9 13,074
Notes: The variable Year was centred around 1980.
The fonnula of the BIC is: BIC = L' - (N-df""d)*log(N).
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Canada is Model B preferable to Model A. Consequently, in general we have to
reject the strict economic hypothesis in favour of the weak economic hypothesis.
Model C represents the acculturation hypothesis, which predicts that the older a
person is, the larger the influence of destination class relative to origin class is on
voting behaviour. The figures in Table 7.2 show that in nine of the sixteen
countries, according to the Likelihood-ratio test, Model C results in a significant
improvement in fit compared with Model A. In four of these nine countries,
Model C also represents the data better according to the BIC. These countries are
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, United States. Furthermore, in three countries,
i.e. Austria, Germany and Britain, the BIC of Model C differs less than two from
the BIC of Model A. Thus, in seven countries Model C is to be preferred to
Model A. In the other countries under investigation, according to the Likelihood-
ratio test and/or the BIC, Model C does not yield a signiq~ant improvement in fit
compared to Model A. Consequently, in general we can not decide between the
weak economic hypothesis and the acculturation hypothesis.
Next, the status maximization hypothesis predicts that upwardly
intergenerationally mobile people orient their voting behaviour relatively more to
the voting behaviour of their class of destination than is true for downwardly
mobile persons. This hypothesis is represented by Model D. According to both
the Likelihood-ratio test and the BIC, Model D does not result in a significant
improvement in fit either compared to Model C or, for those countries where
Model C does not fit better than Model A, compared to Model A. Consequently,
the status maximization hypothesis has to be rejected.
Finally, the three combinations of the acculturation hypothesis and the status
maximization hypothesis formulated earlier, are represented by Models E, F and
G. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show that, according to the BIC, in none of the countries
under investigation these three models are to be preferred to the acculturation
model (Model C) or the weak economic model (Model A). Thus, we have to
reject the hypothesis that the downwardly mobile and upwardly mobile differ in
their acculturation patterns.
To conclude this section we suggest that Model C, representing the
acculturation hypothesis, gives the best representation of the data in seven
countries. These countries are Austria, Britain, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the
Netherlands, and the United States. In the other countries, however, the
acculturation hypothesis is not corroborated. In these countries - Australia,
Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland - Model A
representing the weak economic hypothesis, is preferable. Consequently, iIi all
countries the other hypotheses, i.e. the strict economic hypothesis, the status
maximization hypothesis, and the combinations of the acculturation and status
maximization hypothesis, cannot be accepted.
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Because the model selection did not yield a clear conclusion about whether the
model representing the weak economic hypothesis or that representing the
acculturation hypothesis was preferable, we next examine the parameter estimates
of both models (Model A and Model C) for all countries. The most important are
the weight-parameter p (both in Model A and C) and the acculturation-parameter
8 (in Model C). These parameters for both models are given in Table 7.4. Models
A and C, of course, also yield parameter estimates for the covariates religion,
age, ethnicity and period. However, since reporting the parameters for all
covariates for all country specific models would require very large tables and
would not provide information about the effects of class mobility on individual
class voting, we do not report them here.
The weight-parameters for Model A, representing the weak economic
hypothesis, are given in the first main column of Table 7.4. The weak economic
hypothesis assumes that the voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile people
will be between the typical voting behaviour of their class of destination and that
of their class of origin. This implies that the weight-parameter p (indicating the
relative weight of the destination class) of this model is assumed to be between
zero and one. lO The estimates of the weight-parameter p show that this is the
case. In all countries, except Canada, the estimated values of the p-parameter are
between 0.55 and 0.70. Furthermore, the standard errors of these estimates are
very small. Thus, the parameter estimates support the weak economic hypothesis.
Because in all countries the value of the p-parameter exceeds 0.50, the weight of
the destination class is larger than that of the origin class. The only exception is
the estimated weight-parameter fOr Canada that has the value 1.484 which is hard
to interpret. This incomprehensible result is probably due to the fact that the data
are not well described by the model, since in Canada classes hardly differ in their
voting behaviour.
In Table 7.4 the relevant parameters of Model C for all countries are presented.
This models gives the best representation of our data for seven countries: Austria,
Britain, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, and United States. Model
C represents the acculturation hypothesis, which assumes that the older
intergenerationa1ly mobile people are, the closer their voting behaviour will be to
the typical voting behaviour of their class of destination relative to that of their
class of origin. Model C therefore includes a weight-parameter Po and an
acculturation effect parameter 8, i.e. an interaction between age and the origin and
destination weights. If the acculturation hypothesis holds (and because· as
indicated earlier - we coded the continuous age variable as: age - 40), the
estimate of the po-parameter has to take a value between zero and one, and the
Table 7.4. Parameter estimates of models representing the weak economic hypothesis (Model A) and the acculturation
hypothesis (Model C)
Model A: Model C:
Weak economic hypothesis Acculturation hypothesis
Weight s.e. Weight S.e. Acculturation s.e.
parameter p parameter Po parameter Ii
Australia 0.676* 0.027 0.662* 0.029 0.003 0.002
Austria 0.626* 0.069 0.579* 0.072 0.009* 0.005
Belgium 0.678* 0.205 0.628* 0.228 0.012 0.013
Britain 0.606* 0.030 0.585* 0.031 0.004* 0.002
Canada 1.484* 0.585 1.747* 0.710 -0.023 0.021
Denmark 0.674* 0.028 0.656* 0.029 0.006* 0.002
Finland 0.615* 0.047 0.622* 0.048 0.010* 0.004
France 0.621* 0.663 0.584* 0.070 0.004 0.004
Gennany 0.650* 0.028 0.612* 0.032 0.003* 0.002
Ireland 0.604* 0.102 0.559* 0.105 0.007 0.006
Italy 0.712* 0.085 0.674* 0.086 0.010 0.006
Netherlands 0.596* 0.034 0.559* 0.035 0.007* 0.002
Norway 0.539* 0.026 0.535* 0.027 0.001 0.002
Sweden 0.575* 0.059 0.546* 0.065 0.005 0.004
Switzerland 0.693* 0.071 0.663* 0.082 0.003 0.004
United States 0.567* 0.054 0.548* 0.055 0.010* 0.003
Note: * p < 0.05.
·Effects of Individual Intergenerational Class Mobility 145
acculturation-parameter estimate has to take a positive value.
The figures in Table 7.4 give the estimates of the country weight-parameter Po
and the acculturation-parameter () for all countries. The results for all countries -
except Canada - are the following. The weight-parameter estimates are all
between 0.55 and 0.66. Furthermore, the estimates of the acculturation-parameters
have positive values for all countries. This indicates that the. older the
intergenerationally mobile get, the more they adopt the voting behaviour of their
class of destination. In the seven countries for which the acculturation model
gives the best representation of the data, the acculturation-parameters are
statistically significant from zero. Furthermore, it should be noted that the
acculturation-parameter estimates also have positive - although not statistically
significant - values in all countries where Model C does not give a statistically
better fit than Model A. This result gives a strong indication that in general the
acculturation hypothesis is supported.
Substantially the values of the acculturation-parameter estimates tell an
interesting story. For example, in the Britain - a country with a relatively strong
relationship between class and voting behaviour - the weight-parameter Po is
0.585 (s.e. 0.031) and the acculturation-parameter () is 0.004 (s.e. 0.002). These
results imply that in Britain for mobile persons at the age of 40, the destination
class has a little more impact than their origin class. Furthermore, the
acculturation-parameters implies that each year people get older the destination
class becomes a little more important, i.e. by 0.4 per cent. Apparently, the
cumulative impact of acculturation over the life-span is substantial. The model
suggests that, for people aged eighteen, the relative destination and origin weights
are respectively 0.585 - 22*0.004, or 0.497, and 1 - 0.497, or 0.503. This implies
that for our youngest respondents the effect of their origin class is almost equal to
that of their destination class. By the time they have reached sixty five years of
age (coded 25 on our age variable), the relative destination and origin effects
become 0.585 + 25*0.004, or 0.685, and I - 0.685, or 0.315 respectively. These
figures indicate that the destination effect is twice the size of the origin effect.
However, the origin still has a substantial impact on the voting behaviour of those
aged sixty five and over.
This pattern for Britain also holds for all other countries, except of course
Canada. For example, ill the Netherlands - a country with a much weaker
relationship between class and voting behaviour than in Britain - the coefficients
of the acculturation-parameters indicate that at the age of 18 the relative
destination weight is 0.405, at the age of 40 it is 0.559, and at the age of 65 the
destination weight is 0.734. Furthermore, in the United States - a country with a
very low level of class voting - the destination weight has the value 0.328 at the
age of 18, 0.548 at the age of 40 and 0.798 at the age of 65. Thus, in all
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countries the destination class has less impact than the origin class when the
intergenerationally mobile class members are young. The older mobile class
members are, the stronger the relative impact of the destination class is. For
mobile people older than about 35 years of age, is their destination class is more
important than their origin class. However, even when mobile people are about 65
years old, their origin class still has a substantial impact on their voting
behaviour.
7.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we examined the impact of intergenerational class mobility on
individual voting behaviour. Four hypotheses concerning the effects of mobility
on voting behaviour were tested using a research design characteristic for studies
of the third generation. That is, we used the design of Sobel's diagonal mobility
models analysing 113 crosscsectional datasets representing sixteen countries over
the period 1956-1990.
In all countries we found that the voting behaviour of the intergenerationally
mobile was between the typical voting behaviour of their class of destination and
that of their class of origin. In fact, the outcomes of the analyses showed that the
effect ofpeople's destination class was larger than that of their origin class.
Furthermore, we found in seven countries - Austria, Britain, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States - that the voting behaviour of
older intergenerationally mobile people was closer to the typical voting behaviour
of their class of destination relative to the typical voting behaviour of their class
of origin, than was the case for the voting behaviour of younger intergeneration-
ally mobile people. For our youngest respondents the effect of class origin was
almost equal to that of class destination. By the time respondents reached sixty
five years of age the relative destination effect was two times the size of the
origin effect, although the latter still had a substantial impact on the voting
behaviour of this age group.
The results of our analyses furthermore implied that two hypotheses could not
be accepted. The first hypothesis assumed that no effects of people's origin class
exist. This assumption has already been rejected by most earlier studies on
stratification and politics an its rejection here is thus in line with these studies.
The other hypothesis stated that upwardly intergenerationally mobile persons
orient their voting behaviour relatively more to the typical voting behaviour of
their class of destination, than do downwardly intergenerationally mobile persons.
The fact that this maximization hypothesis had to be rejected contradicts earlier
empirical studies from the first generation (for an overview see Janowitz 1970),
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but is in line with the more recent empirical results of studies from· the third
generation of stratification and politics (De Graaf & Ultee 1990; Weakliem 1992;
Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1993).
The results discussed in this chapter also have implications for macro-
.explanations of variation in levels of class voting. We know that classes in a
country consist of immobile and mobile members. Furthermore, our analyses have
shown that mobile class members have a voting behaviour somewhere between
the typical voting behaviour in their origin class and that in their destination
class. This implies that in general, differences in voting behaviour between
mobile class members will be less than that between immobile class members
from the same classes. Thus, the more classes consist only of mobile members,
the lower the level of class voting will be. Therefore, in general, we can conclude
that intergenerational class mobility tends to weaken the "democratic class
struggle" in a country.
However, the strength of the effect of intergenerational class mobility on the
intensity of the class struggle in a society depends on the proportion of
intergenerationally mobile and immobile members in each class. Thus, it is only
when taking into account these composition effects that we can investigate
adequately the extent to which. variations in the strengths of the relationship
between social class and voting behaviour in countries can be explained. by
variations in the patterns of intergenerational class mobility in these countries. We
do this in Chapter 9 of this study. However, before testing this macro-level
explanation, we pay attention to other effects of intergenerational class mobility
on individual voting behaviour, i.e. the so-called "contextual" effects of class
mobility.

8 Contextual Effects of Intergenerational
Class Mobility on Voting Behaviour
8.1 Introduction!
When exannrnng the relationship between intergenerational class mobility and·
individual voting behaviour, most researchers have adopted the micro-sociological
perspective, i.e. they have investigated the effects of individual mobility on the
voting behaviour of intergenerationally mobile persons (see for example: Barber
1970; Weakliem 1992; Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf 1992). Indeed, we also adopted
this perspective in the previous chapter. A series of studies stretching from the
first to the third generation of research· on stratification and politics, however,
suggests that intergenerational class mobility may also influence people's voting
behaviour in a more indirect way, i.e. people may change their voting behaviour
because they perceive intergenerational class mobility in their environment
(Abramson & Books 1971; Thorburn 1979). It are these "contextual effects" of
class mobility that we focus on in the present chapter.
Although, of course, such contextual effects can be assumed to affect the
voting behaviour of both the intergenerationally mobile and the immobile, we
restrict our investigations to the immobile class members. We do this, because for
the immobile the contextual effects can be expected to be stronger than for the
mobile. The contexts of mobile have changed over their life course and
consequently they were subject to conflicting contextual effects. However, for
immobile class members contextual effect are easier to detect. In this chapter we
thus address the question: What are the contextual effects of intergenerational
class mobility in a country on the voting behaviour of intergenerationally
immobile persons?
The significance of the answer to this question lies not only in the way it helps
us to understand individual voting behaviour. Contextual effects of class mobility
might also have implications for understanding the political consequences of
mobility on the political constellation in a country. It has been customary - as
discussed in Chapter 1 - to concentrate on the mobile and to suppose that more
(upward) mobility in a country leads to a lower level of class voting in that
country. Such argnments generally assnme composition effects. For example, if
more people with manual backgrounds enter the service class, its mean voting
behaviour will be more left-wing. However, a shift to less class voting might also
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be strengthened by contextual effects. For instance, the influences of the mobile
members on the immobile might cause a movement towards the left by immobile
members of the nonmanual classes, and towards the right by immobile members
of the manual classes. Therefore, before in the next chapter we examine the
macro-effect of the class mobility patterns of countries on the levels of class
voting in these countries, we examine the contextual effects of class mobility in
this chapter.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2 we present our hypoth-
eses. In Section 3, we discuss the research methods. Our hypotheses are tested in
Section 4. In this chapter's last section, Section 5, we discuss the results.
8.2 Hypotheses
Many scholars of the various generations of research on stratification and politics
have formulated theories and hypotheses about the contextual effects of class
mobility on voting behaviour (for example: Elau & Duncan 1967: 440; Abramson
& Books 1971; .Thorburn 1979; De Graaf & mtee 1987). Building on this earlier
research into the contextual effects of class mobility, we formulate hypotheses
about the effects of two characteristics of mobility patterns on the voting
behaviour of immobile class members. These characteristics are the level of
outflow mobility from a specific class and the level of inflow mobility to a specific
class.
To hypothesize on the effects of levels of outflow and inflow mobility in a
certain class on the voting behaviour of the members of that class, we use - as in
Chapter 7 - the instrumental and expressive theories of individual voting
behaviour. According to the instrumental theory, voting behaviour is rational and
self-interested: people vote according to their interests and therefore vote for the
party whose policies will bring them the greatest utility now or in the future. In
the expressive theory, voting is seen as a social act rather than an instrumental
one. People associate with each other, and these associations are thought to
provide an arena in which voting behaviour may be influenced. In general, such
associations are made with people from the same class position, but sometimes -
for example due to class mobility - they are not.
An hypothesis concerning the effects of the level of inflow mobility to a class
on the voting behaviour of the stable members of that class, can best be deduced
from the expressive theory. Because people in general associate with people
occupying the same class position (Goldthorpe 1986), people's alignments to a
certain party are usually stimulated by the influences of their class co-members,
and all influences being in the same direction. However, when classes are
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heterogeneous - due to the inflow of intergenerationally mobile people - we
would expect the existing mobile class members to be influenced by the different
voting behaviour of those entering the class. This is especially the case when the
influx of newcomers with different political attitudes and behaviours is large (see
also Lipset 1960).
The impact of newcomers may be expected to depend not only on the amount
of inflow to a class, but also on the political character of that inflow. The more
left-wing the voting behaviour of newly arrived class members, the more will the
voting behaviour of the stable class members be left-wing. Thus, the effects of
inflow mobility on the voting behaviour of immobile class members can be
assumed to be dependent on two factors: the absolute level of inflow mobility to
a class, and the political character of this inflow. Therefore, the following inflow
mobility hypothesis can be formulated:
The higher the level of left-wing inflow mobility to a class, the more likely it is
that the immobile members of that class will vote for a left-wing political party.
The effects of the level of outflow mobility from a class on the individual voting
behaviour of immobile members of that class, can be deduced from the
instrumental theory. We might expect that people are influenced by seeing others
move out of their class. If people see many co-class members leaving their class,
they can be expected to anticipate the possibility of mobility for themselves.
Consequently, they might adjust t..heir voting behaviour in line with possible
future interests. It is through this mechanism that the level of outflow mobility
from a class can be expected to have an effect on the voting behaviour of
immobile members of that class.
Again, it should be noted that the effects of outflow mobility on the voting
behaviour of immobile class members depend upon two factors. The first is the
absolute level of outflow mpjility, i.e. the percentage ~f class members leaving
the class of their father. The higher the amount of outflow mobility from a class,
the greater the likelihood that immobile class members will change their voting
behaviour. The second factor, the political character of the outflow mobility - i.e.
the interests and typical voting behaviour of the classes where the mobile flow.
to - can also be assumed to have an impact on the voting behaviour of those who
are "left behind". The more left-wing the interests of those moving out become,
the more those who stay in their class will anticipate these new interests and
consequently vote in a more left-wing way. Summarizing these arguments leads
us to the following outflow mobility hypothesis:
The higher the level of left-wing outflow mobility from a class, the more likely
it is that the immobile members of that class will vote for a left-wing political
party.
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The implications of this hypothesis can best be illustrated by an example. For
instance, immobile unskilled manual workers in a society with a high level of
outflow from their class, might anticipate their own possible mobility. Because,
by defInition, those moving out go to classes with less left-wing interests, the
immobile unskilled manual workers may adopt a less left-wing political party
preference than they would have adopted in a society with little outflow from
their class. This hypothesis is directly in line with Elau and Duncan's argument
that "men who see little opportunity for improvement in their own economic
status or, at least, that of their children, have greater inducements than those
anticipating advancements in status to organize a union, to raise wages or to vote
for a party that advocates higher taxes for the wealthy" (1967: 440).
However, the effect of the amount of outflow mobility from the unskilled
manual class does not give suffIcient information about the direction and the
extent to which the immobile class members are influenced by level of outflow
mobility. This depends on the classes to which the mobile members go. For
example, in a country where most people from the unskilled manual class go to
the skilled manual class (with its similar interests and voting behaviour), the
voting behaviour of the immobile members of the unskilled manual class will
hardly be affected by the level of outflow from their class. Conversely, in a
country where most of those leaving the unskilled manual class go to the service
class (which has less to gain from a more egalitarian society and displays, in
general, a substantially less left-wing voting pattern), it is likely that the voting
behaviour of the immobile members of the unskilled manual class will change
substantially. Similarly, for members of the other social classes it can be
hypothesized that the more they see their class members fall down the social
ladder, the more they will anticipate their own downward mobility, and thus vote
in a more left-wing way.
Before testing the formulated hypotheses, we should first note a conflicting
argumentation that has also been suggested in the literature. Goldthorpe (1986:
342), for example, suggested such an hypothesis on the basis of social-
psychological arguments. He argued that the more men of working class origins
make their way into the service class, the more it would seem reasonable to
suppose that a large majority of those who remain within the working class will
"have a recognition of apparent 'openness'''. Consequently, among those who - so
to speak - were "left behind", some degree of discontentment or frustration might
develop. Then, under the assumption that dissatisfaction and frustration for
manual class members lead to a more left-wing voting behaviour, it can be
expected that those who stay behind vote more left-wing than they would have
done in a situation where only a limited number of people were upwardly mobile
from their class. However, Goldthorpe himself has already suggested that such a
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response would not be widespread due to the fact that for those who fail to
achieve upward mobility, there still remain many alternatives that can serve to
prevent any widespread sense of grievance. When testing our hypotheses this
argumentation has to be kept in mind.
8.3 Modelling the contextual effects of class mobility
The main thrust of our contextual hypotheses is that the voting behaviour of
individual stable members of a particular class in a certain country for a given
year, can be explained by the inflow and outflow mobility in that class, country
and year. Therefore, when testing the hypotheses we have to take account of the
layered structure of our data, i.e. individuals are surveyed within years and within
classes and countries. An appropriate way to test our hypotheses is to use a multi-
level model containing three different levels: (1) an individual"level; (2) a year-
level and (3) a class/country-level.
When modelling these effects two remarks are in order. First, the effects of
inflow and outflow mobility depend both on the amount of inflow and outflow
mobility and on the political character of that inflow and outflow. However, the
amount of inflow and outflow mobility per se, do not give an indication of the
direction in which the immobile class members will change their voting
behaviour, i.e. whether they will become more right-wing or more left-wing.
Therefore, in our models we take this into account by including interaction effects
of the level of inflow and outflow mobility and the political character of that
inflow and outflow..
A second consideration when testing the contextual effects of class mobility on
the individual voting behaviour of intergenerationally immobile class members, is
. that their voting behaviour is not solely affected by differences in rates of inflow
and outflow mobility, but are more determined by their material circumstances
and interests. We take this into account in our modelling by allowing each class
within each nation to have its own "natural" level of left-wing preferences. In this
way we can test whether rates of outflow and inflow mobility can account for
variations around this natural level.
Therefore, to test the hypotheses concerning the effects of levels of inflow and
outflow mobility in a society on individual voting behaviour we use multi-level
models that take these considerations into account. We use three models: one that
tests the inflow mobility hypothesis, one that tests the outflow mobility
hypothesis, and one that tests both these hypotheses simultaneously. In all three
models, at the individual-level we estimate the voting behaviour of individual
immobile class members as follows:
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(1)
In this individual-level equation, the dependent variable is the log-odds for the
immobile members (i) of each class (d) to vote for a left-wing political party
rather than a right-wing party in each year G) and country (k). The intercept in
the individual-level equation, !3wjk> represents the mean log-odds of voting left-
wing rather right-wing for stable class members in each of the distinguished
classes and countries in each year. This intercept (which can vary from year to
year, from class to class, and from nation to nation), serves as the dependent
variable in the year-level equation.
To test the inflow mobility hypothesis we then use a model (Model A) in
which the year-level equation is specified as follows:
~Odjk = ~OdOk + ~lOOO (Inflowdik*In-weightdk) + YOdjk (2)
Similarly, to test the outflow mobility hypothesis we apply a model (Model B)
with the following year-level equation:
~Odjk = ~OdOk + ~2000 (OUtflOWdjk*Out-weightdk) + YOdjk (3)
In addition, to test the inflow and outflow hypotheses simultaneously, a third
model (Model C) will be applied, whereby the year-level equation reads as
follows:
~Odjk = ~OdOk + ~1000 (Inflowdjk*In-weightdk) +
~2000 (Outflowdjk*Out-weigh~k) + YOdjk (4)
In these equations the variable Inflowdjk represents the proportion of class d in
year j and country k who were intergenerationally mobile (that is, who came from
non-d origins). The variable OUtjlOWdjk represents the proportion of class d in year
j and country k who were intergenerationally mobile (that is, who went to non-d
destinations). The variables In-weightdk and Out-weightdk stand for the weight
factors that take into account the political character of the outflow mobility" to and
inflow mobility from a class in a country.
In all three models, the combined explanatory variables are centred around their
grand mean in each class and each nation. Therefore, ~OdOk represents the natural
left-Wing voting behaviour in the different classes in each country. To allow this
natural level to vary from class to class and from nation to nation, ~OdOk is treated
as random at the class/country-level:
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To calculate the political character of the inflow and outflow mobility, In-
weightdk and Out-weightdk, we use the average voting behaviour of the stable
members of the origin classes in our dataset (cf. De Graaf et al. 1995). These
weights must be kept constant over-time, since allowing them to vary each year
could introduce circularity into the model. This is because in some years, quite
independent of levels of mobility, there may be across-the-board increases in
left-wing voting behaviour affecting the mobile and the stable alike. Weights
which were allowed to vary each year might thus be correlated with the yearly
variations in the dependent variable.
A numerical example may make clearer the procedure for calculating the
political character of the inflow and outflow mobility. In calculating the political
character of the inflow mobility to the service class in Britain in 1964, we first
take the actual proportions of the service class in Britain in 1964 who moved
from the other. six classes. Of these, 20 per cent originated in the unskilled
manual class. This figure is then weighted by 0.61 (the proportion of the stable
members of the unskilled manual class who had a left-wing voting behaviour in
Britain in the combined British dataset - as reported in Table 7.1 in the previous
chapter). Similarly, the 4 per cent who were mobile from the agricultural worker
class is weighted by 0.41. The weighted inflow to the service class in Britain in
1964 thus becomes (20*61 + 28*61 + 4*41 + 7*33 + 11*11 + 4*8)1100, or 34.8.
The calculation of the left-wing inflow mobility for other classes and countries
proceeds in an analogous manner. In calculating the left-wing outflow mobility
we follow the same procedure, except that here we weight by the proportion and
the voting behaviour of the destination classes.
8.4 Results
While questions at the individual-level in principle can be addressed using a
single dataset from a single country and year, in the case of contextual questions,
the higher the number of contexts the better. For this reason, we employ our
individual-level survey dataset containing data from sixteen countries, seven
classes and many years over the period 1956-1990. Because of our research
questions, we restrict the analyses to intergenerationally immobile male members
of the classes aged eighteen years or older, leaving us with a total of 20,619
respondents. By analysing data on so many contexts and so many individuals we
aim to give hypotheses on the contextual effects of class mobility a higher chance
of corroboration in empirical tests, than has been the case in earlier studies.
Table 8.1. Percentages outflow mobility in EGP classes in sixteen countries, 1956-1990
Service Routine Petty Farmers Skilled Unskilled Agric.
class nonmanual bourg. manual manual labourers
Australia 1961-70 49.6 83.9 90.4 61.5 60.2 73.1 89.3
1971-80 51.4 75.2 77.8 72.6 71.3 77.1 96.4
1981-90 41.1 82.7 91.3 77.1 74.4 78.4 94.1
Austria 1971-80 41.9 67.9 78.4 54.2 64.1 65.3 78.6
1981-90 41.5 78.4 80.0 61.0 66.0 67.0 95.0
Belgium 1971-80 48.3 37.4 59.6 53.1 69.0 67.3
Britain 1961-70 49.7 81.6 83.4 70.4 56.3 64.0 84.2
1971-80 36.9 86.9 82.3 72.7 59.5 66.2 76.0
1981-90 39.3 82.6 77.1 74.1 63.7 68.0 89.5
Canada 1981-90 39.8 81.0 - 57.7 70.1 72.6 94.4
Denmark 1971-80 49.2 67.3 79.8 58.2 61.5 56.2
Finland 1971-80 48.2 92.9 86.8 62.5 47.3 75.4 81.6
France 1971-80 34.4 78.8 77.7 52.4 51.3 83.6 87.5
Germany 1961-70 41.9 83.7 86.9 68.3 48.4 63.2 89.8
1971-80 41.3 78.0 83.6 77.2 53.8 81.0 88.3
1981-90 37.1 85.4 77.5 81.1 48.7 77.7 93.1
Table 8.1. (Continued)
Service Routine Petty Fanners Skilled Unskilled Agric.
class nonmanual bourg. manual manual labourers
Ireland 1981-90 46.4 97.2 77.8 47.6 67.7 51.5 84.1
Italy 1961-70 60.0 57.8 68.6 60.5 48.1 75.6 67.5
1971-80 57.9 67.4 63.0 78.1 66.0 83.3 85.7
1981-90 57.6 63.2 63.1 78.5 56.7 73.5 76.8
Netherlands 1961-70 37.0 71.9 70.7 62.6 49.6 64.1 84.7
1971-80 38.3 69.4 80.1 64.6 64.0 79.3 86.7
1981-90 39.0 75.7 86.7 74.0 65.9 75.7 91.1
Norway 1961-70 36.8 100.0 88.7 66.7 55.6 53.1 100.0
1971-80 38.3 84.1 88.9 62.8 - 71.9 88.9
1981-90 36.1 89.0 83.2 70.8 - 21.9 95.0
Sweden 1971-80 32.4 79.3 76.2 73.4 64.6 71.4 100.0
1981-90 53.7 95.5 93.1 74.4 68.6 78.3 100.0
Switzerland 1971-80 36.5 80.7 74.9 60.4 62.8 77.0 100.0
United States 1956-60 38.5 83.0 79.6 71.6 66.4 61.9 30.0
1961-70 44.8 83.5 78.0 79.9 68.8 68.3 76.7
1971-80 48.4 87.5 91.6 82.9 63.1 68.3 90.6
1981-90 47.2 78.1 89.9 80.8 69.8 68.6 93.7
Table 8.2. Percentages inflow mobility in EGP classes in sixteen countries, 1956-1990
Service Routine Petty Fanners Skilled Unskilled Agric.
class nonmanual bourg. manual manual labourers
Australia 1961-70 64.5 90.4 81.8 33.1 62.1 72.2 84.3
1971-80 71.3 81.8 82.8 36.2 68.8 72.6 93.8
1981-90 61.4 88.4 92.8 31.9 67.4 72.6 90.7
Austria 1971-80 70.2 75.0 61.9 7.7 68.6 73.2 75.0
1981-90 70.6 91.3 0.0 14.0 61.4 65.6 91.7
Belgium 1971-80 66.7 62.0 53.1 21.1 70.5 35.8
Britain 1961-70 72.4 91.3 78.3 31.0 51.3 59.3 45.4
1971-80 68.9 90.5 78.1 33.6 49.5 64.0 54.2
1981-90 65.6 87.2 74.3 33.6 52.4 64.2 65.3
Canada 1981-90 66.8 85.3 100.0 10.6 59.7 73.3 90.5
'Denmark 1971-80 75.9 81.4 66.5 14.9 71.1 59.8
Finland 1971-80 74.1 90.0 85.8 15.1 64.4 82.1 72.0
France 1971-80 68.1 85.9 66.4 11.8 58.4 72.9 70.0
Germany 1961-70 68.5 82.8 63.6 3.2 55.6 61.9 89.7
1971-80 67.4 87.1 68.9 15.3 53.1 77.9 65.4
1981-90 65.0 92.5 65.8 7.6 46.7 76.3 78.2
Table 8.2. (Continued)
Service Routine Petty Fanners Skilled Unskilled Agric.
class nonmanual bourg. manual manual labourers
Ireland .1981-90 70.1 96.4 89.0 8.1 68.5 51.8 71.4
Italy 1961-70 88.9 78.0 65.5 67.0 81.0 69.6 12.6
1971-80 84.3 82.1 78.5 25.0 60.6 84.1 82.1
1981-90 74.0 80.8 61.7 16.0 65.6 72.4 25.0
Netherlands 1961-70 55.3 84.6 50.7 10.3 64.6 64.7 65.4
1971-80 65.6 85.8 49.8 13.7 70.0 70.5 72.6
1981-90 64.2 84.0 70.4 17.3 60.8 73.0 71.4
Norway 1961-70 73.3 00.0 75.8 15.4 63.6 55.1 100.0
1971-80 73.5 86.8 81.0 30.9 83.0 66.4 80.0
1981-90 71.7 89.8 69.3 43.1 71.9 79.4 70.5
Sweden 1971-80 75.8 75.0 82.8 16.7 56.3 87.1 100.0
1981-90 69.6 96.6 91.3 23.1 66.7 76.2 100.0
Switzerland 1971-80 70.0 88.8 66.9 9.3 66.2 67.7 100.0
United Slates 1956-60 70.3 94.1 78.4 6.5 68.5 70.1 66.7
1961-70 72.5 91.4 85.3 14.6 69.6 73.0 79.0
1971-80 65.5 93.0 85.1 11.0 64.4 75.5 80.3
1981-90 59.4 88.0 87.1 20.8 67.6 72.6 77.5
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Describing the levels of inflow and outflow mobility
Before testing the contextual hypothesis about the effects of inflow and outflow
mobility on the voting behaviour of immobile class members, we fIrst describe
the levels of outflow and inflow mobility in the countries. In Table 8.1 for all
countries for the periods 1956-1960, 1961-1970, 1971-1980, and 1981-1990 the
percentage of outflow mobility is given for each of the seven EGP classes. We
fInd that in general the manual classes have higher outflow rates than other
classes. The seryice class has the lowest. It shoUld be noted that differences
between the classes are larger than differences across countries or periods.
In Table 8.2 the percentage of inflow mobility is given. The farmers form the
class with the lowest level of inflow mobility. The service and routine nonmanual
classes have relatively high levels of inflow mobility. This is because these two
classes have grown substantially during the last decades. For this to have occurred
members of the other classes had to be recruited. Furthermore, differences from
country to country in inflow rates are substantial.
Testing the hypotheses
We now test the formulated contextual hypotheses. The fIrst hypothe&is,. the
outflow mobility hypothesis states that the more "left-wing outflow" from a class
there is, the more likely it is that stable members of that class will vote for a left-
wing political party. The second hypothesis, the inflow mobility hypothesis,
implies that the more left-wing inflow mobility to a class there is, the more likely
it is that stable members of that class will vote left-wing.
We test these hypotheses in four different ways. To begin with we test the
hypotheses_ for all classes simultaneously. Next, we test them for each class
separately. Subsequently we test the hypotheses focusing on the effects of "pure"
inflow and outflow mobility, i.e. not controlling for the political character of the
inflow and the outflow mobility. Fourth, we test the hypotheses examining the
effects of "extreme" inflow and outflow mobility on the voting behaviour of the
immobile members of two classes that have very distinct interests, the unskilled
manual class and the service class.
Test of hypotheses: all classes simultaneously
To test the hypotheses for all classes simultaneously, the three multi-level models
are fItted on 20,619 respondents within 599 years within 107 country/class
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combinations.2 Model A tests the inflow mobility hyPothesis, by including the
interaction effect Inflow*In-weight as a contextual explanatory variable. The
outflow mobility hypothesis is tested by fitting Model B, which includes the
interaction effect Outflow*Out-weight. In Model C the Inflow*In-weight and the
Outflow*Out-weight variables are included simultaneously. When the hypotheses
hold, we expect the parameter estimates for these variables to be positive and
significantly different from zero. The parameter estimates for the three fitted
multi-level models are presented in Table 8.3.
The estimates of the parameters in the multi-level analysis in Models A and C,
indicating the effect of left-wing inflow mobility are 0.004 and 0.005
respectively. These estimates are in the expected direction but clearly not
statistically significant. We therefore can not accept the hypothesis that the more
left-wing inflow mobility there is to a class, the more likely it is that immobile
members will have a left-wing voting behaviour.
In Models B and C estimates of the effects of left-wing outflow mobility take
the values -0.001 and -0.002 respectively. These are not in the expected direction,
but are also not statistically significant. Therefore, we can not accept the outflow
mobility hypothesis that the more left-wing outflow mobility there is from a class,
the more likely it is that immobile members of that class will have a left-wing
voting behaviour.
Test of hypotheses: per class
It might be, however, that while we must reject the inflow and outflow
hypotheses for all classes simultaneously, they nevertheless hold for stable
members of some particular classes. For this reason we fit our models for the
stable members of each specific class separately. To test our hypotheses for each
class separately, multi-level models are fitted, each analysing only those
respondents who currently are members of a specific class. As in the test for all
classes simultaneously, we fit three models: Model A including the interaction
effect Inflow*In-weight, Model B including the interaction effect Outflow*Out-
.weight, and Model C including both these variables. Again, if the hypotheses
hold, significant positive parameter estimates are to be expected. In Table 8.4
ouly the pertinent parameter estimates of the fitted multi-level models are
presented. All the other coefficients - the intercept and the random coefficients -
are not reported.
The results of these tests are largely negative. The figures in Table 8.4 indicate
that none of the estimated parameters are statistically significant. Furthermore, ten
out of the twenty-eight estimated parameters have a negative value, i.e. these
Table 8.3. Parameter estimates of multi-level models: the effects of inflow and outflow mobility on the left-wing voting
behaviour of immobile class members
Model A Model B Model C
Parameter s.e. Parameter s.e Parameter S.e.
Fixed parameters
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL
Intercept -0.458 0.100 -0.457 0.100 -0.458 0.100
YEAR-LEVEL
Inflow * in-weight 0.004 0.006 - 0.005 0.006
Outflow * out-weight - - -0.001 0.007 -0.002 0.007
Random parameters
COUNTRY/CLASS-LEVEL
Intercept 0.902 0.143 0.902 0.143 0.902 0.143
YEAR-LEVEL
Intercept 0.093 0.Q15 0.094 0.Q15 0.093 0.Q15
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL
Intercept 1 - I - J
Notes: * p < 0.05.
The analyses were based on 20,619 individuals within 599 years within 107 country/classes
I
Table 8.4. Parameter estimates of multi-level models: the effects of inflow and outflow mobility on the left-wing voting
behaviour of immobile class members, per class
Model A Model B Model C
Parameter s.e. Parameter s.e. Parameter s.e.
Service class (N =5910)
Inflow * in-weight 0.017 0.021 - 0.017 0.021
Outflow * out-weight - -0.006 0.020 -0.007 0.020
Routine nonmanual (N =913)
Inflow * in-weight 0.033 0.021 - - 0.033 0.023
Outflow * out-weight - 0.D15 0.026 -0.000 0.D28
Petty bourgeoisie (N = 1062)
Inflow * in-weight -0.028 0.D18 - -0.029 0.019
Outflow * out-weight - - -0.007 0.026 0.003 0.027
Farmers (N =3098)
Inflow * in-weight 0.017 0.019 - 0.D18 0.019
Outflow * out-weight - - 0.010 0.021 0.012 0.020
Skilled manual (N =6144)
Inflow * in-weight 0.010 0.016 - - 0.008 0.017
Outflow * out-weight - - 0.014 0.021 0.012 0.022
Unskilled manual (N =3099)
Inflow * in-weight 0.003 0.015 - - 0.011 0.016
Outflow * out-weight - - -0.035 0.020 -0.039 0.021
Agricultural labourers (N =393)
Inflow * in-weight -0.017 0.020 - - 0.022 0.020
Outflow * out-weight - 0.022 0.029 0.031 0.030
Note: * p < 0.05.
Table 8.5. Parameter estimates of multi-level models: the effects of the levels of "pure" inflow and outflow mobility on the left-
wing voting behaviour of immobile class members. per class
Model D Model E Model F
Parameter s.e. Parameter s.e. Parameter s.e.
Service class (N =5910)
Inflow 0.Ql8 0.011 - 0.019 0.012
Outflow - - -0.004 0.010 -0.007 0.010
Routine nonmanual (N =913)
Inflow 0.008 0.013 - 0.010 0.025
Outflow - 0.003 0.008 -0.002 0.016
Petty bourgeoisie (N =1062)
Inflow -0.010 0.009 - 0.010 0.010
Outflow - - 0.004 0.013 -0.001 0.014
Farmers (N =3098)
Inflow 0.009 0.009 - - 0.008 0.009
Outflow - - 0.009 0.011 0.007 0.011
Skilled manual (N =6144)
Inflow 0.001 0.009 - 0.004 0.010
Outflow - -0.008 0.008 -0.009 0.008
Unskilled manual (N =3099)
Inflow -0.001 0.008 - - 0.005 0.009
Outflow - -0.009 0.009 -0.012 0.011
Agricultural labourers (N =393)
Inflow 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.008
Outflow - - 0.007 0.016 0.002 0.023
Note: * p < 0.05.
-'I
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effects are in the unexpected direction. This means that evert when testing the
hypotheses for all classes separately, both the inflow and outflow hypotheses have
to be rejected.
Test of hypotheses: effects of "pure" inflow and outflow mobility
Before drawing conclusions with respect to the inflow and outflow hypotheses, an
extra test is in order. It might be argued that the inclusion of interaction effects
between the amount of inflow and outflow mobility and the political character of
that mobility obscures the main effect of the level of inflow and outflow mobility.
Therefore, as a check we do our analyses including only the pure mobility level
variables in models A, B and C. This results in models D, E and F, where the In-
weight and Out-weight variables are left out.
When making predictions about the effect of the pure levels of inflow and
outflow on the voting behaviour of immobile members of specific classes,
assumptions must be made about the political character of that inflow and
outflow. For some classes it is easy to come up with predictions, because the
assumptions are straightforward. For example, it can be assumed that all people
who move out of the skilled and unskilled manual classes go to classes with more
right-wing interests and political culture than are found among the stable
members of the man.ual classes. Thus, for members of the unskilled and skilled
manual classes, it can be expected that the more outflow from their class there is,
the more right-wing they will be. Furthermore, it can be assumed that those who
move into the manual classes also have more right-wing voting behaviour than
the stable members of these classes. Therefore, it can be expected that the more
inflow mobility there is to the manual classes, the less likely the immobile
members of these classes will be to vote for a left-wing party.
In addition, for members of the farming and petty bourgeoisie classes it can be
assumed that most outflow goes to more left-wing classes, while most inflow
comes from more left-wing classes. In this way it can be predicted that the more
inflow mobility to these classes, the more likely members of these classes are to
vote left-wing. For the other classes - the service class, the routine nonmanual
class and the agricultural labourers - making predictions about the effects of the
amount of inflow and outflow mobility is less straightforward. The political
character of that mobility depends too much on the patterns of intergenerational
mobility in a country in a certain year to be able to predict the contextual effects
of inflow and outflow mobility for these classes.
To test our predictions about the effects of pure inflow and outflow mobility on
the voting behaviour of stable class members, we follow the same procedure as
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before. For each class separately, three multi-level models are fitted, each
analysing only those respondents who are members of a specific class. Model D
includes the Inflow variable, model E the Outflow variable, and model F includes
both these variables. In Table 8.5 the pertinent parameter estimates are presented.
Again the results~ of .these tests are negative. None of the estimated parameters
representing the effects of levels of inflow and outflow differ significantly from
zero. Thus, in none of our analyses so far in this chapter, did we find a single
indication of a contextual effect of inflow and outflow mobility in a country on
the voting behaviour of immobile class members. This gives us strong grounds on
which to reject both hypotheses outright.
Tests of hypotheses: effects of "extreme" inflow and outflow mobility
Although the results presented above seem convincing, we would like to perform
one further analysis. When the scholars of the first generation hinted at the
existence of contextual effects of class mobility, they had no detailed class
scheme available or even in mind. Their claims about the existence of contextual
effects referred mainly to simple ideas of inflow and outflow mobility from the
highest to the lowest classes (see for example: Abramson & Books 1971, and
.. Parkin 1971) To do justice to these claims, we therefore do a last test where we
" focus on the effects of inflow and outflow mobility on the voting behaviour of
members of two classes that are "extreme" with respect to their interests, the
service class and the unskilled manual class. We carry out separate analyses for
both of these classes, and focus on the effects of iIiflow and outflow mobility
from one of these classes to the other. Of course, the idea behind these analyses
is that, if contextual effects do exist, these can be expected to be detected most
easily when investigating the effects of this "extreme" inflow and outflow
mobility.
On the basis of our above formulated hypotheses and earlier studies on this
topic, we can expect the level of inflow mobility from the unskilled manual class
into the service class to have a significant effect on the voting behaviour of
immobile class members of the service class. The more former members of the
unskilled manual class enter the service class, the mQre the stable members of the
service class will be influenced by them, and consequently the more they will
vote for a left-wing rather than a right-wing political party. Similarly, we expect
the level of inflow mobility from the service class into the unskilled manual class
to have a substantial impact on the voting behaviour of the stable members of the
unskilled manual class. The more service class members move into the manual
class, the more the members of that manual class can be expected to vote for a
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right-wing party.
In addition, we can formulate hypotheses concerning the effects of levels of
outflow mobility. If stable members of the servic~ class see many of their class
members "fall" to the unskilled manual class, it can be expected that the stable
service class members anticipate their own downward mobility and thus become
more likely to vote for a left-wing party. Thus, the more outflow mobility from
the service class into the unskilled manual class, the more the stable members
will vote for a left-wing party. Again, an analogous idea can be applied to the
voting behaviour of the stable members of the unskilled manual class. In this
case, it can be expected that the more people from the unskilled manual class
climb to the service class, the more those who remain in the unskilled manual
o
class will anticipate their own climb, and the more they will vote right-wing.
To test the hypotheses of "extreme" inflow and outflow mobility, we first do a
separate analysis on data from stable members of the service class. We use the
same models and data as earlier in this chapter, but as our explanatory Inflow
variable we take of the total number of people currently in the service class the
percentage that arrived into the service class from the unskilled manual class.
Furthermore, we take the percentage of people who moved into the unskilled
manual class, based on the total number of people that were originally members
of the service class, as the Outflow variable. Again we fit three models, one
including as an explanatory variable only the Inflow variable, a second only the
Outflow variable, and a third both variables. The results of fitting these models. to
our data, however, show statistically insignificant parameter estimates for these
explanatory variables. The parameter of the Inflow variable has the value of -
0.001 (s.e. 0.014) when it is solely included, and 0.002 (s.e. 0.014) when it is
simultaneously included. In addition, the Outflow parameters yield the value -
0.012 (s.e. 0.019) and -0.013 (s.e. 0.020), respectively.
A separate analysis, using the same model and data, but now concerning the
voting behaviour of the stable members of the unskilled manual class also yields
statistically insignificant parameter estimates. As our Inflow variable we take the
percentage of the total number of people currently in the skilled manual class,
that arrived into the skilled manual class from the service class. As our Outflow
variable we take the percentage of people who moved into the service class,
based on the total number of people who were originally members of the
unskilled manual class. The parameter estimate of the Inflow variable has the
value 0.002 (s.e. 0.012) when it is solely included, and -0.002 (s.e. 0.014) when it
is simultaneously included. The Outflow parameter estimates yield the values -
0.003 (s.e. 0.024) and 0.011 (s.e.0.022) respectively.
Thus, also doing these analyses on "extreme" inflow and .outflow mobility, we
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do not find any corroboration of the hypotheses concerning the contextual effects
of inflow and outflow class mobility on the voting behaviour of immobile class
members.
8.5 Conclusions
In studies of the first until the thirdcJgeneration of research on stratification and
politics many scholars have suggested that intergenerational class mobility has
contextual effects on the voting behaviour of stable class members. However,
such arguments have been made without the support of empirical evidence. In this
chapter we used the literature to formulate two hypotheses about the contextual
effects of class mobility on the voting behaviour of intergenerationally immobile
class members. These hypotheses pertain to the effects of both inflow mobility
and outflow mobility. We aimed to make progress on earlier studies of research
on stratification and politics by giving the hypotheses the highest possible chance
to be corroborated. First, we tested these hypotheses by analysing survey data
from a very large number of contexts, i.e. data of seven classes from sixteen
countries over the period 1956 to 1990. Second, we used multi-level models
which are especially designed to investigate contextual effects. Despite these
efforts the results were negative. The analyses showed no significant contextual
effect of either the level of intergenerational inflow or the level of outflow class
mobility in a country on the voting behaviour of intergenerationally immobile
persons. These negative results are remarkable when regarding the large number
of studies that have suggested the contextual effects of intergenerational class
mobility on politics.
An explanation for these negative results might be that there is a difference
between perceived and actual levels of mobility in a class. The perceived level of
mobility may largely be influenced by local examples that do not necessarily
represent the national mobility pattern. This is an important issue, since we might
expect class members' perceptions of potential mobility to have a larger influence
on their political party preferences. Another explanation, linked to the first, might
be that perceived mobility chances may not be based upon long range mobility. In
our analyses we only investigate inter-class mobility. However, people also
change in social positions within classes, for example people change in their
income position. Thus, it might be that if class members think about their chances
of becomin'g upwardly or downwardly mobile, they think more in terms of intra-
class mobility than inter-class mobility. If this is the case, even our detailed EGP
class is still to crude, because it does not allow us to pick up the contextual
effects of intra-class income mobility. Concluding, a rephrasing of the hypotheses
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in terms of the contextual effects of local short-range mobility on individual
voting behaviour, seems worthwhile.
Contextual effects of class mobility have often been implicitly or explicitly
assumed when discussing the macro-level political consequences of intergenera-
tional class mobility. In this chapter we followed the research strategy that before
focusing on the macro-level effects of class mobility, the micro-level assumptions
concerning the individual or contextual effects of class mobility on individual
voting behaviour were empirically tested. The consequence of this strategy and
the negative results in this chapter is that in the next chapter where we examine
the extent to which variations in the levels of class voting of countries can be
explained by varying patterns of class mobility of these countries, we do not have
to reckon with contextual effects of class mobility.

9 Macro-Effects of Intergenerational
Class Mobility on Class Voting
9.1 Introduction'
In this chapter we want to address the final research question of this study. It
concerns the macro-effects of intergenerational class mobility on levels of class
voting in a country. The importance of class mobility for a country's level of
class voting has already been touched upon by Marx. Of course, when Marx tried
to explain the absence of a class struggle in the United States, the right to vote
was restricted to persons of certain classes in the United States. Nevertheless,
Marx (1926 [1852]: 33) argued that in the United States "classes are not yet
fixed, but in continual flux, with a persistent interchange of their elements". He
thus assumed that high rates of class mobility within a country would undermine
class formation. Sorokin has also argued that class mobility facilitates atomization
and diffusion of solidarity and antagonisms between its inhabitants (1959 [1927]:
538). Perhaps the clearest statement of the importance of mobility for a country's
class voting is found in Sombart's attempt to account for the absence of socialism
in the United States. Sombart in effect suggested that although the United States
has a lower level of class struggle than Britain, this is largely due to extreme
mobility. He argues that if the mobility pattern of the United States showed as
little flux· as that in Britain, then the intensity of class struggle in the United
States would be as high as that of Britain (Sombart 1976 [1906]).
Ideas on the effects of intergenerational mobility on a country's level of class
voting also have been widespread in the first generation of research on
stratification and politics. For example, Campbell et al. (1960), Lipset &
Zetterberg (1956) and Alford (1963) initially suggested that lower levels of class
voting might be associated with higher levels of class mobility. However, since
leading intergenerational mobility research at that time indicated that the overall
pattern of class mobility was much the same in the industrial societies of various
Western nations (Lipset & Bendix 1959), these scholars had to reject this
hypothesis. More recent mobility research, however, does show substantial
differences between countries in the percentages of people moving from one class
to another compared to their parents, i.e. countries differ in their absolute patterns
of mobility (Jones 1969; Hazelrigg 1974; Ganzeboom et al. 1989; Erikson &
Goldthorpe 1992).
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Ideas on the effects of class mobility on class voting have been advanced not
only to account for differences between countries in levels of class voting, but
also to explain the declining importance of class within many contemporary
societies. Increasing rates of class mobility have, it is claimed, tended to weaken
the cohesion of classes and have been one of the factors in class dealignment
(Lipset 1960; Clark & Lipset 1991; Hout et al. 1994). Thus, as already discussed
in Chapter 4, several scholars have suggested that variation in intergenerational
class mobility patterns might help to explain both cross-national and over-time
variation in levels of class voting (Alford 1963; Campbell et al. 1960; Lipset
1983; De Graaf & Ultee 1987; Dahrendorf 1959; Abramson 1972).
Tests of the thesis that variation in intergenerational mobility rates might result
in variation in levels of class voting, have predominantly been done by scholars
of the first generation of research on stratification and politics. In these studies
the rates of intergenerational manuallnonmanual class mobility in countries and
the levels of class voting in these countries were compared, mainly by visual
inspection of tables. In the second and third generation, tests of the class mobility
explanation for variation in class voting had a low priority on the research
agenda. This, despite the fact that the availability of detailed measurement
procedures, a large amount oLhigh quality data, and appropriate techniques of
analysis provided the third generation with a good opportunity to test this
explanation.
In this chapter we pay attention to the macro-level effects of intergenerational
class mobility on class voting, by addressing the following research questions: To
what extent can differences across democratic industrialized countries in levels of
class voting be explained by cross-country differences in patterns of intergene-
rational class mobility Z,.And further: To what extent can changes over-time in
levels of class voting within these countries be explained by changes within these
countries in patterns of intergenerational class mobility?
When we address these questions, we follow our suggestions in Chapter 4 that
it is essential to take into account the macro-micro-macro link between
intergenerational class mobility and class voting. We assnme that the link between
the mobility patterns in countries and their levels of class voting is an indirect
one. First, auxiliary assumptions at the micro-level are necessary. These concern
the voting behaviour of the various types of individual mobile and immobile class
members. Second, assumptions linking the micro- and the macro-level are
reqnired. These assumptions concern the number of people in a country that can
be classified according to their current and former class, i.e. the mobility pattern,
and how this pattern differs between countries and across periods. When taking
both these micro-level and micro-macro-level assumptions into account, we obtain
a macro-prediction on the relationship between the patterns of intergenerational
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class mobility in countries and the levels of class voting in these countries.
Furthermore, when addressing the research questions in this chapter, some of
the improvements of third generation studies are used. First, we apply a detailed
class scheme, i.e. the seven class version of the EGP class scheme. Second, we
use a large and qualitatively good dataset. When investigating the macro-effects
of class mobility on class voting, we analyse the individual dataset used in the
earlier chapters, pertaining to individual respondents from sixteen countries from
various years in the period 1956-1990. In the present chapter the analyses are
restricted to male respondents, aged eighteen years or older who had a valid score
on their voting behaviour and on their origin and destination class. This leaves us
with a total of 62,946 respondents. Third, when analysing the macro-level effects
of class mobility on class voting, and to deal with the macro-micro-macro link
between the patterns of class mobility in countries and the levels of class voting
in these countries, we use the method of counterfactual analysis. We explain this
method later in this chapter. This method has been applied before in studies of
social stratification (Blau & Duncan 1967; Erikson 1990; Erikson & Goldthorpe
1992). In fact, in this chapter we suggest an improvement on this method, i.e. we
analyse the outcomes of counterfactual simnlations, using models that provide us
with parameters directly answering our research questions.
In Section 2 we go into the macro-micro-macro link between intergenerational
class mobility and class voting. Furthermore, we illustrate the method of
counterfactual analysis that we apply to deal with that link, by presenting an
example for two countries. In Section 3 we discuss how we test the hypotheses
concerning the macro-effect of class mobility by modelling the outcomes of our
counterfactual analysis. Section 4 examines the extent to which differences in
class voting between countries can be explained by differences in mobility
patterns in these countries, and the extent10 which changes in class voting within
countries can be explained by changes in mobility patterns within these countries.
The results are discussed in Section 5.
9.2 Macro-micro-macro link
Our macro-level question is essentially about the link between a country's
mobility pattern and its level of class voting. The most obvious way to examine
this link would be to use a method that relates these two macro-variables directly.
For example, we could examine whether a high mobility rate in a country is
related to a lower level of class voting. However, in this chapter we do not deal
with the relationship between class mobility and class voting by simply linking
two macro-level variables. In fact, we have already done this in Chapter 4. In that
Table 9.1. Observed voting pattern and mobility pattern in the United States, in the period 1961-1970. (Percentage of left-
wing voters (L) by origin and destination class, and percentage of inflow mobility (1) from the origin classes into each
destination class)
United States Destination class
Unskilled Skilled Agric. Routine Service Petty Farmers
manual manual Labourer nonmanua! class bourg.
-
L I L I L I L I L I L I L I
Origin class
Unskilled manua! 73 27 62 23 0 0 57 23 60 16 57 13 33 4
Skilled manual 56 18 68 29 33 14 53 23 55 21 64 19 86 4
Agric. labourers 90 2 50 3 50 24 0 0 67 0 33 1 67 1
Routine nonmanua! 77 4 60 3 0 0 67 10 55 11 50 4 0 0
Service class 53 7 68 7 0 0 52 11 58 28 40 14 50 4
Petty bourgeoisie 76 4 56 5 0 0 61 8 57 8 44 15 25 3
Farmers 69 37 57 30 66 62 70 25 55 15 59 35 54 84
Tota! 67 100 62 100 57 100 60 100 57 100 54 100 54 100
Class distribution 23 22 2 10 26 10 8
(Tota! = 100%)
Log-odds-ratio 0 0.22 0.43 0.30 0.43 0.55 0.55
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chapter we argued that the macro link: is more complex than appears at fIrst sight.
We noticed that the relationship at the macro-level is the result of a micro-level
relationship between a person's class position and his voting behaviour, and a
macro-micro bridge-assumption that states how many persons are mobile between
the specifIc classes, i.e. the patterns of intergenerational mobility of a country.
To be able to deal with the complex relationship between a country's mobility
pattern and its level of class voting, we apply the same strategy as in Chapter 5
and examine this relationship by means of some simulations, i.e. we apply the
method of counterfactual analysis (see also: Elau and Duncan 1967: 159; Heath et
al. 1985: 36; Erikson 1990; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: 210). In doing so, we
answer three questions. The fIrst is: How large are the observed differences in
class voting between countries? The second is: What would the difference in class
voting between these countries be, assuming each had the same mobility pattern?
And the third is: To what extent would the differences in class voting between
these countries in this counterfactual situation be smaller than the observed
differences in class voting between these countries? Our responses to these
questions clearly provide answers to the main question addressed in the present
chapter. When the predicted differences in class voting under the counterfactual
.assumption that countries have the same mobility pattern, are smaller than the
observed differences in class voting, we can conclude that mobility explains at
least to some extent differences in clasS voting. Or in other words: the smaller the
predicted differences in class voting between the countries, when each country is
assumed to have the same mobility pattern, the more the observed differences can
be explained by differences in mobility patterns. Thus, the method of
counterfactual analysis enables us to obtain an answer to our research question,
and is capable of dealing with the macro-micro-macro link between a country's
class mobility pattern and its level of class voting.
Our application of the method of counterfactual analysis can best be illustrated
with an example. Sticking to Sombart's suggestion of comparing the United
States and Britain, in this example we investigate the extent to which the
observed differences in class voting between Britain and the United States over
the period 1961-1970, can be explained by differences in the mobility patterns
between these countries. In Table 9.1 for the United States and in Table 9.2 for
Britain, the observed voting and mobility patterns of these countries are presented
(for the seven origin and destination EGP classes). The voting fIgures (L)
represent the probability for each class member of voting for a left-wing political
party rather than a right-wing party.
The mobility patterns given comprise two components. As a fIrst component
the inflow mobility rates (I) in each of the destination classes are given. These are
the percentages of people who come from each specific origin class into that
Table 9.2. Observed voting pattern and mobility pattern in Britain, in the period 1961-1970. (Percentage of left-wing voters
(L) by origin and destination class, and percentage of inflow mobility (1) from the origin classes into each destination class)
Britain Destination class
Unskilled Skilled Agric. Routine Service Petty Farmers
manual manual Labourer nonmanual class bourg.
-
L I L I L I L I L I L I L I
Origin class
Unskilled manual 68 40 73 31 83 12 43 23 33 20 23 20 0 4
Skilled manual 68 31 74 49 0 6 51 34 34 29 36 24 0 9
Agric. labourers 69 8 66 7 57 59 42 4 20 2 49 6 0 4
Routine nonmanual 53 3 38 2 0 0 43 10 23 7 28 6 0 0
Service class 58 7 37 4 0 6 25 18 16 27 5 13 0 9
Petty bourgeoisie 42 7 39 5 0 0 20 8 6 II II 21 0 4
Farmers 58 4 47 3 46 18 18 3 17 4 33 10 9 70
Total 65 100 68 100 56 100 40 100 24 100 24 100 14 100
Class distribution 26 32 2 9 22 7 2
(Total = 100%)
Log-odds-ratio 0 -0.13 0.38 1.02 1.77 1.77 2.43
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particular destination class. As a second component the percentages that represent
the class distribution of the EGP destination classes are given.
On the basis of voting patterns and inflow mobility rates given in Tables 9.1
and 9.2, the voting behaviour of each EGP class can be calculated. The voting
behaviour of an entire class is, of course, a weighted average of the voting
behaviour of the various class members who originated from different origin
classes. Thus, from the figures in the first two columns in Table 9.2, we can
calculate that of the whole unskilled manual class in Britain in the period 1961-
1970, (68*40 + 68*31 + 69*8 + 53*3 + 58*7 + 42*7 + 58*4)/100, or 65 per·
cent, voted for a left-wing party. The percentages of left-wing voters of all total
destination classes are presented in the total rows of Tables 9.1 and 9.2.'
Using these percentages of left-wing voters - as discussed in Chapters 2 and 6 -
log-adds-ratios measuring the differences in voting behaviour between the EGP
classes can be calculated. For example, the log-odds-ratio measuring the
difference in voting behaviour between the most left-wing class and the most
right-wing class in Britain - the unskilled manual class and the farmers - has the
value log((65/(100-65))/(l4/(l00-14))), or 2.43. Log-odds-ratios calculated for the
differences in voting behaviour between the unskilled manual class and all other
EGP classes in Britain and the United States are given in the bottom rows of
Tables 9.1 and 9.2.3
We now can examine the observed differences in levels of EGP class voting
between the countries. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 6, on the basis of the log-
odds-ratios presented in Tables 9.1 and 9.2, a kappa index as a measure of the
observed level of EGP class voting can be calculated. The kappa index - the
standard deviation of the seven log-odds-ratios measuring the differences in
voting behaviour between the seven EGP classes - amounts to 0.99 for Britain
and 0.20 for the United States. Thus, the observed differences in EGP class
voting between Britain and the United States, measured by the kappa index,
amounts to (0.99 - 0.20), or 0.79.
Additional to differences in EGP class voting, we can also examine the
observed difference in manuallnonmanual class voting between Britain and the
United States. On the basis of the mobility and voting patterns shown in Tables
9.1 and 9.2, it is possible to calculate measures of manuallnonmanual class voting
for Britain and the United States. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, we use the
Thomsen index as a measure of manuallnonmanual class voting in a country. This
Thomsen index is the natural logarithm of an odds-ratio, where that odds-ratio is
the odds for manual workers of voting left-wing rather than right-wing, divided
by .the odds for nonmanual workers of doing the same. Thus, to calculate the
Thomsen index, first the chances of current members of the manual and the
nonmanual classes voting for left-wing rather than right-wing political parties
Table 9.3. Counterfactual situation where the voting pattern is that in the United States and the mobility pattern is that in
Britain, in the period 1961-1970. (Percentage of left-wing voters (L) by origin and destination class, and percentage of inflow
mobility (1) from the origin classes into each destination class)
Destination class
Unskilled Skilled Agric. Routine Service Petty Farmers
manual manual Labourer nonmanual class bourg.
L I L I L I L I L I L I L I
Origin class
Unskilled manual 73 40 62 31 0 12 57 23 60 20 57 20 33 4
Skilled manual 56 31 68 49 33 6 53 34 55 29 64 24 86 9
Agric. labourers 90 8 50 7 50 59 0 4 67 2 33 6 67 4
Routine nonmanual 77 3 60 2 0 0 67 10 55 7 50 6 0 0
Service class 53 7 68 4 0 6 52 18 58 27 40 13 50 9
Petty bourgeoisie 76 7 56 5 0 0 61 8 57 11 44 21 25 4
Farmers 69 4 57 3 66 18 70 3 55 4 59 10 54 70
Total 68 100 64 100 42 100 54 100 58 100 53 100 56 100
Class distribution 26 32 2 9 22 7 2
(Total =100%)
Log-odds-ratio 0 0.18 1.08 0.59 0.43 0.63 1.51
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have to be calculated. For members of the manual class this is the weighted
average of the voting behaviour of the unskilled, skilled and agricultural manual
workers. In Britain this amounts to (65*0.26 + 68*0.32 + 56*0.02)/(0.26 + 0.32 +
0.02), or 66 per cent. For members of the nonmanual class the chance of voting
for a left-wing party is the weighted average of the chance to vote for members
of the service class, the routine nonmanual class, the petty bourgeoisie, and the
farmers. For Britain this is 27 per cent. Thus, in Britain for the period 1961-1970
the Thomsen index takes the value log((661100-66)/(27/100-27)), or 1.67:
Corresponding calculations for the United States give a Thomsen index of 0.32.
Consequently, the observed difference in manuallnonmanual class voting between
Britain and the United States, when measured by the Thomsen index, amounts to
(1.67 - 0.32), or 1.35.
It should be noted that the difference in mobility patterns between the two
countries - as defIned in this example - comprises two components. The fIrst
component is formed by the inflow mobility rates in each EGP destination class.
The second component is formed by the percentages that give the distribution of
the destination classes. These percentages, of course, also represent the
composition of the manual and the nonmanual classes. Therefore, differences in
levels of manuallnonmanual class voting between two countries can be due to
differences in both components of the mobility patterns. Differences between
countries in EGP class voting can only be due to different inflow rates, since
levels of EGP class voting are insensitive to variations in the composition of the
manual and nonmanual classes.
To investigate the extent to which observed differences in class voting, i.e. in
. ·both EGPclass voting and manuallnonmanual class voting, between Britain and
the United States can be explained by differences in their mobility patterns, we
need two more steps. In the fIrst step, we investigate what the differences would
be in the counterfactual situation where these countries are assumed to have the
same mobility pattern. In the second step, a comparison of these two differences
gives an indication of the extent to which the observed differences in class voting
between these countries are due to different mobility patterns.
We start by the fIrst step, by asking what the difference in the level of class
voting between Britain and the United States would be in the counterfactual
situation. That is, we investigate what the differences in class voting would be if
the United States had the same mobility pattern as Britain. In doing so, we touch
upon Sornbart's question of what would happen to socialism in the United States
if the country had the same mobility pattern as Britain. Thus, we have to create a
counterfactual situation where the voting pattern in the United States is as
observed but the mobility pattern is as in Britain. This situation is presented in
Table 9.3. The Thomsen index measuring the level of manuallnonmanual class
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voting in this counterfactual situation has the value 0.38. This means that where
both countries are assumed to have the same mobility pattern, i.e. that of Britain,
the difference in Thomsen index between these countries amounts to (1.67 -
0.38), or 1.29.
As a second step, these results enable us to answer the question of whether the
differences in class voting between Britain and the United States outlined above
is smaller than the observed difference in class voting between these countries. In
fact, we find that the difference between these countries in the counterfactual
situation is (1.35 - 1.29)/(1.35 * 100), or four per cent smaller than the observed
difference in Thomsen indices between these countries. In other words, only
around four per cent of the difference in levels of manual/nonmanual class voting
between Britain and the United States in the period 1961-1970 can be explained
by differences in the mobility patterns between these two coun!ries.
Furthermore, in the counterfactual situation given in Table 9.3, the kappa index
has the value 0.34. The difference between the kappa indices of Britain and the
United States in the counterfactual situation is therefore (0.99 - 0.34), or 0.65.
This means that the difference in the kappa indices between the countries in the
situation where these have the same mobility pattern is (0.79 - 0.65)/(0.79 * 100),
or eighteen per cent smaller than the difference in the kappa indices of these two
countries in the observed situation. Thus, in this case about eighteen per cent of
the observed differences in EGP class voting can be explained by differences in
mobility patterns between the two countries.
Of course, when investigating what the difference in class voting .between
Britain and the United States would be if both countries had the same mobility
pattern, we could also have assumed that both countries had the mobility pattern
of the United States, instead of that of Britain. Therefore, we also pay attention in
two additional steps, to that counterfactual situation. In this situation the Thomsen
index has the value 1.58. Thus, the differences in Thomsen indices between the
countries under the assumption that these have the mobility pattern of the United
States, amounts to (1.58 - 0.32), or 1.26, which is about (1.35 - 1.26)/1.35, or
seven per cent smaller than the observed differences in kappa indices between the
two countries. Furthermore, in the counterfactual situation where both countries
are assumed to have the mobility patterns of the United States, the kappa index
has the value 0.93. Thus the difference in kappa indices between Britain and the
United States when both these countries have the mobility pattern of the United
States, is (0.93 - 0.20), or 0.73, which is (0.79-0.73)/0.79, or eight per cent
smaller than the observed difference in the kappa index between these two
countries. Thus, we can conclude that around seven per cent of the difference in
manuallnonmanual class voting between Britain and the United States in the
period 1961-1970 and around eight per cent of the differences in EGP class
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voting can be explained by differences in mobility patterns between the two
countries. Whether these conclusions also apply when more countries are included
in the analysis remains to be seen when we analyse our entire dataset.
9.3 Modelling the macro-effects of class mobility
Before we analyse our entire dataset to address our research questions, we explain
how we model the results of our counterfactual analyses and thus obtain answers
pertinent to our research questions.
The way we answer our research questions can be illustrated using the results
of the above example for Britain and the United States. The results are
summarized in Table 9.4. The entries in the main diagonal of Table 9.4 are the
observed levels of class voting in Britain and the United States. The entries in. the
off-diagonal cells show the levels of class voting in the counterfactual situations.
As discussed above, the differences in the observed class voting between Britain
and the United States (CLYbri - CLY.s.,) has the value 1.35 for the Thomsen
index, and 0.79 for the kappa index. The differences in class voting between
Britain and the United States in the counterfactual situation where these countries
Table 9.4. Summary of modelling macro-effects of class mobiiity
Mobility pattern
Voting Pattern
Thomsen index
Britain United
States
kappa index
Britain United States
Britain
United States
1.67
0.38
1.58
0.32
0.99
0.34
0.93
0.20
Summary Measures:
CLYbri - CLY.",
CLYbri - CLY.",bri
CLYbri,'"' - CLV.",
S-parameter
1.67 - 0.32 = 1.35
1.67 - 0.38 =1.29
1.58 - 0.32 = 1.26
(1.35-1.29)/1.35 =0.04
(1.35-1.26)/1.35 =0.07
0.06
0.99 - 0.20 =0.79
0.99 - 0.34 =0.65
0.93 - 0.20 =0.73
(0.79-0.65)/0.79 = 0.18
(0.79-0.73)/0.79 = 0.08
0.13
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have the mobility pattern of Britain (CLVbri - CLVusa,bri), has the value 1.29 for
the Thomsen index, and 0.65 for the kappa index. Subsequently, we calculate the
extent to which the differences in levels of class voting in the counterfactual
situation is smaller than the observed difference:
Susa,bri == ((CLVbri - CLV"sa)-(CLVbri - CLV"a,bri)) I (CLVbri - CLV"sal (1)
This formula yields for the Thomsen index the conclusion that the difference is
four per cent smaller than observed. For the kappa index it yields that it is
eighteen per cent smaller than observed. In other words, four per cent of the
differences in mannallnonmanual class voting between Britain and the United
States can be explained by differences in the mobility patterns between these two
countries, while the figure for EGP class voting is about eighteen per cent.
The second counterfactual situation, in which both countries were assumed to
have the mobility pattern of the United States, yields somewhat different but still
comparable results. Here, the differences in class voting between these countries
is:
Sbri.usa == ((CLVbri - CLV",J-(CLVbri,us. - CLV",J) I (CLVbri - CLV".) (2)
According to the Thomsen indices the difference in class voting between these
countries is seven per .cent smaller than the observed difference; and according to
the kappa indices it is eight per cent smaller than the observed difference. Thus,
on the basis of this analysis, we can conclude that seven per cent of the
difference in manuallnonmanual class voting and eight per cent of difference in
the EGP class voting can be explained by differences in mobility patterns
between the Britain and the United States.
In general then, for two countries k and 1, the proportion to which differences
in class voting between these countries - under the (counterfactual) assumption
that these countries have the same mobility pattern (SkI) - deviate from the
differences in observed levels of class voting between these countries, can be
represented by the following general equation:
(3)
After reordering, this equation can be rewritten as follows:
(4)
where the CLVk-parameters represent the observed class voting in country k, and
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the CLVI-parameters represent the observed class voting in country 1.
We can of course do our counterfactual analyses simultaneously for more than
two countries. However, when doing so, many SkI-parameters are obtained. For
two countries we already get 2 Skcparameters, but for 3 countries we get 6, and
for 4 countries we end up with 12 Ski-parameters. In general, when investigating
differences for a number of n countries, this results in (n2 - n) SkI-parameters. All
these Ski-parameters provide an indication of the extent to which variation in class
voting between countries or periods can be explained by variation in patterns of
mobility between these countries or periods.
In order to avoid ending up with many Ski-parameters, and since our hypothesis
does not say anything about varying influences between countries, we apply in
this chapter a model that enables us to summarize the conclusions into a single
parameter. We therefore assume the SkI-parameter to be the same for all
counterfactual situations. Thus, we estimate the parameters of the following
model on the outcomes of the counterfactual analyses:5
CLVkl = S*CLVk+ (l-S)*CLVI (5)
We call the summary measure "S" the "S-parameter" as a tribute to Sombart
(1976 [1906]), who was one of the first to explicitly state hypotheses on the
macro-effects of intergenerational class mobility. When estimating the parameters
of equation (5), the S-parameter is allowed to take any value. If the S-parameter
takes a value between zero and one, than the predicted differences in class voting
between the countries, under the assumption that these countries have the same
mobility pattern, are smaller than the observed differences. It should be noted that
if the S-parameter takes a value smaller than zero or larger than one, then the
predicted differences are larger than the observed differences. In this way, the S-
parameter gives a direct answer to our question: to what extent can differences in
class voting be explained by differences in mobility patterns between these
countries? The larger the S-parameter - if it has a value between zero and one -
the more the differences in class voting can be explained by different mobility
patterns.
In this chapter we use the above model to answer our research question, i.e. to
examine the extent to which differences across countries and periods in levels of
class voting can be explained by differences across countries and periods in
patterns of class mobility. To do this, we first compute outcomes from
counterfactual analyses for the countries. Subsequently, these outcomes, i.e.
entries in a table like Table 9.4, are used as cases to estimate the parameters of
the model. For example, when estimating the S-parameter on the four entries in
Table 9.4 it takes the value 0.06 for the Thomsen indices and 0.13 for the kappa
Table 9.5. Levels ofclass voting (measured by ThomseniTidex) in observed and counterfactual countries, in the period 1961-
1970
Mobility pattern
Voting pattern Australia Britain Germany Italy Netherlands Norway United States
Australia 1.34 1.19 1.38 0.93 1.31 1.43 1.17
Britain 1.65 1.67 1.80 1.04 1.72 1.76 1.58
Germany 1.04 1.08 0.85 2.07 1.09 1.10 0.76
Italy 1.23 1.07 1.39 0.74 1.41 1.34 1.37
Netherlands 0.99 0.82 0.94 0.81 1.05 1.16 0.89
Norway 1.62 1.38 2.04 0.00 1.43 1.84 1.48
United States 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.41 0.39 0.42 0.32
Mean 1.17 1.08 1.25 0.86 1.20 1.28 1.08
Std. deviatiou 0.41 0.38 0.54 0.59 0.39 0.45 0.42
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indices. Thus, by applying this model, we have the advantage of a single S-
parameter summarizing all the above calculations.
9.4 Results
Explaining differences between countries
Let us start by addressing the question: To what extent can differences between
countries in levels of class voting be explained by differences in their patterns of
intergenerational class mobility? To do this, we divide our data into three periods:
1961-1970, 1971-1980, and 1981-1990. In the fIrst period we have data from
seven countries, in the second period from fourteen, and in the last period from
twelve countries.
When analysing the data for these periods, we focus on the obtained S-
parameters. However, before presenting these S-parameters we can illustrate our
method using the data for countries in the fIrst period, i.e. 1961-1970. In this
period data from seven countries are available. Each of the seven countries in this
period has a specifIc mobility pattern and a specifIc voting pattern. Thus, if the
fIgures for mobility patterns are systematically combined with the fIgures for the
voting patterns, we get seven by seven, or 49 voting/mobility combinations.
Seven of these show the observed voting and mobility patterns in the countries
and periods under investigation, while the remaining 42 are for the counterfactual
situations. Thomsen indices, calculated from these matrices as measures of the
levels of manuallnonmanual class voting, are reported in Table 9.5.
The entries in the main diagonal cells of that table show the observed Thomsen
indices, which differ considerably across countries. The highest Thomsen index is
observed for Norway (1.84) and the smallest for the United States (0.32). The
variation in observed Thomsen indices can be summarized by the standard
deviation calculated over these observed indices. This has the value 0.45. The off-
diagonal entries in Table 9.5 show Thomsen indices representing levels of class
voting in the counterfactual situations. In general, Thomsen indices in the
counterfactual situations are more similar to that of the country the voting pattern
is taken from, than to that of the country the mobility pattern is taken from.
Moreover, we fInd that standard deviations summarizing the variation in class
voting in the counterfactual situations where the countries have the same mobility
pattern - given underneath Table 9.5 - are about the same size aS,or even larger
than, the standard deviations for the observed differences in class voting (0.45).
These results indicate that differences in class voting between the seven countries
in the period 1961-1970, are not, or at most are to a very small extent, due to
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Table 9.6. S-parameters indicating the extent to which variation in class mobility
patterns explains between-country variation in levels of class voting
Thomsen index kappa index N. of
S-parameter s.e S-parameter s.e cases
1961-1970 0.03 0.13 -0.03 0.12 49
1971-1980 0.16* 0.02 0.06* 0.02 196
1981-1990 0.00 0.04 -0.05 0.05 144
Note: * p < 0.05.
cross-country differences in mobility patterns.
To get a direct answer to our question of to what extent cross-country
differences in mobility patterns account for differences in manuallnonmanual class
voting between countries, we focus on the S-parameter estimates obtained from
analysing the entries of tables like Table 9.5.6 These estimates are presented in
Table 9.6. In this table the standard errors of the parameter estimates are also
given. However, we are reluctant to interpret the standard errors to examine
whether this value differs significantly from zero, because the models are not
applied to randomly collected data but to counterfactual situations. We find that
for the period 1961-1970 the S-parameter has the value 0.03. This indicates that
on average the difference in the Thomsen indices between the countries assumed
to have the same mobility pattern, is three per cent smaller than the difference
between the observed Thomsen indices of these countries. Or in other words, for
the period 1961-70, about three per cent of the differences in class voting
between the countries can be explained by differences in mobility patterns.
A similar conclusion results from our analyses of data from the other two
periods. These are also presented in Table 9.6. For the period 1971-1980 the S-
parameter takes the value 0.16, while for 1981-1990 it has the value 0.00. Thus in
these periods sixteen and zero per cent respectively of the differences in
manuallnonmanual class voting can be explained by differences in mobility
patterns between the countries. Summarizing these results, on average over the
three periods, about six per cent of the differences across democratic
industrialized countries in manuallnonmanual class voting, as measured by
Thomsen indices, can be explained by differences in the intergenerational
mobility patterns between these countries.
However, as discussed above, when examining the effects of different mobility
patterns on levels of manuallnonmanual class voting, two effects are combined.
The first concerns the effect of differences in the composition of the manual and
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nonmanual classes between countries. We already paid attention to these effects
in Chapter 5. The other is the effect we are specifically interested in the present
chapter, i.e. the effect of differences in mobility patterns between countries.
Therefore, to get a better idea of the effects of differences in mobility patterns on
levels of class voting, we examine the effects on levels of EGP class voting.
When examining levels of EGP class voting, we control for variation in the
composition of the manual and nonmanual class.
When investigating the extent to which differences in EGP class·' voting
between countries can be explained by differences in mobility patterns between
the countries, we follow the same strategy as above, but now apply it to kappa
indices, instead of Thomsen indices. The pertinent S-parameters are presented in
the second main column of Table 9.6. For the period 1961-1970 the S-parameter
is -0.03, for 1971-1980 it is 0.06, and for the period 1981-1990 it has the value -
0.05. Consequently, over all three periods, on average the S-parameter has the
value -0.01. Negative parameters imply that on average differences in class voting
between countries in the counterfactual situations are even larger than the
observed cross-country differences in class voting. Thus, on the basis of these
results, it can be concluded that observed differences across democratic
industrialized countries in levels of EGP class voting, .when measured by kappa
indices, can not be explained at all by differences in the patterns of
intergenerational class mobility across these countries.
The fact that differences in EGP class voting can not be explained by
differences in patterns of mobility, has implications for the interpretation of
results concerning the effects of class mobility on levels of manuallnonmanual
class voting. We found that differences between countries in intergenerational
mobility patterns to some extent are responsible for differences in
manual/nonmanual class voting between these countries. However, these
differences in mobility patterns concern the combined differences in two
components of mobility patterns: the inflow mobility rates and the composition ot
the manual and nonmanual classes. The fact that our analyses show no effects of
class mobility on EGP class voting, therefore, leads us to the conclusion that the
effect of class mobility on manuaVnonmanual class voting is only due to
differences in the class composition of the manual and nonmanual class, and not
to differences in inflow mobility rates. This deduction is supported by the
conclusion of Chapter 5, which holM that differences: in class composition
between countries to some extent explain differences in manual/nonmanual class
voting between these countries. Consequently, we conclude that differences across
democratic industrialized countries in manuaVnonmanual class voting can not be
explained by differences in the intergenerational mobility patterns between these
countries.
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Explaining changes within countries
The results of our analyses so far thus suggest that differences in mobility
patterns do not explain differences in class voting between countries. However, it
might be that changes over-time in class voting within countries can be explained,
to some extent at least, by changes in the patterns of intergenerational class
mobility in these countries. To examine whether this is the case, we adopt the
same strategy used in our investigation of the between-country differences. The
only difference is that now we distinguish periods within each country, instead of
countries within each period. To avoid ending up with many empty cells and to
do away with possible errors in datasets from a single year, we do not distinguish
between years within countries, but only between five-year periods, beginning in
1961. Our dataset allows us to analyse data from only ten countries, because for
the other countries no data from more than two periods are available.
Before discussing the estimates of the S-parameters, we illustrate the method by
using data from a single country. Since Britain is a country in which a strong
decline in class voting has occurred over the last decades, we use it as an
example. To examine the extent to which changes in class voting can be
explained by changes in patterns of intergenerational class mobility in Britain, we
systematically combine figures for mobility patterns with the figures for the
voting patterns. The computed Thomsen indices, as measures of the levels of
manuallnonmanual class voting are reported in Table 9.7.
The entries in the main diagonal cells of Table 9.7 show the observed Thomsen
indices in Britain for each of the periods. These indicate a clear decline in class
voting from 1.82 in the first period, to 1.35 in the last period. This decline in
class voting is in line with our findings in Chapter 3, where we investigated over-
time changes in manuallnonmanual class voting on a year-to-year basis. The
entries in the off-diagonal cells show Thomsen indices representing levels of class
voting in the counterfactual situations. We find that these counterfactual Thomsen
indices have values' that are more like those in the period the voting pattern is
taken from, than those in the period the mobility pattern is taken from.
Furthermore, the standard deviations summarizing the variation in class voting
in the counterfactual situation where the, periods have the same mobility pattern -
given below Table 9.7 - are either the same as, or even larger than, the standard
deviation for the observed changes in class voting (0.19). Thus, it is unlikely that
changes in the patterns of mobility explain changes in manuallnonrnanual class
voting in Britain over the decades.
In addition, when applying our method of analysis to the entries of Table 9.7
that give the observed and counterfactual levels of class voting, this yields an S-
parameter with the value -0.12. A negative S-parameter means that in general the
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Table 9.7. Levels of class voting (measured by Thomsen index) in observed and
counterfactual periods in Britain, 1961-1990
Mobility Pattern
Voting pattern 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90
1961-65 1.82 1.89 1.81 1.82 1.83 1.83
1966-70 1.56 1.60 1.64 1.66 1.61 1.71
1971-75 1.44 1.53 1.50 1.53 1.49 1.55
1976-80 1.31 1.31 1.37 1.28 1.28 1.35
1981-85 1.48 1.51 1.50 1.50 1.51 1.49
1986-90 1.21 124 1.31 1.32 1.33 1.35
Mean 1.47 1.51 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.55
Std. deviation 0.21 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.19
difference between periods assuming the same mobility pattern for these periods
are even larger, than the observed differences in class voting between these
periods. Thus, we are led to conclude that in Britain changes in manual-
Inonrnanual class voting over the periods considered cannot be attributed to
changes in the mobility patterns Over these periods.
Next, we examine the extent to which over-time changes in levels of class
voting can be explained by over-time changes in intergenerational class mobility
in all our countries under investigation. The effects of intergenerational class
mobility on class voting in a country are investigated by means of S-parameters.
Since it is only possible to examine trends when data for more than two periods
are available, in Table 9.8 we report the estimated S-parameters for the ten
countries from which we have data for at least two five-year periods.
We find that with respect to the levels of manuallnonmanual class voting,
measured by Thomsen indices, in five countries the S-parameters have a negative
value. These five countries are Britain, Denmark, Germany, Italy, and Norway.
The negative S-parameters imply that in these countries the changes in class
voting between the periods in the counterfactual situation are even larger than the
observed changes in class voting over the same periods. Furthermore, in the
remaining five countries the S-parameters have positive values. Austria and
Sweden have the largest values (both: 0.36). In the United States and the
Netherlands the S-parameters have· the smallest positive value: 0.05 and 0.02
respectively. Furthermore, over all ten countries the average of the S-parameters
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Table 9.8. S-parameters indicating the extent to which variation in class mobility
patterns explains over-time variation in levels of class voting
Thomsen index kappa index N. of
S-parameter S-parameter casess.e s.e
Australia 0.18* 0.04 0.03 0.10 36
Austria 0.36 0.15 0.75 0.44 9
Britain -0.12* 0.04 0.20 0.31 36
Denmark -0.Q3 0.Q7 0.28* 0.11 4
Germany -0.18 0.18 0.08 0.05 25
Italy -0.65 0.52 -0.02 0.19 9
Netherlands 0.02 0.12 -0.13 0.17 25
Norway -0.05 0.10 -0.23 0.22 25
Sweden 0.36* 0.13 -1.40* 0.19 4
United States 0.05* 0.02 -0.49 0.29 36
Note: * p < 0.05.
has the value -0.01. Thus, we can conclude that in general changes over-time in
levels of manuallnonmanual class voting within democratic industrialized
countries cannot be explained by changes in the intergenerational mobility
patterns within these countries. Taking into account that - as we concluded in
Chapter 5 - variations in class compositions are able to explain about a fifth of
the over-time variations in the levels of manuallnonmanual class voting within
countries, our findings imply that effects of changes in the composition of the
manual and nonmanual classes are surpassed by counter-acting effects of changes
over-time in the inflow mobility rates of the EGP classes within these countries.
A similar story emerges from an examination of the S-parameters for the
levels of EGP class voting, as measured by kappa indices. The pertinent S-
parameters are reported in the second main column of Table 9.8. Here we again
find negative S-parameters for Norway and Italy. In addition negative parameters
are found for the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. For Sweden we
even find a S-parameter of -1.40. This value is probably due to the fact that the
estimation of the S-parameter is based only on a comparison of two periods, and
thus on only four· cases in this analysis: For the countries where we find a
positive S-parameter, these parameters differ largely in size. They range from
0.75 for Austria, to 0.28 in Denmark, to 0.08 in Germany and 0.03 in Australia
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However, the average value of the S-parameters over the ten countries is -0.09.
Thus, these findings reinforce our conclusion that in general the observed changes
in class voting across the periods studied in the democratic industrialized
countries are to a large extent unrelated to changing class mobility patterns in
these countries.
9.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we investigated whether macro-effects of intergenerational class
mobility on levels of class voting in countries could be found. The existence of
such effects had been suggested in many studies of the first generation of
research on stratification and politics. In fact, these effects had been already
explicitly touched upon by Sombart, in his attempt to explain why there was no
socialism in the United States. In studies of the first generation, the effects of
class mobility were only tested by tentative comparisons of rates of mobility of
countries and their levels of class voting. Furthermore, they were not tested when
using detailed class schemes, and taking into account the complicated relationship
between mobility patterns and levels of class voting.
In the present chapter we aimed to improve upon these earlier tests. We did so
by investigating the macro-effects of class voting on a large individual-level
dataset for sixteen countries over the postwar period. Furthermore, we did our
analyses focusing on both the levels of manual/nonmanual class voting and the
levels of EGP class voting. In addition, we applied a method of counterfactual
analysis that enabled us to take the complex macro-micro-macro link between the
mobility patterns of countries and their levels of class voting into account.
Moreover, we used models of the third generation to analyse the outcomes of the
counterfactual analysis and to get single measures of the extent to which variation
in class voting can be explained by variation in patterns of intergenerational class
mobility.
However, despite the large amount of literature on the macro-effects of
mobility on levels of class voting, and the elaborate way we investigated these
effects, we had to conclude that differences across democratic industrialized
countries in levels of class voting could not at all be explained by cross-country
differences in patterns of intergenerational class mobility. We did find some
effect of differences in mobility patterns on variations in manuallnonmanual class
voting. However, the results of our analyses indicated that these were due to
differences in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes between the
countries, and not to differences in the rates of inflow mobility between the
countries. Our analyses also showed that changes over-time in levels of class
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voting within these countries could not be explained by changes within these
countries in patterns of intergenerational class mobility. This conclusion was
obtained for both Il1allual/nonrnanual class voting and for EGP class voting.
10 Summary and Discussion
10.1 Summary
In almost all industrialized countries where people have the right to vote at
general elections, people's social position - in particular their class - is important
in determining their party choice. Since those in the lower classes are more likely
to vote for a left-wing party than are those in the higher classes, it can be said
that in every country a so-called "democratic class struggle" takes place.
The present study focused on the relationship between class and voting
behaviour in democratic industrialized countries. It did so, by addressing three
sorts of questions which, although they had been addressed in earlier studies, had
not yet been adequately answered. First, descriptive questions concerning the
levels of class voting in Western industrialized countries over the postwar period
are addressed. Second, it examined questions of various explanations for between-
country and over-time variations in class voting. Third, this. study concentrated on
questions about the effects of intergenerational class mobility on individual voting
behaviour.
When addressing these questions, this study builts on a long history of research
On social stratification and politics. As discussed in Chapter 1, the history of this
research area can be divided into three generations. Over these three generations
considerable progress has been made with respect to the articulation of research
questions, measurement procedures, data collection and methods of analyses. In
studies of the first generation - starting in the 1950s and ending in the 1970s -
relatively vague research questions were addressed by examining cross-tabulations
based upon a limited number of datasets and using simple class measures. In
studies of the second generation - beginning in the 1960s - more precise questions
were addressed analysing more survey data with more adequate linear regression
techniques. Studies of the third generation - that started in the 1980s - have dealt
with more precise research questions, using detailed and standardized class
measures, large scale comparable datasets, and non-linear research techniques.
However, this third generation is only still in its infancy and has yet to live up to
expectations. The present study, by addressing classical questions on the relation-
ship between class and voting behaviour, by applying up-to-date measurement
procedures and methods of analysis, and by analysing large datasets, aims to live
up to some of these expectations.
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Data and operationalizations
The data analysed in this study come from two datasets. The fIrst dataset consists
of aggregated data from twenty Western industrialized democratic countries - i.e.
from all Western European countries, Australia, Canada, and the United States -
over the period 1945-1990. This dataset includes both data on levels of class
voting in the countries, and data on various social and political characteristics of
these countries. The second dataset contains data on individuals from 113 national
representative surveys held in sixteen out of the twenty countries - leaving
Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain aside - in the period 1956-1990. The
use of both these large datasets allowed us to come up with reliable answers and
lessened the chance to not accepting hypotheses, while these hypotheses in reality
hold. Furthermore, these data allowed for relatively strong tests by doing
multivariate analysis.
The measurement procedures for people's class position used in this study are
diverse. First, we applied the traditional manuallnonmanual class scheme. In other
analyses we applied a more detailed class scheme, i.e. the class scheme developed
by Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarrero, the so-called "EGP" class scheme.
According to this EGP class scheme, unskilled, skilled and agricultural manual
workers are distinguished within the manual class, and service class workers,
routine nonmanual workers, petty bourgeoisie and farmers within the nonmanual
class. To measure the strength of the relationship between class and voting
behaviour, i.e. the level of class voting, we used log-odds-ratios.
Description of levels of class voting
From the very beginning of research on class and voting behaviour, studies have
shown that the strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour
differed between countries. In addition, these studies have shown that the strength
of that relationship declined over the postwar period in most of these countries.
These conclusions were especially drawn in studies of the fIrst generation of
social stratifIcation and politics. In these studies levels of class voting were
measured on the basis of so-called "Alford indices", that only distinguish between
manual and nonmanual classes and measure absolute differences in voting"
behaviour.
However, ill studies of the third generation doubts were raised about the
conclusions of these fIrst generation studies. It was claimed that differences
detected, when using measures of absolute class voting like the Alford index,
might not (solely) be due to differences in the strength of the relationship .
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between class and voting behaviour, but also to differences in the general
popularity of the political parties. Furthermore, it was argued that differences
between countries or periods detected when using the manual/nonmanual class
scheme, might to some extent be due to differences in the composition of the
manual and nonmanual classes between countries or periods, and not (only) to
differences in the strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour.
Consequently, in third generation studies it was argued that when using a measure
of relative class voting and distinguishing between more detailed classes, descrip-
tions of levels of class voting might lead to different conclusions about between-
country and over-time differences in class voting.
In the present study we tested the tenability of these arguments. In Chapter 3
we described the levels of class voting using measures of relative class voting
that distinguish between manual and nonmanual classes - i.e. Thomsen indices.
Thus, we examined what we called the levels of relative manuallnonmanual class
voting. In Chapter 6 we also described the levels of relative class voting, but in
that chapter we distinguished classes according to the more detailed EGP class
scheme, and therefore talked about the levels ofrelative EGP class voting.
The analyses for both manuallnonmanual class voting and EGP class voting
yielded basically the same conclusions. They indicated that substantial differences
in levels of relative class voting existed between democratic industrialized
countries in the postwar period. Of all countries under investigation, the Scandi-
navian countries and Britain had the highest levels of class voting, and the
United States and Canada the lowest. In addition, our analyses showed that in
many of the countries substantial declines in levels of relative class voting
occurred in the postwar period. The declines were largest in the Scandinavian
countries, followed by Germany and Britain. Moreover, we found no evidence of
substantial declines in class voting in Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland
and the Netherlands. This despite the fact that for these countries data over a
considerable time period were available.
In addition, analyses showed, when describing between-country differences and
over-time changes in class voting, that the various measures of class voting
yielded the same conclusions with respect to the ranking of the countries accord-
ing to their levels of class voting, and according to the speed of declines of class
voting. These results, however, do not imply that the claims of the scholars of the
third generation were wrong. Our findings, as we discuss later in more detail,
showed that some of the between-country and over-time variations in man-
uallnonmanual class voting were due to variations in the composition of the .
manual and nonmanual classes, and not only to variations in the strength of the
relationship between class and voting behaviour.
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Explanations of variation in class voting
In this study three explanations for the between-country and over-time variations
in class voting were tested. The fIrst explanation - that involves indirectly the
above discussed descriptions of class voting - concerns the effects of the composi-
tion of manual and nonmanual classes on class voting. This explanation was
suggested by scholars of the third generation, but was never directly tested. It
supposes that between-country and over-time variation in class voting, when
measured by the manuallnonmanual class scheme, to some extent can be
explained by differences between these countries and changes within these
countries in the composition of the manual and nonmanual classes. We tested this
explanation in Chapter 5 analysing our individual-level dataset containing data
from sixteen countries. When doing so, we presumed that within the manual and
the nonrnanual classes a distinction could be made between sub-classes. These
sub-classes are defIned according to the class scheme developed by Erikson;
Goldthorpe and Portocarrero (the EGP class scheme).
The test of this explanation revealed that about a quarter of the differences
across democratic industrialized countries, when measured by the manual-
Inonmanual class distinction, could be explained by differences in the composition
of the manual and nonmanual classes between these countries. Furthermore,
around one fifth of the changes within derYUlcratic industrialized countries in
manuallnonmanual class voting, could be explained by changes in the composi-
tion of the manual and nonmanual classes within these countries. These results
thus imply that variations in manuallnonmanual class voting were not entirely due
to variation in the strength of the relationship between class and voting behaviour.
On the other hand, these results imply that at least three quarters of between-
country and over-time variations in manuallnonmanual class voting were due to
variation in the actual voting behaviour of the EGP sub-classes between the
countries and periods. This thus explains why both our descriptive analyses for
manuallnonmanual and EGP class voting, i.e. controlling for variation in the
composition of the manual and nonmanual class, basically yielded the same
results.
The second explanation of differences and trends in class voting that we investi-
gated, concerns the effects of social and political characteristics of countries on
manuallnonmanual class voting. In studies that predominantly appeared in the
fIrst and second generation of research on stratifIcation and politics, it was
suggested that differences across democratic industrialized countries and changes
within these countries in levels of manuallnonmanual class voting could to some
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extent be explained by between-country and over-time variations in the· social and
political characteristics of countries. However, these explanations were
predominantly vaguely formulated, and have not been subjected to strong
empirical tests by analysing large numbers of data with multivariate techniques.
Therefore, in Chapter 4, we improved upon the earlier studies and formulated
seven precise hypotheses explaining levels of manuallnonmanual class voting.
Subsequently, these hypotheses were tested using our aggregated country dataset
containing information on class voting and social and political country character-
istics for twenty countries for various years in the postwar period.
These tests resulted in somewhat different conclusions. With respect to
between-country variations in class voting, the tests revealed that differences in
the levels of manuallnonmanual class voting between democratic industrialized
countries can to some extent be explained by differences in religious and ethnic
diversity among the inhabitants in these countries, and by cross-country differ-
ences in the extent of trade union membership: The higher the religious and
ethnic diversity among the inhabitants of a country and tbe lower the union
density in a country, the lower the level of class voting. No effects on cross-
country differences in class voting were found with respect to a country's income
differences, the size of the manual· class, the general standard of living, and
whether class was an issue in politics. Furthermore, an unexpected effect was
found of the amount of intergenerational class mobility: the higher the percentage
of mobile persons in a country, the higher the level of class voting in that
country.
With respect to developments over-time in manuallnonmanual class voting, our
tests indicated that changes in class voting within the democratic industrialized
countries to some extent can be explained by changes in the standard of living of
the inhabitants in these countries. The higher the standard of living of a country's
inhabitants, the lower the level of class voting. Furthermore, changes in a
country's level of class voting can be explained by changes in the proportion of
inhabitants that were members of a trade union in that country. A growth in
union density in a country leads to a decline in the level of class voting. This
unexpected finding is especially the case in countries where a general rise in
union density was accompanied by a rise in the numbers of nonmanual class
members becoming union members.
A third account of between-country and over-time variations in levels of class
voting concerns the macro-effects of intergenerational class. mobility on class
voting. When examining the effects of social and political characteristics of
countries on class voting we already focused on the effects of intergenerational
class mobility. However, after having done that we suggested that it would be
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worthwhile to investigate these effects again, this time taking into account the
micro-level assumptions concerning the individual voting behaviour of mobile and
immobile class members. The macro-level explanation tested Chapter 9 invokes
cross-country differences and developments in patterns of intergenerational class
mobility as explanatory factors for variations in class voting. This explanation has
a long tradition in studies on stratificati<?n and politics. For example, it ''Was
already touched upon in the classic study of Sombart, where he tried to explain
why there was no socialism in the United States, and it has also been raised in
many more recent studies. However, no serious tests had been done to test this
explanation over the long history of research in this area. We examined these
effects of class mobility using our individual level dataset on twenty countries
over the period 1956-1990. To take into account the micro-assumptions necessary
to relate a country's mobility pattern with its level of class voting, we applied a
method of counterfactual analysis.
However, despite the large amount of literature on the macrOceffects of
mobility on class voting, and the elaborate way we investigated these effects, the
conclusion was that differences aeross democratic industrialized countries and
changes within these countries in levels of class voting, could not at all be
explained by cross-country differences or over-time changes in the patterns of
intergenerational class mobility of these countries. This conclusion was obtained
both for levels of manuallnonmanual class voting, and for levels of EGP class
voting.
Effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour
Before we tested the macro-level explanation of variations in class voting
between countries and periods by variations in intergenerational class mobility
patterns, some micro-level assumptions were tested. These assumptions concerned
the effects of intergenerational class mobility on individual voting behaviour. The
effects of class mobility on individual voting behaviour are twofold: effects of
individual class mobility and contextual effects of class mobility.
The effects of individual intergenerational class mobility on voting behaviour
were examined in Chapter 7. These effects had been investigated earlier. How-
ever, in the studies of the first and second generation this was predominantly
done by examining percentage figures in cross-tabulations based on relatively
small datasets, or by applying substantially inappropriate linear regression models
on a limited number of datasets. In this study we were able to use more appropri-
ate models, so-called "diagonal mobility" models. Furthermore, we analysed our
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individual dataset containing data from 113 cross-sectional surveys representing
sixteen countries over the period 1956-1990. We tested the tenability of four
specific hypotheses on the effects of individual intergenerational class mobility on
the voting behaviour of mobile persons.
We found that in all countries that the voting behaviour of the intergeneration-
ally mobile persons is somewhere between the typical voting behaviour of their
class of destination and that of their class of origin, which confirmed our weak
economic hypothesis. The outcomes of the analyses showed that for all countries
the effect of destination class was larger than the effect of origin class. Further-
more, we found that in seven countries - Austria, Britain, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States - the voting behaviour ofolder
intergenerationally mobile people is closer to the typical voting behaviour of their
class of destination relative to the typical voting behaviour of their class of
origin, than is the voting behaviour of younger intergenerationally mobile people.
This supported our acculturation hypothesis. The parameter estimates obtained in
our analyses showed that for our youngest respondents the effect of class origin
was almost equal to the effect of their class destination. By the time respondents
had reached sixty five years of age the relative destination effect was two times
the size of the origin effect. The latter thus still had a substantial impact on the
voting behaviour of this age group.
The acceptance of these two hypotheses implied that the two other tested
hypotheses, i.e. the strict economic hypothesis and the status maximization
hypothesis, had to be rejected. The strict economic hypothesis states that the
voting behaviour of the intergenerationally mobility persons is identical to the
typical voting behaviour of their class of destination. The status maximization
hypothesis, holds that upwardly intergenerationally mobile persons orient their
voting behaviour relatively more to the typical voting behaviour of their class of
destination, than do downwardly intergenerationally mobile persons.
The contextual effects of intergenerational class mobility on the voting behaviour
of immobile class members were investigated in Chapter 8. Hypotheses on these
contextual effects had already been raised several times, especially in the first
generation. These hypotheses concerned the effects of levels of inflow and levels
of outflow mobility in a class. On the basis of this literature we formulated two
testable hypotheses. The first was: the higher the level of left-wing inflow
mobility to a class, the more likely it is that the voting behaviour of immobile
members of that class will vote for a left-wing party. The second was: the higher
the level of left-wing outflow mobility from a class, the more likely it is that the
voting behaviour of immobile members of that class will vote for a left-wing
party. To test these hypotheses it was necessary to have data on many "contexts",
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i.e. on many classes, countries and periods. In this study we therefore tested the
hypotheses by analysing our individual dataset containing data from seven classes
in sixteen countries and over a long. period and thus from many contexts. In
addition, we used a method of analysis that is especially designed to investigate
contextual effects, multi-level models. Despite these efforts, the results were
negative. The analyses showed no significant contextual effects of either the level
of intergenerational inflow- or the level of outflow class mobility in a country on
the voting behaviour of intergenerationally immobile persons.
10.2 Discussion
Having summarized the main findings of this study, we now discuss the implica-
tions of these findings. Doing so, we first go back to the theoretical premises of
this. study. Second, we discuss the research design we applied, reviewing the
employed measurement procedures, the data analysed and the methods of analyses
utilized. Third, we discuss some research questions that deserve attention in future
research.
THEORETICAL PREMISES
In this study we started by addressing questions at the macro-level, i.e. questions
conceming the levels of class voting in a country at any given point in time.
Nevertheless, after we did some explanatory analyses (in Chapter 5), we sug-
gested that we should also include assumptions at the individual-level in our
theory. Therefore, in later chapters we paid specific attention to individual-level
assumptions (e.g., in Chapters 7 and 8), and we integrated these in macro-level
analyses (e.g., in Chapter 9). It could be asked then, whether it was perceptive to
start at the macro-level in this study. One could argue that this indeed was a good
strategy for two reasons. The first reason is that macro"level phenomena are of
interest in themselves. We regard it as a relevant question to fmd out why in
some countries some factors have more impact on people's behaviour than in
other countries. In fact, the study of these macro phenomena has been the main
reason for the very existence of· sociology and political science. The second
reason why we think addressing macro-level questions is relevant, is that a
repetition of answers to micro questions, almost inevitably leads to macro ques-
tions. For example, when in Norway election after election the effect of class on
individual voting behaviour is shown, an over-time comparison of these effects
shows that this effect decreased over-time. This then leads to the macro-level
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question why the effect of class on voting behaviour in Norway decreased.
Another feature of this study is its particular perspective. When explaining
between-country and over-time variations in levels of class voting, we remained
as close as possible within the class perspective. That is, when explaining
differences in levels of class voting, we mainly focused on explanations concern-
ing the class position of individuals. These explanations almost without exception
implied that if the class positions of individuals were more adequately defined,
then no differences in class voting between countries and no changes over-time
would exist. We began by proposing the use of more detailed classes, then we
argued that people's class positions should be defined not only in relation to
current class, but also to origin class.
Having stayed firmly within this class perspective we now ask ourselves
whether this was a successful choice and whether future studies on this topic
should also adopt this perspective. Three answers to these questions come up.
First, we found that variation in levels of manuallnonmanual class voting indeed
to some extent could be explained by variations in the composition of these
classes. This suggests that by using an even more detailed class scheme we might
be able to explain more of the variation in class voting.
A second answer is that, although in this study some class-based explanations
were not corroborated, this does not mean that the entire class perspective has to
be rejected. It still offers various possibilities for explaining between-country and
over-time variations in class voting. For example, more attention should be paid
to the explanatory power of the rise of so-called "new classes", the class position
of women, and the effects of mixed class marriages. Only if these possibilities
within the class perspective turn out to be ineffective at explaining variations in
class voting, should the class perspective be abandoned.
However, the third reason why the class perspective is likely to remain
important is because of the lack of full-blooming alternative approaches for
explaining variations in class voting. For example, a perspective - such as
Inglehart's theory on post-materialism - implying that people more and more vote
on the basis of issues instead of their class interests, seems to overlook that class
interests always had a central position on the agenda in daily politics. Further-
more, a perspective presupposing that political institutions influence electoral
outcomes seem to have a limited scope for explaining variations in class voting.
There are several reasons for this. To begin with, it is not clear that this perspec-
tive is supposed to apply to the relationship between class and voting behaviour
at all. Second, there are difficulties in specifying the exact nature of the relation-
ship between institutions and electoral outcomes. It is complex to derive from this
perspective whether a certain institution makes for a stronger or weaker relation-
ship between class and vote. Third, it is acknowledged that political institutions
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are conditioned by social structures. In conclusion, we would like to maintain that
any perspective explaining electoral outcomes, if it is successful, should not just
postulate the existence of the major and smaller political parties, but should seek
to explain their existence as resulting from the votes cast by individuals. Thus, we
regard it a useful strategy to continue research within a perspective that does that,
i.e. the class perspective.
RESEARCH DESIGN
The present study builds on a long history of research on social stratification and
politics. We claim that by using up-to-date data, applying current measurement
procedures and employing contemporary research methods we have been able to
address more precise questions and to come up with more adequate answers than
in earlier studies. Now we have finished our examinations in this study, it is time
to evaluate the applied research design, and to think of possibilities where (more)
progress can be made in future studies.
Measurement procedures
With respect to measurement procedures, one of the ways we aimed to make
progress in this study was by using a detailed class scheme. We used the EGP
class scheme in addition to the manualJnonmanual class scheme that has tradi-
tionally been used in studies on stratification and politics. Despite the fact that the
EGP class scheme proved useful, future studies might consider some improve-
ments. A first adjustment that might be considered concerns the number of classes
that are distinguished. In the class scheme, some classes are relatively large in
numbers and members seem quite heterogeneous in their interests. This especially
concerns the service class. This class has been shown in some countries to
comprise about one third of the population. Furthermore, Inglehart (1990) and
Kriesi (1989) have suggested that within the service class there is a substantial
group that could be labelled the "cultural and social" specialists. This sub-class is
characteristic for the post-industrial society, and has relatively left-wing voting
patterns rather than the right-wing voting behaviour characteristic of members of
the service class. In addition, a distinction can be made between service class
members employed in the public sector and those employed in the private sector.
Members of the public sector sub-class of the service class can be expected to be
relatively more in favour of left-wing political parties, since their employment
conditions depend on the policy implemented by the government and left-wing
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parties are more in favour of a large public sector than right-wing parties. Those
employed in the private sector can be expected to be relatively more in favour of
right-wing political parties, since their employment conditions are influenced by
the chances private firms get from the government to make profit.
Another recommendable adjustment to the operationalization of class concerns
the class position of women. In this study we excluded women from our analyses,
since it was theoretically unclear how the social positions of especially wives
should be defined. According to the current literature they could not be assigned
solely on the basis of their husbands' occupations or solely on the basis of their
own occupations. However, for this study, we were unable to find adequate more
complex operationalizations to take account of the interactions between husbands'
and wives' occupations. In future research such operationalizations have to be
developed. Furthermore, examinations of the relationship between the class
position of women and their voting behaviour in democratic industrialized
countries over the post war periods are worthwhile.
When operationalizing people's voting behaviour, we followed a tradition in
comparative research on the relationship between class and voting behaviour. We
left aside those respondents who did not vote, and we dichotomized the political
parties people could vote for into left-wing and right-wing. We argued that this
captured the most relevant distinctions.
However, in future studies it would be interesting to distinguish between all the
separate political parties that run in a country's elections. This would enable us to
find out whether substantial changes in the voting patterns of social classes have
occurred within left-wing or ring-wing political blocks. For example, it might be
that in the Netherlands - a country where we did not find a systematic decline in
class voting - the manual workers are just as likely to vote for left-wing parties as
before, but are less apt to vote for extreme left-wing parties, choosing instead
more moderate left-wing parties. Evans et al. (1991) and Heath et al. (1985,
1995) have already applied more detailed party classifications when investigating
trends in Britain, and Hout et al. (1994) have done likewise for the United States.
For trend analyses in other countries and for cross-nationally comparable studies
in the future these examples deserve to be followed. Furthermore, distingUishing
between all parties that run in a country's election allows for tests of hypotheses
stating that changes in the behaviour of the political parties are to some extent
responsible for changes in voting behaviour of classes.
A further recommendation for future research is the inclusion of a category
"non-voters". Hout et al. (1994) did this in their trend analyses for the United
States. This strategy is useful, since members of manual classes are in general
less apt to vote at elections than are members of nonmanual classes. Thus, it
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might be that when analysing only respondents who vote, the effect of people's
class on their voting behaviour is underestimated. Furthermore, variations in
class-based non-voting, might explain variations in levels of class voting as
examined in the present study. For example, the declines in levels of class voting
found in this study might have been caused by the fact that the left-wing manual
workers stopped voting at all. We thus regard research that includes analyses of
non-voting in the examinations of class voting as a worthwhile development.
Data
We would also like to comment on the data used in this and future studies on
class voting. To address the descriptive questions on the extent which countries
differed in their levels of class voting and to what extent there was a decline in
these levels in the countries, we used data from a large number of surveys that
were held in many countries and over numerous years. When addressing Qjlf
descriptive questions, these countries and years then became the cases in the
analyses. In this way we avoided a traditional problem in comparative and trends
studies, i.e. the "small N problem". However, despite our data collection efforts,
we occasionally still ended up with a small number of cases. This resulted in
some analyses depending on only a few cases, and consequently outliers having a
large influence. An obvious suggestion for future research therefore is to collect
and analyse more surveys from more countries (e.g., eastern European countries)
and years (e.g., after 1990). However, although we do not claim to have fully
reached the limits of this strategy, we think we already included most of the
publicly available datasets containing detailed measures of respondent's origin
and destination class and voting behaviour, especially for the period before 1980.
Therefore, the small N problem probably cannot be solved by collecting more
data, but has to be solved by paying specific attention to the robustness of the
results and the effects of possible outliers on these results. Thus, more explorative
research in this area, as well as the use of methods of analysis that are designed
to deal with the effects of outliers, seems worthwhile.
Another suggestion concerns the quality of the data. In this study we used data
from high quality surveys. Furthermore, we explicitly checked for outliers with
respect to the class and voting distributions. However, the datasets still differ in
the way respondents' current and former classes or occupations were coded. In
some surveys detailed codes were available, while in others more crude measures
were included. Furthermore, surveys differed in their sampling procedures. These
differences in the characteristics of the studies had an unknown impact on the
outcomes of the analyses. Therefore, we suggest that future research should pay
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explicit attention to the effects of these characteristics of survey data. This can be
done by specific studies of the effects of survey characteristics on class measures,
voting measures, and measures of strength of the relationship between class and
voting behaviour. It can also· be done by including data-quality variables as
control variables in descriptive and explanatory analyses of class voting (See for
example: Ganzeboom et al. 1989).
Methods of analyses
In this study we employed methods of analyses that were available to studies of
1;he third generation of research on stratification and politics. These methods are
equipped to analyse large scale datasets and use 10g-odds-ratiQs as a measure of
class voting. They were successful in getting adequate answers to our research
questions in this study. However, we would also like to suggest some other
methods for future research.
First, when describing and explaining levels of class voting between countries
and periods - as discussed above - we had to deal with the "small N problem".
This problem raises questions on the robustness of our results, i.e. the outliers
might have had a large impact. For future research it is therefore worthwhile to
pay specific attention to the impact of these outliers on results of analyses. When
doing so techniques that are specially developed to examine the effect of outlying
cases in analyses on a small number of cases, like bootstrapping and jackknifmg,
can be applied.
Second, we would like to focus on the methods we used to test the explana-
tions of varying levels of class voting at the macro-level, while including
individual-level assumptions. In this study, when testing the class composition
explanations and the class mobility analyses, we used the so-called "method of
counterfactualanalysis". This had been useful in earlier studies and was effective
in the present study when doing comparative analyses. Even more, we claimed to
have improved on this method by analysing its outcomes with non-linear models
as discussed in Chapter 9. However, we still feel that it would be relevant to
formalise the method of counterfactual analysis and the use of these models. It is
a potentially important method for cross-national and over-time analysis, and
needs theoretical and technical support.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Finally we discuss some research questions to be addressed in future research. We
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pay attention to the same three types of questions that were central in this study:
descriptive questions on levels of class voting, explanatory questions on class
voting, and questions about the effects of intergenerational class mobility on
individual voting behaviour.
Descriptive questions
In this study we claim to have made progress by addressing descriptive questions
concerning relative levels of class voting and concerning many countries over
such a long period. Furthermore, we addressed our descriptive questions on
relative class voting while distinguishing between more than two classes. How-
ever, we did not fully use the possibilities offered by the detailed class scheme.
We dealt with a question that pertains only to the overall levels of class voting in
countries. We thus did not examine the voting behaviour of these detailed classes
separately, nor did we investigate the specific trends in the voting behaviour of
these different classes. Such class specific trends are of interest, since - as for
example supposed for Britain by Heath et al. (1991) - some classes might have
started to vote less according to their class interest, while others might have kept
the same voting pattern or even started to vote more according to their class
interests. These separate class specific trends cannot always fully be detected
when investigating the overall levels of class voting. The class dealignment in one
class might be surpassed by the class realignment in another class. Therefore, in
future studies the focus should not be restricted to overall levels of class voting,
but should also be on class-specific voting behaviour. In this way, more detailed
research questions can be addressed, such as: To what extent have the service
class and the skilled manual class become more similar in their voting behaviour
in the Western industrialized over the postwar period?
Another more precise descriptive research questions has been suggested by
Hout et al. (1994). When describing the trend in class voting in the United States,
they did not only do it in a straightforward way, but they also described the
effects of class on people's voting behaviour controlling for the effects of various
other characteristics of these people, like their religion, age, and region of
residence. They called the outcomes of the controlled and the uncontrolled
analyses the net and the gross level of class voting respectively. We consider it
worthwhile to investigate the net levels of class voting in future studies. There-
fore, we suggest that future studies should address questions like: To what extent
were there differences between countries and declines over-time in net and gross
class voting in Western industrialized countries in the postwar period? Further-
more, questions on class-specific net class voting should be addressed. These
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include: To what extent has the voting behaviour of members of the service class
and the skilled manual worker class become more similar in the Western indus-
trialized in the postwar period, when controlling for their origin class, religion,
union membership?
Explanations of variation in class voting
When we addressed questions pertaining to explanations of variation in class
voting at the macro-level, many of the formulated hypotheses were rejected. We
claimed then to rephrase the hypotheses, by including individual-level assump-
tions in the theory. To continue in this line of reasoning, we now suggest
rephrasing the explanatory question for future research by taking the individual-
level into account. Therefore, future research would benefit from implementing
the sociological idea that the immobile are the core members of classes. Thus,
when focusing on the effects of social and political characteristics of countries on
class voting, the focus should be solely on the (class) voting of immobile class
members. Another suggestion for rephrasing the explanatory research questions -
also in line with the above suggestions - is by focusing on net class voting, i.e.
controlling for relevant non-class characteristics. Thus, possible research questions
might be: To what extent would differences across democratic industrialized
countries and changes within these countries in the levels of relative net class
voting among immobile class members, be explained by differences between
these countries and changes within these countries in their social and political
characteristics? Addressing such questions requires large individual-level datasets
containing information about many characteristics of individual respondents,
measured in a comparable way between countries and over-time. It will be a giant
but worthwhile task to assemble and analyse such datasets in future studies.
Another challenge for future studies is to find out why in this study we found
no effects of variation in intergenerational class mobility between countries on
levels of class' voting in these countries. We expected that differences between
countries and changes over-time in the patterns of intergenerational class mobility,
would to some extent explain between-country and over-time variations in levels
of class voting. This expectation was based upon the assumption that there was
substantial variation in the patterns of class mobility between countries and over-
time. We made this assumption on .the basis of results of many studies into
absolute rates of intergenerational class mobility. Furthermore, it was based upon
the assumption that mobile class members had a different voting behaviour
compared to immobile class members in these countries. These assumptions were
built upon the fmdings in Chapter 7 of the present study. However, although to
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our knowledge these assumptions seem to be correct, in Chapter 9 we found that
variation in intergenerational class mobility over countries and periods did not
explain any variation in levels of class voting between the countries and periods.
Therefore, future research has to show which of our assumptions have to be
adjusted. It might, for example, be that countries differ in their mobility patterns
in many ways, but that effects of these various sorts of differences cancel each
other out when it concerns the levels of overall class voting. Furthermore, it
might be that the acculturation of the mobile to the political climate in their new
class takes less time in some countries than in others. Which of the assumptions
needs to be revised, remains to be investigated in future research.
Effects of intergenerational class mobility on voting behaviour
When we examined the effects of intergenerational class mobility on individual
voting behaviour, we found for some countries that the older intergenerationally
mobile persons are, the more they obtain the voting behaviour of their new
destination class. To explain this finding, we assumed a process of acculturation,
i.e. new class members are assumed to be influenced by their new personal
networks which consist of members of their destination class. However, when
investigating this, we had to rely on cross-sectional data, Le. data that did not
include information about the history· of these persons, or on their personal
network. Thus, we could not address research questions like: at what age did
mobile persons become members of'their new class? How did their individual
career look like? In what stage of their career did they have what kind of
members in their personal network? To get a good picture of the acculturation
process, addressing such questions is vital and deserves attention.
We realize that investigating the effects of class mobility does offer more
insight at the individual-level, but probably does not illuminate the relationsbip
between class and voting behaviour at the country-level. Investigations that
differentiate between various types of mobile persons might illuminate the voting
behaviour of these specific groups, but these groups are too small to end up with
significantly better predictions about the levels of class voting at the country-
level. However, considering the importance of people's class position in determin-
ing their party choice in Western industrialized countries even in current days, it
is worth putting such micro-level questions on the agenda of research on social
stratification 3lJd politics.
Appendix A
Data Sources: Aggregated Data
Class Voting Data
Class voting data were collected from two types of sources: tables published in
various articles and books, and tables calculated with data from representative
surveys published on tape. The sources of the survey data are presented in Appendix
B. The tables published in articles and books come from the following sources:
France:
Austria:
Finland:
Australia:
Ireland:
Italy:
Belgium:
Britain:
Canada:
Denmark:
Germany:
Alford (1963); Baxter et al. (1991); McAllister (personal
communication 1992); Rose (1974).
Rose & Urwin (1969); Crewe & Denver (1985); Lijphart (1971);
Lane & Ersson (1991).
Frognier (1975); Lijphart (1971); Rose (1980).
Alford (1963); Heath et al. (1985, 1991); NORC (1948); Rose &
McAllister (1986).
Alford (1963); Rose (1974); Rose (1980).
Andersen (1984); Lane & Ersson (1991); Rose (1980); Sainsbury
(1990).
Allardt & Littunen (1964); Allardt & Wesolowski (1978); Berglund
(1988); Matheson (1979); Rose & Urwin (1969); Rose (1974).
Converse & Pierce (1986); Dalton (1988); Dalton et al. (1984); .
MacRae (1967).
Dalton (1988); Forschungsgruppe WaWen (1990); De Jong (1956);
Lijphart (1971); Rose & Urwin (1969).
Crewe & Denver (1985); Laver et al. (1987); Rose (1974).
Allum (1979); Crewe & Denver (1985); Lijphart (1971);Lipset
(1983); Rose (1974); Von Beyme (1985); Rose & Urwin (1969).
Netherlands: Lijphart (1968).
Norway: Listhaug (1989); Valen (personal communication 1992).
Portugal: Lane & Ersson (1991).
Spain: Gunther et al. (1986); Rose (1980).
Sweden: Holmberg (1991); Stephens (1981);
Switserland: Kerr (1987); Lane & Ersson (1991); Rose (1980).
United States: Alford (1963); Abramson et al. (1990).
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Union density
As a measure of union density, we used so-called "gross density rates", the number
of union members divided by the size of the labour force, without correcting for
union members drawing a pension. Union density data were collected froIl} the
following sources: Kjelberg (1983): Australia 1945-1980 (officiell serie, totalt);
Belgium, 1947, 1950, 1957-1980 (lontagare, (1)); United States, 1945-1976 (NBER,
totalt). Visser (1989) (gross density rates). Visser (1992) (table 1: aggregate union
density rates (employed + unemployed + retired (see notes)) column 1988/89: Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland; column 1980 and 1988/89: United States; column 1970, 1980
and 1988/89: Luxembourg, Canada, Finland, Ireland. Visser (19Ql): Greece (1977,
1985), Luxembourg (1975, 1981), Portugal (1969, 1975, 1980, 1985), Spain (1976,
1981, 1985). Korpi, 1983: Canada: 1946-1960. Lane et al. 1991: Finland: 1950,
1955, 1960, 1965, 1975.
Income differences
We found no data for income differences between the social classes of our 20
countries. As an approximation we followed tradition (Lane & Ersson 1991) and
used measures for a country's overall income distribution. We chose the income
share of the highest 20 % as a measure for the income differences in a country.
Sources for such income difference data are qnite diverse and comparability in the
course of time is limited. In general there is a shift from data for individuals to data
for households. Methodological studies of income distribution data (Menard 1986,
Hoover 1989, Mahler 1989) advise against combining data from different sources.
We settled for data from the World Bank (1978-1991). These series commence
around 1970. We did away with missing values for the period 1945-1970 by
assuming stability in income differences within countries (the Pearson correlation
between the mean values for countries in the period 1971-1980 and those in the
period 1981-1990 is 0.48, a measure somewhat too low for proper interpolation) and
substituting the mean value of a country for 1971-1980. No data were available for
Austria, Greece and Luxembourg.
Standard of living
As an indicator of the general standard of living, we took a country's per capita
gross domestic product (GDP) in constant dollars and 1985 intemational prices. Our
source was Summers & Heston (1991), covering the 1950-1988 period. In those
cases where information was needed for a country during the period 1945-1949, we
took its value for 1950. For a country in 1989 and 1990 we took its value for 1988.
In the analyses we divided GDP per capita measures by 1000, yielding more
manageable parameters.
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Intergenerational Social Mobility
For data on a country's mobility pattern we used an updated version of the file
reported in Ganzeboom et al. (1989). We calculated the percentage mobile men for
each two by two table cross classifying a male's present occupation·
.(manuallnonmanual) with the occupation of his father. Only males between 18 and
64 years were considered. Since data were not available on a year-to-year basis, we
went on to calculate the mean for every country for each of the periods 1945-1960,
1961-1970, 1971-1980 and 1981-1990. If no data for a particular country were
available in the fIrst and the last period, the value of the adjacent period was taken.
If no data were available for the two periods in between, if possible the mean of the
adjacent periods was taken. This reduced the number of missing values, but for
Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal the missing values are still present in our data set.
Ethnic-linguistic and Religious Heterogeneity
As to ethnic-linguistic and religious heterogeneity, our measure is the fragmentation
index as computed by Rae & Taylor (1970). The fragmentation index refers to the
probability that two randomly sampled people will belong to different groups. The
higher this index, the more heterogeneous a country. We took data for the period
1945-1970 from Taylor & Hudson (1972). For the period 1971-1990 we used Barrett
(1982).
Class as a Political Issue
Measures for the prominence of class as a political issue were taken from Lane &
Ersson (1991: 291). To create these scores, they apparently used their knowledge of
countries' political histories. The higher the score on this predictor, the more
prominent class as an issue. Measures for the prominence of class as a political issue
were available for the periods 1945-1964 and 1965-1989. For 1990 we used the
1965-1989 data. In Lane & Ersson, data for Australia, Canada, Luxembourg and the
USA are missing. Based on our own knowledge of the political histories of these
countries, we ourselves gave these countries in the distinguished periods scores on
this variable. To obtain better interpretable parameters, in the analyses we did not
use Lane & Ersson's 1 to 5 scoring, but recoded ranging from 0 to 4.
Percentage Manual Workers
The tables we used for computing the level of class voting also yielded the
percentage of manual occupations held by persons belonging to the labour force.
Summary statistics for the explanatory variables at the country level are shown in
Table A.1.
Table A. I. Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables: means (upper figures) and standard deviations (lower figures)
Std. of Income Perc. Perc. Rel.-ethn. Union Class as N. of
living diff. manual mobility heterog. density issue cases
Australia 9.09 40.78 45.85 37.12 0.70 55.01 1.00 17
2.92 2.84 12.82 3.45 0.00 2.15 0.00
Austria 9.39 50.46 34.30 -0.63 58.00 0.00 5
2.22 - 9.21 3.53 0.02 3.07 0.00
Belgium 10.03 36.00 40.04 28.77 0.31 70.34 1.00 20
1.14 0.00 3.51 0.31 0.00 5.07 0.00
Britain 8.51 39.32 52.54 32.37 0.55 46.64 1.00 30
2.30 0.19 6.31 3.32 0.06 4.07 0.00
Canada 8.15 40.93 45.46 34.31 . 1.85 25.60 0.00 13
2.09 0.25 6.50 1.11 0.Q3 1.94 0.00
Denmark 9.05 37.88 42.61 30.07 -1.05 70.81 0.76 29
2.59 0.53 6.00 2.77 0.04 10.20 0.44
Finland 7.60 36.96 60.38 36.04 -0.77 58.32 0.80 5
2.93 0.36 10.62 9.49 0.02 21.65 0.45
France 9.46 41.92 38.38 33.50 0.15 17.38 0.20 25
2.76 1.51 4.98 2.31 0.12 3.77 0.41
Germany 9.64 40.94 42.75 31.15 0.12 38.83 0.16 25
2.57 2.47 10.55 2.25 0.12 1.64 0.37
Greece 5.61 - 33.60 - -1.04 36.51 1.00 10
0.19 - 9.02 - 0.00 0.24 0.00
Table A.I. (Continued)
Std. of Income Perc. Perc. Rel.-ethn. Union Class as N. of
living diff. manual mobility heterog. density issue cases
Ireland 5.93 39.40 53.88 30.01 -1.02 51.93 2.00 18
0.39 0.00 6.02 0.56 0.00 3.81 0.00
Italy 9.31 42.71 35.26 34.93 -0.68 49.95 3.95 20
2.16 1.91 7.00 4.17 0.07 5.30 0.22
Luxembourg 11.83 - 33.25 - -0.33 48.23 - 17
1.37 - 5.12 0.00 1.89
Netherlands 9.67 37.43 36.98 32.26 0.30 35.59 1.00 25
1.79 0.63 5.77 2.02 0.03 4.96 0.00
Norway 9.67 37.45 47.56 34.84 -1.19 60.15 1.82 II
3.76 0.61 8.41 1.67 0.04 4.18 0.40
Portugal 4.99 49.10 50.71 -1.17 51.60 1.00 5
0.35 0.00 5.25 - 0.00 0.00 0.00
Spain 6.92 40.37 45.92 32.80 -0.14 17.35 2.00 6
0.44 0.90 6.32 4.90 0.00 3.31 0.00
Sweden 9.20 37:06 56.28 34.57 -0.56 78.38 0.67 12
2.55 0.10 5.12 2.46 0.64 10.09 0.49
Switzerland 13.72 39.65 32.51 35.50 1.20 32.67 1.00 4
1.35 3.30 9.52 0.00 0.00 2.05 0.00
United States 14.07 42.05 40.75 37.13 1.31 23.70 0.00 27
2.95 0.77 7.12 1.83 0.05 5.17 0.00

Appendix B
Data Sources: Survey Data
For this study we analysed a large collection of relevant population sample data
from sixteen countries on different points in time. These datasets have been
extracted and collected in one large combine file. This "International Stratifica-
tion, Mobility and Politics File" consist of a set of extracts from 113 datasets that
contain information on intergenerational occupational mobility (father's and
respondent's occupation) and politics (voting behaviour). In this file these vari-
ables, together with some elementary demographics, are available in comparable
and standardized codes. For detailed information on this ftle, we refer to Nieuw-
beerta & Ganzeboom (1995). In this appendix we confine ourselves by giving
references to the original files. The names of the files are acronyms: the first
three letters represent the country, the first two figures the year the survey took
place. The reference numbers refer to the numbers in the catalogues of the data-
archivs where the files were stored. These archives are listed at the end of this
appendix.
File Reference File Reference
AUS65 SSDA: 7 BRI85i ICPSR: 8909
AUS67 ICPSR: 7282 BRI86i ICPSR: 9205
AUS73 SSDA: 9 BRI87e NYM :ENG87e
AUS79 SSDA: 9 BRI87i ICPSR: 9383
AUS84 SSDA: 423 BRI88i ZA : 1700
AUS85i ICPSR: 8909 BRI89i ZA : 1840
AUS86i ICPSR: 9205 BRI90i ZA : 1950
AUS87e SSDA: 445
AUS87i ICPSR: 9383 CAN84e ICPSR: 8544
AUS90e SSDA: 570
DEN7Ie ICPSR: 8946
AUT74p ICPSR: 7777 DEN72s DDA : 081
AUT85i ICPSR: 8909 DEN75e ICPSR: 8946
AUT88i ZA : 1700 DEN77e ICPSR: 8946
AUT89i ZA : 1840 DEN7ge ICPSR: 8946
DEN81e ICPSR: 8946
BEL75 ESRC: 1577
FIN72s DDA : 081
BRIMe ICPSR: 7250 FIN75p ICPSR: 7777
BRI66e ICPSR: 7250
BRI70e ICPSR: 7004 FRA78e ESRC: 1987
BRI74e ICPSR: 7870
BRI7ge ICPSR: 8196 GER6ge ICPSR: 7108
BRI83e ICPSR: 8409 . GER69f ICPSR: 7098
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File Reference File Reference
GER75p ICPSR: 7777 NOR65e ICPSR: 7256
GER76z ZA : 1233 NOR72s DDA : 081
GER77z ZA : 1233 NOR77e NSD : NOR77e
GER78c ZA : 1233 NOR81e NSD : NOR81e
GER78x ZA : 1233 NOR85e NSD : NOR85e
GER79x ZA : 1233 NOR8ge NSD : NOR8ge
GER79z ZA : 1233 NOR9Oe NSD : NOR90e
GER80a ZA : 1795
GER80c ZA : 1233 SWE72s DDA : 081
GER80p ZA : 1188 SWE90 NYM : SWE90
GER80z ZA : 1233
GER82a ZA : 1795 SWI72 ICPSR: 7342
GER84a ZA : 1795 SWI76p ICPSR: 7777
GER86a ZA : 1795
GER87i ICPSR: 9383 USA56e ICPSR: 7214
GER88a ZA : 1795 USA58e ICPSR: 7215
GER90a ZA : 1800 USA60e ICPSR: 7216
USA64e ICPSR: 7235
IRE89i ZA : 1840 USA66e ICPSR: 7259
IRE90i ZA : 1950 USA68e ICPSR: 7281
USA70e ICPSR: 7298
ITA68e ICPSR: 7953 USA72g ICPSR: 9505
ITA75p ICPSR: 7777 USA73g ICPSR: 9505
ITA85 NYM : ITA85 USA74g ICPSR: 9505
USA74p ICPSR: 7777
NET70 ICPSR: 7261 USA75g ICPSR: 9505
NET71 ICPSR: 7768 USA76g ICPSR: 9505
NET72e STEIN: P0353 USA77g ICPSR: 9505
NET74p ICPSR: 7777 USA78g ICPSR: 9505
NET76 STEIN: P0653 USA80g ICPSR: 9505
NET77e STEIN: P0354 USA82g ICPSR: 9505
NET771 STEIN: P0328 USA83g ICPSR: 9505
NET79p ZA : 1188 USA84g ICPSR: 9505
NET81e STEIN: P0350 USA85g ICPSR: 9505
NET82e sTEiN: P0633 USA86g ICPSR: 9505
NET85s STEIN: P1012 USA87g ICPSR: 9505
NET86e STEIN: P0866 USA88g ICPSR: 9505
NET87 NYM : NET87 USA89g ICPSR: 9505
NET89nt NYM : NET89m USA90g ICPSR: 9505
NET90s STEIN: P1100
Data References
DDA:081
ESRC:1577
ESRC:1987
ICPSR:7004
ICPSR:7098
ICPSR:7108
Allardt, E., H. Uusitalo, Scandinavian Welfare Survey, 1972.
Bernard, S., S. Delruelle et aI., Belgian Citizen in the Political System,
1975.
Capdevielle, J., E. Dupoirier, G. Grunberg, E. Schweisguth & C. Ysmal,
French National Election Study, 1978.
Butler, D., & D.E. Stokes, Political Change in Britain, 1969-1970.
Klingemann, H.-D., & F.U. Pappi, German Pre- and Post-Election Study,
1969.
Kaase, M., U. Sch1eth, W. Adrian, M. Berger & R. Wi1denmann, German
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ICPSR:7214
ICPSR:7215
ICPSR:7216
ICPSR:7235
ICPSR:7250
ICPSR:7256
ICPSR:7259
ICPSR:7261
ICPSR:7281
ICPSR:7282
ICPSR:7298
ICPSR:7342
ICPSR:7768
ICPSR:7777
ICPSR:7870
ICPSR:7953
ICPSR:8196
ICPSR:8409
ICPSR:8544
ICPSR:8909
ICPSR:8946
ICPSR:9205
ICPSR:9383
ICPSR:9505
NSD:NOR77e
NSD:NOR8le
NSD:NOR85e
NSD:NOR8ge
NSD:NOR90e
NYM:BRI87e
NYM:ITA85
NYM:NET87
Election Study: August - September 1969.
Campbell, A, P. Converse et al., American National Election Study, 1956.
Campbell, A, P. Converse et al., American National Election Study, 1958.
Campbell, A, P. Converse et aI., American National Election Study, 1960.
SRC (Survey Research Center, American National Election Study, 1964.
Butler, D., & D.E. Stokes, Political Change in Britain, 1963-1970.
Valen, H., Norwegian Election Study, 1965.
SRC (Survey Research Center, American National Election Study, 1966.
Heunks, F. M., M.K. Jennings, W.E. Miller, P.C. Stouthard & J. Tho-
massen, Dutch Election Study, 1970-1973.
SRC (Survey Research Center, American National Election Study, 1968.
Aitkin, D., M. Kahan & D.E. Stokes, Australian National Political Atti-
tudes, 1967.
CPS (Center for Political Studies, American National Election Study, 1970.
Kerr, H., D. Sidjanski & G. Schmidtchen, Swiss Voting Study, 1972.
Verba, S., N.H. Nie & J.-O. Kim, Political Participation and Equality in
Seven Nations, 1966-1971.
Barnes, S.H., & M. Kaase et al., Political Action: An Eight Nation Study,
1973-1976.
Crewe, I., B. Saerlvik & J. Alt, British Election Study: October 1974,
Cross-section.
Barnes, SR., Italian Mass Election Survey, 1968.
Crewe, I., B. Saerlvik & D. Robertson, British Election Study: May 1979,
Cross-section.
Heath, A.F., R.M. Jowell, J.K. Curtice & EJ. Field, British Election Study:
June 1983.
. Lambert, R.D., S.D. Brown, J.E. Curtis, B.J. Kay & J.M. Wilson, Cana-
dian National Election Study, 1984.
International Social Science Program (ISSP), International Social Science
Program: Role of Government, 1985-1986.
Borre, O. et al., Danish Election Studies Continuity File, 1971-1981.
International Social Science Program (ISSP), International Social Science
Program: Social Networks and Support Systems, 1986.
International Social Science Program (ISSP), International Social Science
Program: Social Inequality, 1987.
Davis, J.A. & T.W. Smith, General Social Survey Cumulative File,
1972-1991.
Valen, H. Norwegian Election Study, 1977.
Valen, H. Norwegian Election Study, 1981.
Valen, H. Norwegian Election Study, 1985.
Valen, H. Norwegian Election Study, 1989.
Valen, H. Norwegian Election Study, 1990.
Heath, A.F., et aI., British Election Study: 1987.
Department of Social Policy, University of Trento, Department of Educa-
tional Science, University of Bologna, and Department of Human Science,
University of Trieste, Survey of Social Mobility and Education Italy, 1985.
Herrnkens, P.LJ. & PJ. van Wijngaarden, Criteria for Justification of
Income Differences, Netherlands 1987.
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Notes
2 Data and operationaJizations
1. Lijphart does not qualify Spain, Portugal and Greece under the criterion of a long-tenn
and uninterrupted democracy, but claims that these countries have been democratic since
the mid-1970s and are generally judged to be stable and consolidated democracies.
2. With respect to the published data, we had to accept the way respondents were divided
into manual and nonmanual class members in these sources.
3. These concern the following datasets:
• Denmark 1976: Danish Social Welfare study 1976 (DDA 0070);
• France 1958: G. Dupeux, French Election Study 1958 (ICPSR 7278);
• Italy 1972: S.H. Barnes, G. Sani, Italian Mass Election Survey 1972 (ICPSR 7954);
• Italy 1990: International Social Science Program (ISSP): Role of Government II
1990 (ZA 1950);
• Norway 1969: S. Rokkan, H. Valen, Norwegian Election Study 1969 (NSD NOR69);
• Switzerland 1987: International Social Science Program (ISSP), Social Inequality
1987 (ICPSR 9383).
4. The codes between bracket are based on Mackie & Rose (1991). The first two digits
refer to the country-chapter; the last two digits refer to the specific political party. For
infonnation about political parties we also used Day & Degenhardt (1980) and Lane et
aI. (1990.
5. Large proprietors are included in the service class, where they might appear as a rather
anomalous element. However, large proprietors are few in number. Furthennore, large
proprietors are not the capitalist elite or captains of industry, but are more like salaried
managers (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: 40).
6. The log-odds-ratio can be seen as the multiplicative equivalent of the Alford index. The
Alford index equals the estimated ~, coefficient of a linear regression:
Left = ~o + ~, Manual class (I)
where Left is coded (1) when voting for a left party and (0) when voting for other
parties, and Manual class is coded as (1) for manual class workers and (0) for non-
manual class workers. The value of the log-odds-ratio equals the value of the estimated
~, coefficient for an analogous logistic regression:
log((1t*Left)/(1 - 1t*Left» = ~o + ~, Manual class (2)
7. We would like to thank John Goldthorpe for providing us with these tables.
3 Description of manual/nonmanual class voting
1. Part of this chapter is based upon a paper - in collaboration with Wout Ultee - presented
at the Annual Meeting of the European Consortium of Political Research in Limerick,
1992, and at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in
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Chicago, 1992 (revised version).
2. To take into account the susceptibility of the Thomsen index to sampling error (see also
note 2, Chapter 4), we also estimated for each country separately the parameters of the
following logistic multi-level model:
10g((1t*Left;jJ/(1 - 1t*Left;jk)) =
130jk+ 131jk Manual class;jk + cUk (3)
(4)
(5)
131jk = 13m + 13211 Year of SurveYj + Yljk (6)
13m = 13111 + Ym (7)
where i stands for the individual respondent, j for the year of observation and k for the
country. The results of these analyses yielded similar conclusions to the simple linear
regression analyses for which results are presented in the text and in Table 3.3 and 3.4.
The multi-level analyses were .conducted using the ML3 computer program (Prosser et
al. 1991). For more information on the advantages of multi-level models over traditional
techniques we refer to Chapter 4.
3. Moreover, the correlation between the Alford index and the Thomsen index, leaving out
the cases where the percentage of left-wing party supporters is lower than 25 per cent -
mainly the Irish cases - turned out to be 0.99.
4 Effects of social and political characteristics of countries on
manuallnonmanual class voting
1. This chapter is an adaptation of a paper - in collaboration with Wout Ultee - presented
at the Annual Meeting of the European Consortium of Political Research in Limerick,
1992; and at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in
Chicago, 1992 (revised version). A translated version of this chapter is published in the
Sociologische Gids (Nieuwbeerta & Ultee 1995).
2. In our dataset there is no variation in the percentage mobile within Switzerland and no
variation in the union density within Portugal. Therefore, for Table 4.2 and Table 4.4
the pertinent correlations and trend parameters could not be calculated.
3. The standard deviation of the Thomsen index, i.e. the natural logarithm of the odds-
ratio, is given by: (1!xu + 1!x12 + l/x21 + 1!X22)112, where Xu to x22 represent the number
of respondents in the four cells of a two-by-two table (Fienberg 1980: 18).
4. We thus explain variation in the levels of class voting between years within countries. It
is also possible to explain variation between countries within years. The latter way of
modelling seems less natural to us.
5.· To do this, we specified the following equations at the year-level and at the country-
level:
130jk = 1300k + YOjk (4)
~=~+~ m
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6. The various predictors outlined, are not too strongly correlated. The highest correlation
(0.65) is that between mobility and standard of living. The highest correlation but one is
that between the percentage of the population in manual jobs and the standard of living:
this equals -0.55. Such uegligible multicollinearity allows for a multivariate test of our
hypotheses. The two highest correlations between the independent variables that are
centred arollnd their country means (used in the year-level equation in the multi-level
analysis), are that between the percentage of mobility and the standard ofliving (0.78)
and that between the centred percentage in manual jobs and standard of living (-0.58).
7. Analyses were conducted using the ML3 computer program. In ,ML3, all equations are
estimated simultaneously, producing maximum-likelihood estimates of the coefficients
(for a more detailed account, see Prosser et al. 1991).
8. To test whether the bivariate results can be replicated when using the multi-level model,
we fitted eleven multi-level models like the one described, but including in each model
only one of the listed explanatory variables. The coefficients for the uncontrolled
bivariate effects of the explanatory. variables can be compared with the zero-order
correlations reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The estimated coefficients from the bivariate
multi-level model make clear that all variables judged significant in the simple zero-
order correlational analysis are significant when the data are modelled by a multi-level.
model. In addition, none of the variables that were not significant are then significant in
the multi-level model. Thus, the bivariate multi-level model results replicate those
obtained from calculating the zero-order correlations. This outcome is not all that
obvious; whereas the coefficients in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 do not take into account the
number of individuals observed for one year-country Thomsen index, the coefficients in
the bi-va-nate mode! do so.
9. We also estimated a model including only variables at the country level and a model
including only variables' at the year level. The estimated coefficients were very similar
to the model presented in the text. Therefore, the conclusions drawn were the same.
10. In the model presented in the text, no covariance terms between the constant and the
variable manual were included. To check whether the inclusion of covariance terms
would yield different conclusions for our hypotheses tests, we estimated a model
containing these covariance terms. The conclusions obtained from the parameter
estimates of this model, however, are the same as in the "no-covariance model".
11. In our dataset used for the multi-level analyses (N=287), the correlations of 'Year' with
the variables centred around their country means are: standard of living (0.87), percen-
tage manual workers ("0.60), percentage mobile (0.72), and union density (0.22).
12. In some countries, the limited number of cases generated some strange trend parameters
for the explanatory variables. Therefore, we also calculated the correlations between the
trend parameters, while weighting for the number of cases in each country. These
correlations were: class voting with standard of living -0.35 (p=O.07), percentage manual
workers 0.00 (p=0.50), percentage mobile -0.04 (p=O.44), and union density -0.46
(p=0.02). Thus, these yielded the same conclusions.
13. We will return to this in the final chapter.
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5 Effects of composition of manual and nonmanual classes on
manuaVnonmanual class voting
1. Part of this chapter is based upon a paper - in collaboration with Nan Dirk de Graaf -
presented at the World Congress of Sociology of the International Sociological Associ-
ation in Bielefeld, 1994. A revised version of this chapter (Nieuwbeerta & De Graaf
1996) will appear in a book titled "The End of Class Politics7" edited by G. Evans.
2. These scholars' arguments primarily concern trends, in the levels of class voting across
countries. However, since these arguments also have consequences for explaining
differences across countries in the levels of class voting, we have generalized their main
points.
3. For a recent discussion of rational choice theory and class voting see Weakliem &
Heath (l994a) and Mills (1994).
4. In Table 5.3, we collapsed surveys within certain periods. The trends in Table 5.4 are
estimated on the basis of the separate year tables. For this reason, the obtained trend
figures of Table 5.4 do not necessarily match the patterns in Table 5.3. The trends
reported in Table 5.4 give more accurate information on whether trends occurred in the
composition of the manual and nonmanual class, than does the information in Table 5.3.
5. An example may make this procedure clearer. If we would have calculated the Thomsen
index for Australia in the period 1961-1970 - assuming constant voting behaviour for
the EGP classes across countries and tiDle - we would have used the average voting
behaviour from the bottom row in Table 5.2 and the class distribution from the first row
in Table 5.3. Then calculations would have shown that - under this assumption - in the
manual class (56.9 *38.4 + 55.3*56.2 + 43.4*5.3)/100, or 55.2 per cent voted for a left-
wing party, and in the nonmanual class (40.6*21.5 + 32.6*48.8 + 29.8*8.7 +18.3*20.9)-
1100, or 31.1 per cent. TIlis would have resulted in a Thomsen index (for column B) of
log«(55.21(100-55.2))/«31.1/(100-31.1))), or 1.02. However, in the analyses reported in
column B in Table 5.5 we used data on the class distribution per year.instead of per
decade, but the procedure is the same.
6. All unstandardized effect parameter estimates differ significantly from zero at the 0.05
level.
7. In all countries, but in Australia and Italy, the unstandardized effects differ significantly
from zero at the 0.05 level. In Austria the estimated effect of "Thomsen index: Vote
constant" is insignificant. In Italy both effect estimates are insignificant.
6 Description of EGP class voting
1. This chapter is a revised version ofa paper presented at the Bi-annual Meeting of the
Dutch Sociological Association, Amsterdam, 1994.
2. For Belgium and Denmark the reference category is formed by a mixture of unskilled
manual class workers and agricultural labourers.
3. One could argue that our detailed class scheme also enables us to distinguish between
class specific processes of dealignment or realignment. For example, it is possible that
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the distances between the service class and the skilled manual class become smaller,
while at the same time the distances between the service class and the farmers grow. In
this study, however, we focus on the overall change in levels of class voting and. leave
the class specific dealignment and realignment processes for future research (see also
Chapter 10).
4. In order to fit the models we used GUM and the GUM macros as developed by Robert
Erikson. We thank him for making available these macros, and John Hendrickx and
Clive Payne for helping to adjust the maCrOS to our data.
5. It is, of course, interesting to investigate the existence of certain clusters of countries
with strong and less strong trends. However, we regard it informative to compare the
levels and trends in EGP class voting in all the countries with the levels and trends in
manual/nonmanual class voting. Furthermore, to determine which country belongs to
which cluster would require the comparison of a very large number of nested models.
The large amount of computer time it takes to estima~e the parameters of a single
model, i.e. about 24 hours CPU time, therefore was another reason we did no go into
this kind of analysis.
6. The l30j k parameters are not presented in this table, because they are of limited interest
since our concern is with class differences in voting behaviour and not with the absolute
popularity of left-wing parties.
7. Thus, indirectly these results for Finland and Ireland confirm our research strategy of
analysing many datasets for the countries under investigation.
8. The Pearson correlation between the entries in the first and the second main column is
0.98 (N=II, p=O.OOO).
9. The Pearson correlation between the entries of Tables 3.3 and 3.4 is 0.68 (N=I I,
p=O.Oll).
7 Effects of individual intergeueratioual class mobility ou votiug behaviour
1. Part of this chapter is based upon an artiyle published in the American Journal of
Sociology on the effects of class mobility on political preferences in four countries (De
Graaf, Nieuwbeerta & Heath 1995).
2. Evidence on the existence of such countermobility is given by - among others - Girod
(1971) and Goldthorpe (1980).
3. Ideally, we would have liked to have tested the hypothesis "The voting behaviour of
mobile people that have been a long time in their class of destination will be closer to
the typical voting behaviour of this class relative to that of their class of origin, than
will the voting behaviour of mobile people who have been a short period in their class
of destination". However, no information on respondent's mobility careers was available
in our data. Nevertheless, knowing that most intergenerational class mobility takes place
at a relatively early stage of the occupational career with little occurring between the
broad classes which we have identified after the age of 35 (Goldthorpe 1980: 69-71),
the hypothesis formulated in the text forms a suitable alternative.
4. We would like to add that this hypothesis is not just the prediction that voting behav-
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iour will be a weighted average between origin and destination. The literature on social
mobility and political preference often suggests that voting behaviour is not just a
weighted average between class of origin and class of destination, but that due to the
'shock of mobility' (comparable to the often-assumed status inconsistency effect)
mobility has an extra independent effect. Turner (1992) labelled this the effect of
mobility per se. The literature elaborating on such a mobility hypotheses, however, is
rather vague and lacks precision. This can be illustrated by the recent work of Kelley
(1992) which states that mobile persons "may not be fUlly at home, nor fully excepted,
in either class. This might lead to alienation and anomie, and perhaps to disenchantment
with the social order and support for radical change. Or it might lead to extremism of
the Left or the Right, according to the historical circumstance. Thus there are
many reasons to think that there is something more to social mobility than merely class
of origin and present class position, that there is something to the experience of mobility
per se." (1992: 32; italics ours). We feel that our status maximization hypothesis is a
more specific hypothesis on mobility effects.
5. For a comparison of diagonal models with the conventional ones see Hendrickx et al.
(1993). For an application of these models in the case of a multinomial dependent
variable see Nienwbeerta & Wittebrood (1995).
6. These models are also known as diagonal reference models (De Graaf & Ganzeboom
1990; De Graaf 1991; Clifford & Heath 1993).
7. Sobel's original model ~as designed for ordinal dependent variables. Because we have
to deal with a binomial dependent variable (left-wing v!rsus right-wing) we..fitted
instead of Sobel's original model a logistic version of that model.
8. We assumed the restriction that 0 :::; p :::; 1. The parameter p, however, does not have this
restriction in the estimating procedure. In order to get the best fit of the data in the
iterative procedure p might go higher than one or lower than zero. The diagonal
reference models do not offer the appropriate design when p does not fit in the 0-1
interval. However, this only arose for Canada, as the figures in Table 7.4 show.
9. We also fitted a dummy variable for each year instead of for each period. Using a
dummy for each year, however, results in a large number of parameters. Since the
reduction of these parameters by applying five year periods did not change our results
significantly we preferred to apply these periods.
10. See note 8.
8 Contextual effects of intergenerational class mobility
on voting bebaviour
1. This chapter is an adaptation of a paper presented at the World Congress of Sociology
in Bielefeld, 1994. Part of this chapter is also based upon an article published in the
American Journal of Sociology on the e~ects of class mobility on political preferences
in four countries (De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta & Heath 1995).
2. The multi-level analyses were conducted using the ML3 computer program (Prosser et
al. 1991).
Notes
9 Macro-effects of intergenerational class mobility on class voting
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1. This chapter was presented at a colloquium at the Department of Sociology of the
University in Nijmegen, 1994.
2. Note that the presented voting figures in Tables 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 should be the same as
the corresponding figures in Tables 5.2 and 6.1. It is only due to rounding errors
resulting from the calculations that some are not.
3. See note 2.
4. The Thomsen and kappa index for the presented (and rounded) log-odds-ratios yield
slightly different values. However, we prefer to present the figures based on the
unrounded log-odds-ratios.
5. Note that this equation is similar to the parametrization of the diagonal mobility models
as developed by Sobel (1981, 1985), and as applied in Chapter 7.
6. Although we regard analysing the outcomes of the counterfactual analyses with the
model discussed as substantively more appropriate, following Erikson (1990) we also
analysed the outcomes of the counterfactual analyses· by a simple analysis of variance.
The results of these later analyses confirmed the conclusions drawn·oin this chapter. Only
a very small percentage - if any - of variance in class voting was accounted for by
variation in mobility patterns. For example, analysis of variance applied to the entries of
Tables 9.5 and 9.7 yield that variation between the mobility patterns accounts for
respectively 8 and 2 per cent of the total variation, and variation between the voting
patterns accounts for 58 and 96 percent (leaving 35 and 2 percent of the variation to
interaction).
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Samenvatting
In bijna alle industriele landen waar burgers het recht hebben te sternrnen bij
verkiezingen, is hun sociale positie - in het bijzonder hun klasse - een belangrijke
determinant van hun stemgedrag. Omdat mensen in de lagere sociale klassen meer
geneigd zijn op een linkse politieke partij te stemmen dan mensen in de hogere
klassen, kan gesproken worden van een "democratische klassenstrijd".
De onderhavige studie richt zich op deze democratische klassenstrijd door drie
soorten vragen te beantwoorden naar de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag in
twintig democratische industriele landen. Deze vragen zijn - hoewel diverse malen
eerder gesteld - tot dusverre niet adequaat beantwoord. Allereerst zijn beschrij-
vingsvragen gesteld naar de sterkte van de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag in
Westerse industriele landen in de naoorlogse periode. Ten tweede zijn verkla-
ringsvragen gesteld om de verschi1len tussen landen en de ontwikkelingen in die
landen in deze sterkte teverklaren. Ten derde concentreert deze studie zich op
vragen naar de effecten van intergenerationele klasse mobiliteit op individueel
stemgedrag.
Bij het beantwoorden van deze drie soorten vragen is voortgebouwd op een
lange geschiedenis van onderzoek naar sociale stratificatie en politiek. Deze
geschiedenis kan worden verdeeld in drie generaties. Gedurende deze generaties is
aanzienlijke vooruitgang geboekt in de forrnulering van onderzoeksvragen, de
toegepaste meetprocedures, de dataverzarneling en de analysemethoden. In studies
van de eerste generatie zijn relatief vage onderzoeksvragen beantwoord door
tabellen te analyseren die gebaseerd waren op een beperkte hoeveelheid gegevens
en op eenvoudige klasse indelingen. In studies van de tweede generatie zijn pre-
.ciezere vragen gesteld en werden antwoorden veelal verkregen door gegevens te
analyseren met lineaire regressie technieken. Studies van de derde generatie
stelden nog preciezere onderzoeksvragen en beantwoorden deze aan de hand van
gedetailleerde en gestandaardis~erde klassen schema's, gegevens van grootschali-
ge (intemationaal) vergelijkbare onderzoeken en niet-lineaire onderzoektechnie-
ken. Om in onderhavige studie voort te bouwen op deze ontwikkelingen, zijn
klassieke vragen die in alle drie generaties zijn gesteld, precies geformuleerd en is
gebruik gemaakt van gedetailleerde meetprocedures, geavanceerde analysetech-
nieken en dataverzarnelingen die voomarnelijk uit de derde generatie voortkomen.
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Data en operationalisering
c
De gegevens die geanalyseerd zijn in deze studie komen van twee dataverzame-
lingen. De eerste dataverzameling bestaatuit gegevens van twintig Westerse
industriele democratische landen - alle West-Europese landen, Australie, Canada
en de Vereuigde Staten van Amerika - in de periode 1945-1990. Deze dataset
bevat gegevens over de verschillen in stemgedrag tussen arbeiders en uiet-
arbeiders en gegevens over de sociale en po1itieke situatie in die landen. De
tweede dataverzameling bevat gegevens van individuen uit 113 nationaal repre-
sentatieve studies die zijn gehouden in zestien van de genoemde twintig landen in
de periode 1956-1990. Voor Griekenland, Luxemburg, Portugal en Spanje zijn
geen individuele gegevens opgenomen. Het gebruik van beide grote dataverza-
melingen in deze studie geeft de mogelijkheid betrouwbare antwoorden te
.verkrijgen op de gestelde onderzoeksvragen en reduceert de kans om hypothesen
te verwerpen die in werkelijkheid juist zijn.
Om de klassepositie van mensen te meten zijn twee procedures gebruikt.
AJlereerstis het traditionele arbeider versus uiet-arbeider onderscheid gehanteerd.
Daarnaast is een klasse schema gebruikt dat is ontwikkeld door Erikson, Gold-
thorpe en Portocarero, het zogenaarnde "EGP" klasse schema. Dit EGP schema is
gedetailleerder en onderscheidt zeven klassen. Binnen de arbeiders wordt een
onderscheid gemaakt tussen ongeschoolde, geschoolde en agrarische arbeiders.
Binnen de uiet-arbeiders worden de service klasse managers, routine hoofdar-
beiders, kleine zelfstandigen en boeren onderscheiden.
Om de sterkte van de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag te meten zijn diverse
maten gehanteerd. Allereerst is de traditionele maat voor de sterkte van deze
relatie, de Alford index, gebruikt. Deze index geeft het absolute verschil aan
tussen het percentage arbeiders dat stemt op een linkse politieke partij en het
percentage uiet-arbeiders dat stemt op een linkse partij. Daarnaast is een maat
voor het relatieve verschil in stemgedrag gebruikt, namelijk de log-odds-ratio.
Deze log-adds-ratio, die Thomsen index is genoemd, is de natuurlijke logaritrne
van de ratio van de odds voor arbeiders am op een linkse dan weI rechtse partij
te stemmen en de overeenkomstige odds voor niet-arbeiders. Verder zijn maten
gehanteerd voor de sterkte van de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag wanneer
meerdere sociale klassen worden onderscheiden.
Beschrijving van de sterkte van de relatie
tussen klasse en stemgedrag
Sinds het beginvan onderzoeknaar de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag hebben
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studies laten zien dat de sterkte van deze relatie verschilt tussen landen. Daarnaast
hebben diverse onderzoeken laten zien dat de sterkte van deze relatie in de meeste
landen is afgenomen sinds de tweede wereldoorlog. Deze conclusies komen met
name uit studies van de eerste generatie, waarin de Alford index is gebruikt om
de sterkte van de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag te meten. Later zijn echter
twijfels geuit over deze conclusies. In studies van de derde generatie is gesteld
dat de gevonden verschillen in Alford indices niet alleen veroorzaakt kunnen zijn
door verschillen in de sterkte van de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag, maar
ook door verschillen in de algemene populariteit van politieke partijen. Daarnaast
zouden verschillen in Alford indices veroorzaakt kunnen worden door verschilien
in de compositie van de arbeidersklasse en de niet-arbeidersklasse. Onderzoekers
van de derde generatie veronderstelden daarom dat beschrijvingen van de sterkte
van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag tot andere conclusies zouden kunnen
leiden, wanneer maten worden gebruikt die relatieve verschillen in stemgedrag
tussen meerdere klassen vaststellen.
In de onderhavige studie is de houdbaarheid van deze veronderstelling onder-
zocht. Hiervoor is de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag
beschreven met de Alford index, de Thomsen index en met maten die het verschil
in stemgedrag tussen EGP klassen samenvatten. Deze verschillende analyses
leveren gelijke conclusies op. Er bestaan belangrijke verschillen in de sterkte van
de relatie tussen klasse en stemgedrag tussen democratische industriele landen in
de naoorlogse periode. Van alle onderzochte landen is in de Scandinavische
landen en in Brittannie het sterkste verband aanwezig, en in de Verenigde Staten
en in Canada het zwakste. Verder is in een groot aantallanden de sterkte van het
verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag afgenomen in de naoorlogse periode. De
afname is het grootst in de Scandinavische landen, gevolgd door Duitsland en
Brittannie. In Canada, Ierland, Luxemburg, Nederland en Zweden heeft geen
systematische substantiele afuame in de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en
stemgedrag plaatsgevonden. Het feit dat de verscliillende analyses dezelfde
conclusies opleveren, houdt - zoals we later nog zul1en aangeven - echter niet in
dat de veronderstellingen van de onderzoekers van de derde generatie onjuist
waren.
Verklaringen voor verschillen in de sterkte van het verband tussen
klasse en stemgedrag
In deze studie zijn drie verklaringen onderzocht voor de variatie tussen landen en.
tussen tijdstippen in de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag. De
eerste verklaring, die direct te maken heeft met de hierboven genoemde beschrij-
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vingen van de sterkte van dit verband, heeft betrekking op de samenstelling van
de arbeiders- en de niet-arbeidersklasse in een land op een bepaald tijdstip. De:ze
compositie verklaring veronderstelt dat verschillen tussen landen en tijdstippen in
de mate waarin de arbeiders en de niet-arbeidersklasse in stemgedrag van elkaar
verschillen, (in zekere mate) verklaard kunnen worden door verschillen tussen
deze landen en tijdstippen in de compositie van de arbeiders- en de niet-arbei-
dersklasse. Deze verklaring is diverse malen gesuggereerd door onderzoekers van
de derde generatie, maar nooit direct getoetst. Om deze verklaring te toetsen is in
deze studie gebruik gernaakt van de gegevens van de individuele dataset. Hierbij
is verondersteld dat binnen de arbeiders- en niet-arbeidersklasse relevante sub-
klassen op basis van het EGP klasse schema kunnen worden onderscheiden.
De toetsing van deze compositie verklaring heeft uitgewezen dat ongeveer een
kwart van de verschillen tussen democratische industriele landen in de mate
waarin arbeiders en niet-arbeiders verschillen in stemgedrag, verklaard kunnen
worden door verschillen tussen die landen in de samenstelling van de arbeiders en
niet-arbeidersklasse. Daarnaast kan ongeveer een vijfde van de veranderingen
binnen deze landen in de mate waarin de arbeiders en niet-arbeiders verschillen in
stemgedrag worden verklaard door veranderingen in de compositie van de
arbeiders en niet-arbeidersklasse. Deze resultaten betekenen een bevestiging van
de compositie verklaring, maar laten tevens zien dat het grootste deel van de
verschillen tussen landen en perioden in de mate waarln arbeiders en niet-
arbeiders verschillen in stemgedrag, worden veroorzaakt door (echte) verschillen
in het stemgedrag van de klassen.
De tweede verklaring voor verschillen tussen landen en veranderingen binnen die
landen in de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag, betreft de
effecten van sociale en politieke kenmerken van landen. Hypothesen over de
effecten van deze landen kenmerken zijn zowel in studies van de eerste als van de
derde generatie diverse malen gesuggereerd, maar zijn echter veelal vaag gefor-
muleerd en niet onderworpen aan sterke empirische toetsingen. In onderhavige
studie zijn daarom verschillende hypothesen geformuleerd en getoetst met
gegevens van de landen dataset.
De toetsingen van de hypothesen resulteren in enigszins verschillende conclu-
sies voor verschillen tussen landen en ontwikkelingen binnen landen in de sterkte
van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag. De verschillen tussen landen blijken
in zekere mate verklaard te kunnen worden door verschillen in religieuze en
etuische diversiteit tussen de landen en door verschillen in vakbondsdichtheid
tussen de landen: des te kleiner de religieuze en etuische diversiteit en des te
groter de vakbondsdichtheid in een land, des te sterker is de relatie tussen klasse
en stemgedrag in dat land. Verschillen tussen landen in inkomensongelijkheid, de
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relatieve omvang van de arbeidersklasse, de algemene levensstandaard en de mate
waarin klasse-tegenstellingen in de politiek aanwezig zijn, blijken geen rol te
spelen. Wei is een effect - in onverwachte richting - gevonden van de mate van
intergenerationele mobiliteit: des te groter het percentage intergenerationeel
mobiele personen in een land, des te sterker is het verband' tussen klasse en
stemgedrag in dat land.
De veranderingen binnen landen in de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en
stemgedrag kunnen in zekere mate worden verklaard door veranderingen in de
algemene levensstandaard: des te hoger de levensstandaard in een land wordt, des
te zwakker wordt het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag. Daarnaast bleek een
(sterkere) toenarne in het percentage vakbondsledenin een land te leiden tot een .
(sterkere) afnarne in de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag in dat
land. Dit wordt voornarnelijk veroorzaakt doordat in sommige landen een algeme-
ne toenarne in vakbondslidrnaatschap gepaard gaat met een relatief sterke toenarne
in het percentage vakbondsleden onder niet-arbeiders.
Een derde verklaring voor verschillen tussen landen en perioden in de sterkte van
het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag betreft de zogenaamde macro-effecten
van intergenerationele klasse mobiliteit. Deze verklaring heeft een lange traditie in
studies naar stratificatie en politiek. Sombart wees er bijvoorbeeld al op in zijn
klassieke studie naar het ontbreken van het socialisme in de Verenigde Staten.
Omdat in eerdere studies niet voldoende gedetailleerde en intemationaal vergelijk-
bare gegevens over mobiliteit en stemgedrag van klassen beschikbaar waren, zijn
tot dusverre geen serieuze toetsingen van deze verklaring verricht. Met behulp
van deindividuele dataset, die gegevens bevat van individuen in zestien landen
voor de periode 1956-1990, is in onderhavige studie deze verklaring getoetst.
Ondanks het grote aantal studies waarin gesuggereerd is dat er een macro-
effect van intergenerationele mobiliteit bestaat op de sterkte van het verband
tussen klasse en stemgedrag in een land, blijkt echter dat verschillen tusse.\l
landen en perioden in de sterkte van dat verband niet kunnen worden verklaard
door verschillen in patronen van intergenerationele klasse mobiliteit tussen die
landen en perioden. Dit blijkt zowel het geval wanneer onderscheid wordt
gemaakt tussen arbeiders en niet-arbeiders, als wanneer zeven EGP klassen ..
worden onderscheiden.
Effecten van klasse mobiliteit op individueel stemgedrag
Behalve dat in deze studie de macro-effecten van intergenerationele mobiliteitspa-
tronen op de sterkte van het verband tussen klasse en stemgedrag in een land zijn
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onderzocht, zijn ook de effecten van intergenerationele klasse mobiliteit op indivi-
dueel stemgedrag nagegaan.
Allereerst zijn de effecten onderzocht van individuele intergenerationele klasse
mobiliteit op het stemgedrag van intergenerationeel mobiele individuen. Deze
effecten zijn al in studies van de eerste en tweede generatie onderzocht, maar in
deze studies is dit voomamelijk gedaan door het bekijken van percentages in
tabellen die gebaseerd waren op een klein aantal respondenten of door het
toepassen van inhoudelijk ongeschikte lineaire regressie modellen. In de onderha-
vige studie zijn de effecten van mobiliteit op individueel stemgedrag onderzocht
op een wijze die karakteristiek is voor studies van de derde generatie. De
houdbaarheid van verschillende hypothesen is onderzocht door met niet-lineaire
modellen gegevens te analyseren van de individuele dataset.
Uit deze analyses blijkt dat in aIle landen - behalve Canada - het stemgedrag
van de intergenerationeel mobiele personen zich bevindt tussen het kenrnerkende
stemgedrag van hun bestemmingsklasse en dat van hun oorspronkelijke klasse. De
uitkomsten van de analyses laten verder zien dat in deze landen het effect van de
bestemmingsklasse groter is dan het effect van de oorsprong klasse. Daarnaast
blijkt in zeven landen - Brittannie, Denemarken, Duitsland, Finland, Nederland,
Oostenrijk en de Verenigde Staten - het stemgedrag van oudere intergenerationeel
mobiele personen dichter bij het kenrnerkende stemgedrag van hun bestemmings-
klasse te liggen, dan dat van jongere intergenerationeel mobiele personen. Voor
intergenerationeel mobiele personen van 18 jaar is het effect van de oorspronke1ij-
ke klasse ongeveer even groot als het effect van de bestemmingsklasse. Voor
mobiele personen van 65 jaar is het effect van de bestemmingsklasse daarentegen
twee maa1 zo groot als dat van de oorspronkelijke klasse. Voor de oudere res-
pondenten blijft hun oorspronkelijke klasse echter een substantieel effect behou-
den op hun stemgedrag. De analyses wijzen verder uit dat personen die opwaarts
mobiel zijn zich -niet meer richten op het kenrnerkende stemgedrag van hun
bestemmingsklasse, dan personen die neerwaarts intergenerationeel mobiel zijn.
Naast de effecten van individuele intergenerationele klasse mobiliteit zijn in deze
studie ook contextuele effecten van mobiliteit op individueel stemgedrag onder-
zocht. Met name in studies van de eerste generatie zijn hypothesen over deze
contextuele effecten veelvuldig geformuleerd. Op basis hiervan zijn in onderhavi-
ge studie twee hypothesen opgesteld. De eerste luidt: Des te groter de mate van
instroom in een klasse uit linkse klassen, des te groter is de kans dat irnmobiele
personen in die klasse stemmen op een linkse politieke partij. De tweede hypothe-
se luidt: Des te groter de mate van uitstroom in een klasse naar linkse klassen,
des te groter is de kans dat irnmobiele personen in die klasse stemmen op een
linkse politieke partij. am deze hypothesen te toetsen zijn gegevens van de
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individuele dataset geanalyseerd. Hierdoor was informatie beschikbaar over een
groot aantal individuen in zeven klassen in zestien landen en in verscheidene
jaren, en dus in vele contexten. Bij het analyseren van deze gegevens zijn echter
geen significante contextuele effecten gevonden vande mate van intergeneratio-
nele klasse mobiliteit op het stemgedrag van de intergenerationeel immobiele
personen in de diverse sociale klassen.
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